TUDJMAN REALLY MEANS IT

AIM, OSIJEK, January 13, 1994 " I am addressing you in the historical moment when I have reached - in accordance to my Constitutional competences - the decision on cessation of the mandate of peace forces on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, on the day when their present mandate expires - on March 31 this year". With these words, on Thursday evening, addressing the nation on state television, Dr. Franjo Tudjman confirmed what was already leaked in the past few days from sources close to the authorities in Zagreb, and what the Croatian President himself had already anticipated on several occasions already. Namely, first on Monday, having received culture workers, Tudjman said that in the following few days he would reach a decision "which might bear a historical significance for the Croatian people". On Tuesday, at a reception for a part of ambassadors accredited in Zagreb - as state news agency HINA reported - "he informed the diplomats about the intended decisions of the Republic of Croatia concerning UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia", and, finally on Wednesday, he sent his envoys all the way from Washington and Moscow, to Paris, Bruxelles, Bonn and London, to explain Croatia's intentions in world capitals.

Tudjman's address to the nation was unusually short, especially after his recent two-and-a-half hour long speech in the best tradition of Fidel Castro given in the Croatian Assembly. The first assessments are that the anticipated dramatic note which was felt in the announcements just preceeding Tudjman's presentation. The Croatian President did his best to explicitly put everything in its right place: he admitted that in the beginning of its mandate, the UNPROFOR had achieved "at first, undoubtedly, positive results". Then he accused the rebellious Serbs that they were guilty for the failure of implementation of Vance's plan, and finally he added that "those Serbian nationalists among Belgrade leaders who wished to incorporate them in Greater Serbia are even more to blame".

Trying not to say a word unfavourable for UNPROFOR (on the contrary, the President expressed his gratitude and appreciation), Tudjman then stressed that by calling off the mandate to peace forces, Croatia was in no way abandoning "its firm intention to return the occupied territories in a peaceful manner into the integral economic, and state and legal system of Croatia". He did not use the customary "but", which not only in his speeches, but those of other Croatian politicians on similar occasions, was always followed by the remark that, should peaceful reintegration prove to be impossible, there was always the military option left. He rephrased the usual expression by the statement that "Croatia will stand firmly in defence of its national and state interests, but that it will also continue pursuing its constructive peaceful policy".

To the Serbs in "Krajina", he guaranteed again "all human and ethnic rights according to the highest standards of international conventions", and to Belgrade, he sent word that he would "in direct negotiations and within the aspirations of the international community", continue with the efforts on normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations. He repeated his old thesis that normalization was possible only after mutual recognition, assessing that this would be "in the interest of creating conditions for the new international order in this part of Europe".

Even a superficial analysis of Tudjman's address to the nation in which he explained reasons for calling off the new mandate to peace forces, as well as the intentions of Croatia to persist in peaceful reintegration of its occupied territories, shows that he avoided strong words, ultimatums, and most of all threats. He wished to leave the impression of determination, but he also wished to leave the door slightly open (especially in his letter to the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali), in order to be able to find an honourable way out for both parties, should things become too compicated.

One of the key issues is certainly why Tudjman chose this very moment to come out with the decision on discharging the UNPROFOR, when it was much more logical to expect that he would have done it in the middle of last year, at the time when refugees blocked the protection forces and at the time of programmed general disapproval of UNPROFOR. Tudjman's calling off the UNPROFOR followed the first indications of slight "loosening the strain" in the relations between Zagreb and Knin. Towards the end of December last year, after 40 months of interruption, 27 kilometres of the occupied part of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway were open to traffic. During three wekks since the road has been opened, not a single incident occurred, and on the very day Tudjman made his decision, it was publicised that all symbols would be removed from the road except the international signs. Namely, Croatian authorities have protested with the UNPROFOR on several occasions because at the entrance and the exit from the UNPA zone "West", Serbian militia stood guard, and insignia and flags of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina". Only a day after the "resolute decision", as Tudjman called his intention to dismiss UNPROFOR, the chief Croatian negotiator with Knin, Hrvoje Sarinic was exceptionally satisfied with the latest round of talks with Borislav Mikelic on the implementation of the economic agreement. For the first time since the beginning of these talks we have made a deal", he said to the journalists, explaining that symbols of "Krajina" would be removed from the highway by January 17, that Croatia would deliver electrodes for the Obrovac power plant, and then, on January 23, open the Northern side of the oil pipeline.

Has Croatia felt that additional pressure on Knin, in the form of dismissal of the UNPROFOR, could contribute to quicker fulfillment of other Croatian demands stated in the economic agreement, such as opening of the highway and the railroad Zagreb-Knin-Split, and especially the beginning of return of refugees to their homes? Is the four-month ceasefire in Bosnia a sufficient guarantee to Croatia that bursting out of a new war in former Yugoslav space should not be expected now that it has abated in its most explosive part? Or has a hint arrived from Belgrade that Croatia should exert some pressure on Knin, after everything Milosevic had done? These are the questions which are still without answers, and which will eventually give a clearer answer whether Tudjman's dismissal of UNPROFOR was just a manoeuvre in order to obtain concessions from Knin, or just a firm decision to go for all or nothing.

Reactions to Tudjman's decision which have arrived in the meanwhile from the world, are not favourable to Croatia, so according to them it seems that it was, after all, an autonomous decision of Croatia to "decide about its own destiny", as it was once announced on election posters of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). It is, nevertheless, not impossible that Tudjman's decision is the result of pressure exerted by the rightist faction of the ruling party which is explicitly dissatisfied with the UNPROFOR and which would much rather solve the problem of occupied territories quickly and with armed forces, than gradually, through tedious negotiations. Before Tudjman's decision to tell UNPROFOR "go home", there were rumouurs in Zagreb political lobbies that the Croatian Assembly would not put the dispute on the mandate of UN peace forces on the agenda of its session to be held between January 17 and 20 (which is, it appears, postponed again for an indefinite period). The Assembly has, namely, reached a decision in autumn last year on a conditional prolonging of the mandate of blue helmets until January 10, after which the mandate would be called off. Perhaps Tudjman feared the discussion in the Assembly on this burning issue, because UNPROFOR's mandate is one of the main causes of conflicts and splits within the HDZ. The weakly majority the HDZ has in the Croatian Parliament after Mesic and Manolic have left it, could easily break on such an issue.

Although it might not mean anything much, but on Friday evening, a television program was cancelled at the last minute, in which Dr. Mate Granic, Minister of the Exterior, Gojko Susak, Minister of Defence, and three opposition leaders, Drazen Budisa (HSLS), Zlatko Tomcic (HSS) and Radomir Cacic (HNS) were expected to answer to the questions whether international pressure and threats could cause Croatia to waver, were military actions out of the question, and could the Security Council impose a new mandate on Croatia. It seems that the Croatian leadership was surprised by the unanimous stance of the international community that the decision of calling off the mandate of the UNPROFOR was made incautiously and rashly, and that it probably was a possible introduction into a new war. This could be the reason why Granic and Susak avoided to face the public.

Although more than two and a half months are left until March 31, count-down has already started in Croatia. In the sphere of internal affairs, especially among the refugees, Tudjman's position has undoubtedly gained strength providing him with the glory of resoluteness which he had chronically lacked so far in their eyes. But, this is too serious a matter for just this one political point to be significant enough to make him persist in such a far-reaching decision. The eyes and the ears of Croatian leadership will be turned in the days to come towards New York, Washington, Moscow, Bonn, Paris, London and Bruxelles, where so far there have sounded neither ovations nor aplauses for Tudjman's "Historical decision".

DRAGO HEDL