CROATIA WILL NOT GO TO WAR

The decision of the Croatian Assembly, or better still of the party in power (HDZ) not to allow discussion about the agreement with the Serbs from Knin, the situation in Bihac and plans Z-4 and B2, proved to have been just showing force. But, since it was all carried by television, and the discussions published in the newspapers, it is debatable whether this was the victory of the majority or in fact, a further split within the HDZ and the first large point made by the opposition, because why would not Croatian citizens know what is signed in their name. Avoiding of the discussion is also best proof that Croatia has become a hostage of world politics and that its sovereignty has been limited to the right of Tudjman to declare what he has declared.

AIM, ZAGREB, December 6, 1994 The crisis in the Assembly is continuing. This short sentence was the comment of Ivica Racan on December 1, concerning the refusal of the HDZ, the leadership of the Assembly and the Government to discuss the agreement with the Knin Serbs and the situation in Bhac. After many big words (and even comparison with the long gone 1918, but 1971 too) because of an alleged disorder in the Assembly, Vladimir Seks announced that the session was interrupted and would continue on Tuesday at 11 a.m. Direct cause for interruption of the session, carried out in the manner of "training a coup", was the proposal not to vote about the Conclusion of the Internal Policy and National Security Board, which was probably a precedent in the history of world parliaments. Namely, probably nowhere in the world in normal parliaments, could it happen that the Chamber of Representatives had no right to give its opinion concerning conclusions of an agency subordinated to it, and to make things even more tragicomical, the mentioned Conclusions read as follows in their item six: "The Board was informed about the contents of a possible agreement with the members of local Serbs from occupied regions of the Republic of Croatia". This was a notorious untruth, because the only things deputies of Croatian Assembly had were photo-copies of the agreement published by the Belgrade daily "Borba" that day.

The attempts of the opposition deputies joined by several deputies of the ruling HDZ, were all in vain when they tried to prove that the agreement, signed in the meantime on December 2, was so well known to everyone that even Belgrade newspapers published it, that all the media of the "Krajina" blazoned about it, that it was discussed first by the Government and then by the so-called parliament of the self-proclaimed "Krajina" and that it would be high time that the Croatian deputies were informed about it. To heavy accusations that President Tudjman had left on a tourist journey to Argentina and Chile at the time war was waged in Croatia or at its doorstep, to demands that he returns immediately, to allegations that if the authorities had no confidence in the representatives of the people, some parties are taking an adequate attitude for themselves, the leaders of the Assembly remined silent and actually made all discussion impossible. This was repeated on Tuesday when Vladimir Seks calmly continued the session of the Chamber of Representatives as if nothing had happened. As if the agreement with Knin had not been signed, as if Tudjman had said nothing in Argentina and Budapest. In fact, a lot has happened. So much, that one may freely claim that the Balkan crisis has entered a new phase, but it is still impossible to see whether it was an introduction into a definite peace, or to a renewal of an even worse war.

Namely, even the Conclusions of the Internal Policy and National Security Board literally read as follows: "Enabling Serbian paramilitary terroristic groups to cross the internationally recognized border of the Republic of Croatia and attack in a criminal manner the territory of another sovereign state, Bosnia&Herzegovina, mainly towns of Bihac and Velika Kladusa, is so far the heaviest piece of evidence about the absurdity of UNPROFOR's further stay on occupied territories of Croatia. Therefore, the Board expresses its opinion that, in these conditions, there will be no reason for UNPROFOR to reman on the territory of Croatia". This would actually mean that Croatia will ask UNPROFOR to leave its territory in January, and a way out for reintegration of UNPA zones will be sought by other means, that is, in war if necessary.

Another great sign of a change is that Croatian units did not join in the Bihac conflicts, as Izetbegovic and Zubak demanded, but Croatia chose the so-called diplomatic option.

