RADOVAN KARADZIC'S SPECTACULAR COMEBACK

Following the Initiative Regarding Jimmy Carter's Mediating Mission

Summary: Pale essentially wishes to directly return to the negotiating process and to do so under its own terms. The fact that Karadzic's initiative received such attention in the American mass media is of much greater importance for the Serbs than its substance. In principle, the proposals contain no new elements and the the division of Bosnia is still insisted upon. Milosevic has reason to be concerned that he will no longer remain in the forefront.

AIM, BELGRADE, December 12, 1994

Even if it does not bring concrete results, the initiative of Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, on the continuation of the peace negotiations, with the mediation of the former American President Jimmy Carter, is of exceptional importance for Pale. Namely, owing to this initiative the local leadership has spectacularly reappeared on the Western mass media scene, from which it had been largely pushed in the background from the moment it refused to sign the peace plan.

The most well known TV network in the world, CNN, practically stopped broadcasting its programmes and devoted more than an hour of its time to the mentioned initiative which it characterized as "the most sensational news in the present phase of the Bosnian crisis." True enough, in the course of CNN's exceptionally valuable hour of time, Karadzic was not the sole speaker, but most of what was said referred to him and the Bosnian Serbs.

In addition to presenting the proposals which pertained to securing the free movement of humanitarian aid and all UNPROFOR personnel, a cease-fire and freeing of prisoners, Karadzic took advantange of the occasion to reassert Pale's view that it was meaningless to insist on the maps but rather that it was necessary to exert efforts for the creation of state entities "capable for life." More precisely, he repeated the stand that Bosnia should be divided and two separate and independent stated proclaimed within it : the Muslim-Croatian and the Serbian state. Politically speaking, therefore, the initiative is void of any new elements.

The first reactions to his statements on CNN could be reduced to the conclusion that if Pale is serious and if it keeps its world, something could come out of the whole affair. One can observe that criticism and denial of Karadzic's crucial point which implies the creation of an independent state of Bosnian Serbs, i.e., the division of Bosnia had been avoided and that everyone focused their attention on the proposal regarding the cessation of hostilities and lifting of blokade preventing the free movement of UNPROFOR personnel and humanitarian convoys. Possibly, news analysts are avoiding to speak of the political aspect of Karadzic's proposal as the more difficult and complicated side of the problem, but the fact remains that it was not met with hostility.

It should be borne in mind that Pale's signals to Washington are nothing new. Immediately after the introduction of the blockade on the Drina border, Karadzic dispatched envoys who tried to establish contact with officials from the American administration, but the results of such efforts have remained unknown. In circles close to the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade, almost a month ago there was "rumour" that Carter would be offered a mediating role, but such efforts were classified as "state secret." The former head of the American diplomacy, Henry Kissinger was mentioned in the same context, but it seems he showed less interest in getting involved in the Bosnian issue.

The fact that the Americans decided to go public with Karadzic's attempts to directly return to the negotiations on Bosnia is actually of crucial importance for the leadership in Pale. Namely, Pale is convinced and with good reason that both the American administration and the CNN are acquainted in detail with such efforts. Their disclosure, and in such a spectcular manner, with Karadzic's "live" appearance will most certainly be interpreted as a sign of the at least partial wilingness of Washington to negotiate among other things about the political requests of the Bosnian Serbs.

New negotiations are precisely what the Bosnian Serbs wish most at this point, naturally on condition that they avoid accepting the offered maps and constitutional solutions for Bosnia and Herzegovina. They believe they are within reach of the possibility to reap the fruit of their relentlessness and return to the negotiating table under conditions aceptable to them rather than those established by the Contact Group.

Actually, Karadzic's newest intiatitive does not imply any new concessions on the part of Pale. UNPRFOR's convoys have been blocked since the deterioration of relations with the UN and intensification of NATO's air-raids. The same goes for allowing humanitarian convoys to pass and the opening of the airport in Sarajevo. We are, therefore, dealing with additional measures introduced to exert pressure on the international community, something that would be easy to do away with if everything returned to the previous state, namely, to renewed negotiations without the stipulation of territorial delimitation and constitutional solutions. Likewise, Karadzic knows that it would be just as easy to re-institute them if things were to go in the wrong direction.

As much as Karadzic has reason to be content with the newest turn of events, the President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic has reason to be dissastisfied. Pale is striving, with increasing clarity and success, to assert itself as a direct and inevitable factor in the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia, deminishing in that way Milosevic's role, praised in Europe as the "key factor", in the achievement of peace.

There is more than sufficient proof that the "key factor" did not succeed in "doing his homework", namely, that he was not efficacious in exerting adequate pressure on Pale. If it turns out that the Western states have begun to show nervousness and loss of confidence in the actual scope of his influence, opting for direct contact with Karadzic, Milosevic could, as far as Bosnia is concerned, slide off to the sidetrack.

At this point, therefore, the vital question is whether the USA and other Western countries are ready to offer Karadzic the continuation of the negotitions without any pre-set conditions, and if so, in what form would they do so. Indicatively, the Contact Group did not respond to Pale's invitation to meet with the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and offer written guarantees in respect the most recent interpretation of the peace plan, but on the other hand it did not reject such an initiative either.

It is not completely clear whether Pale is seeking specific changes of the plan itself in advance, or whether it is ready to sign it (including the maps) with a written addendum that both the maps and the constitutional arrangements would be the subject of further discussions, namely, that it did not represent a final solution. It would be too much to expect of the Contact Group to accept the former, but it is likewise not impossible that it would offer quite serious and explicit guarantees for the latter.

One thing is certain however - after its military success in Western Bosnia and Herzegovina and the most recent signals from the West relating to the continuation of peace negotiations, Pale is not unconditionally going to sign the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Past events can further encourage the Bosnian Serbs to continue persisting on an independent Serbian state in Bosnia.

Dragan Janjic