SERBS AND CROATS BETWEEN NEGOTIATIONS AND WAR

Summary: There are no extremely sharp reactions to the decision of President Tudjman to refuse the hospitality to UNRPOFOR. War would be disastrous and it would last too long. Milosevic wishes to continue negotiations and he is exerting pressure on Knin to find a political solution.

AIM, Belgrade, January 17, 1995 The decision of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on refusing to prolong the mandate of UNPROFOR from March 31 this year, was received with comparatively lukewarm comments in Belgrade and Knin, with no war rhetorics and with the conviction that it is not a "fait accompli".

The leader of the Serbs from Krajina, Milan Martic, said that Tudjman was forced to make such a decision in order to pacify internal political passions and maintain power, noting that the UNPROFOR did not have to leave the territory controlled by the Serbs.

Foreign Minister and the former hard-core leader of Krajina, Milan Babic, issued a statement assessing briefly that Zagreb was not competent to decide about the destiny of the UNPROFOR, since the decision on the deployment of peace forces had not been made by Croatia in the first place, but by the UN "in agreement with Krajina". Therefore, according to his opinion, the decision on withdrawing could also be made only by the UN in agreement with Krajina.

There are no sharp reactions from Belgrade either. Serbian media, it seems, were even a little confused with this decision, and the leading daily, "Politika", which is close to the ruling circles, did not even publish it on the front page, but somewhere inside. On the same page, the statement of Krajina Prime Minister, Borislav Mikelic, was carried, in which he spoke favourably about the progress of negotiations with Zagreb.

Since the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg visited Belgrade just before New Year's eve, who must have been informed, at last indirectly, about Tudjman's intentions, it is hard to believe that President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic was not.

Total absence of at least a declaratory announcement that in the case of escalation of the conflict, Belgrade was ready to help Krajina can, therefore, in no way be attributed to conflusion and surprise caused by Tudjman's decision. Milosevic either knows that Tudjman will not send troops to Krajina, or wishes to use the tension and confusion created in Knin as additional pressure on the Serbs there to reach a political agreement with Zagreb as soon as possible.

How the UNPROFOR were deployed

The UN Protection Forces were deployed in Croatia, in territories controlled by the Serbs from Krajina, and the Croatian authorities in March 1992, based on the Vance Plan and a UN Resolution. At the time, the leadership of Krajina Serbs unwillingly accepted their deployment after an exlicit presure was exerted by Belgrade.

Their acceptance was preceded by a marathon session of the Presidency of former Yugoslavia, where resistance of the former leader Milan Babic was crushed. Now he is the Minister of foreign affairs of Krajina.

According to the reports and statements published in the press at the time, former Yugoslavia guaranteed Knin that it would intervene with its army should Croatia send troops to Krajina. Knin still refers to such promises, but they have, obviously, never been given in writing.

The UNPROFOR came, according to a UN Resolution, to maintain peace, and the two parties interpreted their arrival each in its own way. The Serbs from Krajina kept repeating that they were here to protect them, and Croatian authorities demanded from the international forces to enable reestablishment of Croatian authorities on the territory of Krajina.

During the past three years, the UN stuck to the basic idea of maintaining peace, but with a remark that they considered Croatia a sovereign state, meaning that they did not recognize the statehood of Krajina. Towards the end of last year, the Security Council explicitly repeated on several occasions that Krajina is considered as Croatian territory.

But, the UN have also refused to be directly engaged on Croatian side, sticking strictly to the mandate of peace protection. This increased nervousness inside Croatia where the rightists constantly exerted pressure in order to reintegrate the territory of Krajina into Croatia, by either military or political means.

What would war bring

According to some assessments, Croatia can nowadays mobilise almost 200 thousand soldiers, that it has more than 200 tanks at its disposal, some fifty airplanes and helicopters, and that its troops are well armed, equipped and trained, despite the arms importation embargo.

The Serbs in Krajina can hardly mobilise more than 60 thousand soldiers, and the advantage in tanks and heavy armament they had at the beginning of the war, disappeared in the meantime, after Croatia armed itself quite well. From this aspect, they would not be capable of resisting a Croatian offensive of large proportions for long, with no help on the side.

Despite this fact, however, Croatian readiness to choose the military option should not be taken as an accomplished fact, since the entire international community is opposed to such a solution, and Zagreb can hardly resist its will. A possible war could last long in spite of their obvious military superiority, and it is not quite certain what consequences it would have on political and other circumstances in Belgrade. There is also the possibility of the Bosnian Serbs getting involved in the conflict.

To state it simply, a military solution could be accepted only as an accomplished fact, that is, in case Croatian forces managed to complete the operation in just a few days, with no excess of bloodshed and only on the territory of Krajina. Zagreb in fact cannot be sure that such an option is feasible.

Remonstration of the international community

From this aspect, refusal to prolong the mandate of UNPROFOR could rather be interpreted as a means of political pressure to find a peaceful solution for reintegration of Krajina into Croatia, than as an announcement of readiness to force it out, "by military means, if necessary".

Just a few days after Tudjman has revealed his decision, the loud support to this move in Zagreb gradually started to diminish. On Tuesday, Tudjman met the American Ambassador, Peter Galbright, who conveyed the concern of Washington caused by the refusal to prolong the mandate of UNPROFOR, and on the same day, the Security Council reacted similarly by issuing a Presidential statement and calling Zagreb to reconsider its decision.

The Serbian party appears to count on such development, and that is where reasons for its restrained reactions should be sought. Should the pressure of the international community on Zagreb be strong enough, Milosevic will certainly try to increase pressure on the confused Knin in order to accelerate negotiations on finding a political solution of the crisis. In any case, the fact that official Belgrade has not mentioned either statehood or independence of Krajina for months should not be disregarded.

A political solution is demanded from Milosevic by the international community which has imposed sanctions on Serbia and which will keep them until it believes that Milosevic can influence pacifying of the conflict in former Yugoslav space.

It might, therefore, happen that the following a month and a half until the UNPROFOR can remain in Croatia, will pass in a specific combination of pressure by the world on Zagreb to abandon the idea od refusing tha mandate to peace forces, and pressure by Belgrade on Knin to find a formula for a political agreement with Croatia.

Dragan Janjic