BIHAC, CROATIAN-SERBIAN "YALTA" AND THE "ETERNAL DADDY"

Since Bihac together with Velika Kladusa and Cazin round off a space where Fikret Abdic has always had much greater influence than Alija Izetbegovic and his Government in Sarajevo, it is not impossible to imagine that the Serbian offensive on Bihac and breakig down the forces of the Fifth Corps is actually aimed at establishement of a puppet government of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, with the legendary "Daddy" at its head. If that option has actually been chosen, and it is quite possible that it has, Croatia would probably have nothing against having Abdic's state as its neighbour. In a way, it might even be more convenient for it than the Muslim authorities controlled by Sarajevo. With Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia - while it lasted - the Croats did not have a bad experience: it was an excellent and discrete go-between for all kinds of deals and transactions, which - should the region be controlled by Sarajevo - would probably be impossible.

AIM, OSIJEK, November 27, 1994. Croatia did not run to the aid of the Fifth Corps of the Army of B&H, because it had firm guarantees of the NATO that it would protect Croatian strategic interests with a decisive action. With these words, the Vice-Chiarman of the Croatian Assembly, Vladimir Seks, speaking last Saturday at the assembly of the Alliance of Exiles of Croatia in Osijek, explained with nonchalance, the Croatian stance concerning the agony of Bihac. In fact, Seks did also say that Croatian army was put on alert, ready to liberate the occupied region, should diplomatic attempts fail. He mentioned also strict time limits which had been fixed and, as he added, would not be abandoned. But, the latter is one of those "generalizations" in Croatian politics that not only the exiles, but the entire public have got tired of listening to in the past months and years.

Tudjman's journey to Chile and Argenttina ironically coincided with the entrance of Mladic's troops into the suburb of Bihac, clearly sending word to the domestic and the world public that Croatia does not intend to go to war on the eve of this winter. Namely, it would have been exptremely unusual for a country to go to war when its commander-in-chief was so far away from his commanding post. Tudjman did leave his Minister of Defence, Gojko Susak, behind, but everyone is aware that such an important decision as Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnbia&Herzegovina is one of those that cannot be made without Tudjman. The Latin America tour of the Croatian President which will last for days will probably be completed after things around Bihac will become much clearer than when he was starting on his journey. What is actually at stake here, and how can one explain Croatian lack of interest for the dramatic events in its closest neighbourhood, for what has publicly been declared to be a "strategic interest", and nothing is being done to protect it?

A part of the answer for the question why Croatia left its confederate partner in the lurch, obviously lies in a secret diplomatic mission going on in the direction Zagreb-Belgrade, with numerous mediators, negotiators and messangers. Everyone will notice that the negotiations between Zagreb and Knin, frozen for months, suddenly perked up at the time of the Bihac crisis and that the talks of the head of the Croatian Mission in Belgrade, Zvonimir Markovic, with the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, intensified especially in the past few days. Military involvement of Martic's forces on the side of Karadzic's troops would hardly be conceivable at the time of possible Croatian military engangement in liberation of its occupied territories. Did anyone give guarantees that Croatia would not go to war and made things considerably easier for Karadzic and Martic to complete the job around Bihac? If so what could have been the reasons for it?

The ultimatum of the Commander of Serbian troops which have surrounded Bihac, that the intention of Mladic's army is not to take the city, but to destroy the forces of the Fifth Corps of the Army of B&H, could provide certain indications of a possible answer. Namely, in none of the many territorial divisions of Bosnia&Herzegovina, was the region of Bihac marked as Serbian. And since Bihac with Velika Kladusa and Cazin rounds off a space where the influence of Fikret Abdic was always greater than that of Alija Izetbegovic and his Government in Sarajevo, it is not impossible to imagine that the Serbian offensive on Bihac and breaking the resistence of the Fifth Corps is actually aimed at establishment of the puppet government of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia with the legendary "Daddy" at its head. If this option was actually chosen, and it is quite possible that is was (it is difficult to imagine that the Serbs would be able to remain in power for a long time in this space without a new, dramatic wave of ethnic cleansing), Croatia would probably have nothing against having Abdic's state as its neighbour. In a certain way, it would be even more convenient for it than the Muslim authorities controlled by Sarajevo. With Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia - while it lasted - the Croats had not a bad experience: it was an excellent and discrete go-between for all kinds of deals and transactions, which - had the region been controlled by Sarajevo - would have probably been quite impossible. Abdic himself, who was the favourite of Croatian media, especially of state television, never experienced to be anathemized as some "Bosnian Quisling", as could be expected after the fall of Velika Kladusa. As if someone anticipated that the "eternal Dady" had not had his last say.