The third, it seems, the most significant, issue are the statements of Tudjman himself who said in Argentina that a conflict between civilizations is going on in B&H, and then he agreed with the proposal that a peaceful solution was possible only if the Serbs were allowed to enter a confederation with Serbia. The same as the Washington agreements planned for the Croats and the Muslims. Since it is difficult to assume that Tudjman would agree to a renewal of Yugoslavia, even if it did consist of loose confederate links, it is not difficult to foretell that this is actually relization of the idea about the division of Bosnia, but with the difference that in this case, Croatia would get Knin back as a reward. Silent approval of the new proposal of the Contact Group was repeated by Tudjman in Budapest, but this time he warned that the acute crisis around Bihac and the entire crisis in the former Yugoslav space was not just regional but global, and that it was not only peace and security of Soputh-East Europe at stake here, but of whole of Europe.

These three facts, according to some, are proof of indecisiveness, and according to others, they are just links in the chain of Croatian policy, but it seems that those who claim that these are just reflexes of world trends and weighing out of forces between the world powers, especially the USA and its European allies, are closest to the truth. Of course, haughty behavior in the Assembly, which serves as a decoration for a year already, and as an alibi to democracy, cannot win over the public, but obviously, Tudjman's "consistency" or "inconsistency" should primarily be measured by standards of world policy and real-political situation, where it is clear that neither NATO, nor the USA, UN or European Union wish to get further involved in this war, least of all to take sides. Those who have believed, after two NATO "video-games" that it was all over, were naive because the mechanisms of world politics are much more complicated than someone may think. Croatia has thus chosen a long march to peace, trying its best to avoid war as the outcome, which it knows, would be disastrous for it at the moment.

But, there are several questions that seek to be answered. Primarily, whether Tudjman has brought himself and Croatia into a position of a vassal by his rash moves, and whether the allegation that it was of no importance that he was playing tennis in Argentina was not essential, because Galbraith had remained in Zagreb, who had allegedly, stopped the Croatian army on November 19 which wanted to seize the opportunity of the Bihac crisis and attack "Krajina"? This allegation might be true, because according to military experts, there could be no better moment for it, but the truth is probably that it was all a media hoax, just to show that "we were ready, but they would not let us". That this is so, is best illustrated by the agreement signed on December 2 in Zagreb and Knin, because those opposed to it rightfully claim that "Krajina" got more than Zagreb.

The second question is whether anything of the sort could be done without allies? Some even ask: isn't it a fact that Croatia has not been able to create an adequate army in four war years simply because the aim of the Croatian Army is not to attack, but to preserve the existing authorities. Let us remember the statement of Tudjman that Croatia needs a party (HDZ) which will rule for decades in order to preserve its unity. Altogether, this arises the theses of a possible Croatian-Croatia conflict, making Tudjman's position even more complicated.

And finally, what is, in fact, opposition in Croatia, and what does it want? First, it should be said that the strongest opposition block is within the HDZ itself, although it is still maintaining party discipline. This is a large group of deputies who do not agree with the imposed peace policy and who would go to war at all costs and who take seriously threats that Croatia will apply "other means". Deputies of the Croatian Party of Rights think similarly, so its spokesman, Anre Sapic, declared that something must urgently be done, units of volunteers formed and similar. His colleague, Ante Prkacin (general of the Croatian Defense Coincil and the Army of B&H) is also in favour of war, if assessments of the force of Croatian Army are corerct. But there are those in favour of war among the Croatian Social Liberal Party, too, or the Croatian Peasants' Party, and some other. This all proves that there is actually no real opposition which would be capable of offering a different program, and not just tag after the reality, just as Tudjman is doing. The only thing that can be heard from the ranks of the opposition is that they want negotiations neither with Knin, nor with Milosevic, but they cannot tell what they want.

But, in spite of everything, although it semed just the opposite because the HDZ showed its arrogance once again, the opposition won its greatest parliamnetary victory on December 1. It is true that Seks suddenly and with no cause interrupted the session (he repeated it on December 6), but it was all seen by the citizens on TV screens, although it might have been part of a prepared scenario and a way to catch their breath. But it will be difficult to explain to the citizens of Croatia why they should not know what Sarinic is signing, what is happeneing around Bihac, what plab Z-4 and B2 contain. It all has to do with the lives of the citizens, and at the moment the deputies decided to raise their salaries, and there is no money for children's allowances, or Christmas aid for the retired and employed in state enterprises, and there are over two thirds of them.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC