WILL CROATIA GO TO WAR?

The Croatian public was informed about the latest offensive of the Army of B&H just sporadically. Liberation of Kupres was given more space in the media, since it was attributed to the Croatan Defence Council (HVO), although the Army of B&H completed the greatest part of the job. After that, the information became scarce again, and looking from Zagreb, it is very difficult to distinguish what is actually happening on the battlefields of B&H. Although the Bosnians have numerous reasons of their own to start a liberation war, the possibility that their offensive actions coincide with intensifying of Croatian-Serbian negotiations should not be rejected either - they might have been taken in order to present Tudjman with an accomplished fact. That is, to make him finally give up the possibility of dividing Bosnia, which is, despite the Washington Agreement, still his alternative option, and decide to take joint military action against the Serbian armies. Such demands were sent to him by Izetbegovic, but Kresimir Zubak as well. For the time being, Tudjman has decided just to send symbolic assistance. Although it all smells of a new general war, perhaps those military analysts who claim that it will all end up as a short-lived offensive might be right after all, especially when they claim that the Bosnians will progress only to those points that the Serbs do not mind losing.

AIM, ZAGREB, November 15, 1994

When the offensive of the Army of B&H started in Bosnia&Herzegovina, the public in Croatia was informed about it only sporadically and with no pomp, and least of all triumph. Dosing the information solely according to its needs, the authorities brought the euphoria to a climax on the day it was publicized that the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) entered Kupres. Regardless of the fact that the greatest portion of the job was in fact done by the Army of B&H, it was proclaimed a great Croatian victory in Zagreb. But, enthusiasm subsided after that, the information grew scarce again and, at this moment, looking from Zagreb, it is very difficult to distinguish what is actually happening on the battlefields of B&H.

In the beginning some analysts believed that there were actually no victories of the Bosnians, but that it was just a game played between Zagreb and Belgrade - as the actions indicated - aimed at separating the Knin Serbs from the "mother" state, and forcing them finally to enter, or rather return to the Croatian state. When they realized, however, that the Army of B&H was attacking in the directions which do not correspond to this idea, but that the battles were fought in the regions that Croatia and the Croats were equally interested in, the assessments changed. Namely, the key issue became now: was the Army of B&H really recording military victories and why did it choose this moment for an offensive?

Of course, the Bosnians have numerous reasons of their own to start a liberation war, as Ejup Ganic says, because they have obviously decided not to wait for the mercy of the international community and armed themselves on their own, and, therefore, should win as many military battles as possible before winter comes. The second reason is that they have certainly realized that they could not wait for help from anybody, and that they, as the victims of the war, will not be punished for violation of the ceasefire. But the third reason should not be rejected either: this is all happening at the moment talks between Zagreb and Belgrade, and Zagreb and Knin are intensified.

Aware that, despite the Washington Agreements and establishment of the B&H Federation, Tudjman still has a an alternative option in his pocket, that is, that he has never given up the division of Bosnia and what he has agreed with Milosevic a long time ago in Karadjordjevo, they wished to present the Croatian President with an accomplished fact. Tudjman found himself in an extremely delicate situation: in the midst of negotiations with the Serbs, he was presented with a dilemma whether to join the Army of B&H or not? He decided to participate after all, and to join in the conquest of Kupres through the HVO, but obviously some units of the Croatian Army too.

Hans Koschnick, the mayor of Mostar, stated in Zagreb on Saturday that he knew that there were men in the office of the Croatian President, especially the Minister of Defense, who have great impact on the situation in Herzegovina, but it appeared that this time, the decision about the involvement of Croatian troops in the Bosnian war was not made by Tudjman himself, but that it was indirectly imposed on him by Sarajevo. The issue is whether this decision was final? Croatia was exceptionally diplomatically engaged about the situation in Bihac and the attempts of the Krajina Serbs to assist the "Republic of Srpska", but for the time being, although formally and legally its territory was concerned, there was no indications that it would strike from the back.

Many are wondering whether Croatian participation in the Kupres operation (and several other minor ones) was just an episode which symbolically verifies the readiness to make the Federation come to life, or whether something greater will happen later on. Much of it is, of course, in the hands of the world powers, especially after the misunderstanding between the USA and the European allies, but the final decision about war and peace must be made by Zagreb. One should not forget that the main Croatian objective is to reclaim its occupied territories and that Croatian politics tried to do it peacefully by all means, wishing primarily to avoid further destruction and loss of lives. Assessments of military experts say that the Croatian army would not even be capable of carrying out this task. After the offensive of the Army of B&H, the picture somewhat changes, but only under the presumption that the Army of the FR of Yugoslavia will neither directly nor logistically get involved in this war. Tudjman will, therefore, have to weigh out what the actual power of the Army of B&H is, what other allies he can count on, because another lost war would be disastrous for Croatia.

That a certain decision has been reached despite the apparent peace and quiet in Croatian public, is proved by the fact that both Alija Izetbegovic, as President of the Republic of B&H, and Kresimir Zubak, as the President of the Federation B&H, wrote letters to Tudjman on the same day, both induced by the attack on Bihac. Izetbegovic was quite clear: "Although we are aware of the specific circumstances in which the territory of Croatia is used for preparations and carrying out attacks on the territory of B&H, we demand that without delay you take all measures in the spirit of international law. We expect that you take such measures in the spirit of the provision of Article 8 on military cooperation in bordering regions between the two countries from our agreement on friendship and cooperation".

Zubak, a man of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) and Tudjman himself, writes as follows: "I believe that the Republic of Croatia should take necessary measures, both diplomatic ones, and others which are also at its disposal in order to prevent this aggression. Please, do everything possible in this dramatic situation and help stop the Serbian aggressor".

For the time being, Tudjman decided to offer symbolic assistance, and then a Presidential statement arrived from the Security Council which condemned attacks on Bihac from "Krajina" and involvement of its soldiers in the war operations in Bosnia&Herzegovina, but what will follow remains to be seen. But, one thing is certain, Tudjman will do nothing that could jeopardize his already low rating in the world, and he does not have the power that the "United Serbian States" have to help him choose the open war option without various guarantees.

It is interesting that nobody is disturbed neither in Zagreb nor in Belgrade because the negotiations failed, as if both Croatia and Serbia find it convenient that Karadzic is being punished for his stubborness. The only difference is that the voctories of the Army of B&H decrease Milosevic's internal credibility, and Tudjman is given the possibility to use this success of the others for his own benefit.

Although everuthing smells like a new general war, military analysts who claim that it will all be just a short-lived offensive may be right, as well as when they say that the Bosnians will make progress only to the points that the Serbs do not mind losing, just as Clinton's decision to withdraw the airplanes and the ships from the mission of monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo is nothing but a propaganda move for the needs of his internal policy.

GOJKO MARINKOVIC