It is no secret that the Bosnian-Croatian federation in B&H and its possible confederate union with Croatia, has no serious supporters in the Croatian state leadership. It is true that the significance of the Washington agreements is stressed every now and then, always accompanied with the allegations that they are the centre of Croatian policy in respect to Bosnia. Practically, however, nothing, or very little, is being done to implement the papers signed in Washington. As if the sweet sounding idea about the division of Bosnia has not been abandoned, and as if some kind of agreement with Milosevic is still expected. Revival of Abdic's AP of Western Bosnia, even if it turned into a puppet, pro-Serbian regime, seems to be perfectly suitable for some forces among the Croatian state leadership. Such a mini-state would make the already complex talks about the future of Bosnia even more complicated, and in relation to the world, it would show that there are forces in B&H which see the future of this former Yugoslav republic and present state with international recognition only on paper, differently than Izetbegovic and his Sarajevo headquarters.

To certain circles among the Croatian state leadership, ressurection of Abdic's Western Bosnia would provide a perfect alibi for reincarnation of the almost extinguished statehood of Herzeg-Bosnia, which finds it very difficult to reconcile itself to become part of the Bosniaa-Croatian federation. Once AP Western Bosnia is established, completely independent of Sarajevo, and should Karadzic's plan about a "Western Serbian state" succeed, which seems more and more likely after continuous yielding of the international community, Herzeg-Bosnia as a new independent statelet is not without chances to be founded in the space of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And from that to its final annexation to Croatia is just a tiny, easily feasible step.

Although it is very difficult to say whether Croatian disassociation from the Bihac crisis is truly the result of a sophisticated game of the forces which wish to get a Herzegovina part of Bosnia, or if the fact that its hands are tied for any military action by dictation of the world forces (USA and Germany primarily) has just been skilfully used, there are too many indicators that Croatia is not especially interested for "strategic significance" of Bihac. The unusually mild conclusions from the session of the Chamber of Representatives of Croatian Assembly held behind closed doors speak in favour of this, reducing it all down to "most serious condemnation", and saying something about Croatia retaining its legitimate right to self-defence only in its item eight, implying military liberation of its occupied territories. But, even that, eighth conclusion of the Assembly, includes just a trace of the eternal Croatian offer/warning which has become notorious. "The Chamber of Representatives verifies the decisiveness of the Reoublic of Croatia to seek a peaceful solution for the crisis and in cooperation with the international community", reads the last, eighth conclusion. And the following is also stated: "But, if international efforts prove to be insufficiently effective, the Chamber of Representatives emphasizes that Croatia retains the right to independent actions in accordance with its national interests and inalienable right to self-defence". Not a word about anything new, not a word about anything that is not "deja vu". In cases of really endangered "strategic Croatian national interests", as Serbian aggression against Bihac is verbally denoted, the resolution of its parliament sounds as a benign, carefully formulated diplomatic reproach which is usually, at a time of peace, sent to a "copunterpart" because of an insignificant border incident. There is no doubt that such behavior of Croatia concerning the Bihac crisis will not be forgotten in Sarajevo, especially because it all happened right after Kupres was occupied by the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). Independent media in Croatia - contrary to the state media which celebrated the entrance into Kupres as a major military accomplishment - wrote openly that the Army of B&H, in order to return national pride to the Croats, asked the forces of the HVO to enter the emptied Kupres. It was expected then that the HVO, if not directly the Croatian Army, would run to help the army of B&H in return, when neded. There could have been no better opportunity than Bihac.

Whatever the outcome of the Bihac drama may be, it will have enormous consequences on the future of Bosnian-Croatian federation and its confederacy with Croatia. Besides, if a contract on economic cooperation between Zagreb and Knin is signed in a few days, and then, as a crown on top of all that, the FR of Yugoslavia and Croatia mutually recognize each other (which is insisted on in zagreb in the midst of the battle for Bihac), everything that can only be guessed now will become more transparent. Namely, the Croatian-Serbian "Yalta" concerning Bosnia could prove to be much firmer and steadier than considered by the best sets of state diplomacy, which are trying with all their might to find a post-Yugoslav solution for four long years already.

DRAGO HEDL