WILL THERE BE NEW SPLITS IN THE HDZ?

An interpellation of forty Assembly deputies, members of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), which demands an investigation of embezzlements and defrauds accumulated in the course of the three-and-a-half-year process of ownership privatization in Croatia, imposes the question whether a war against corrupt rich upstarts is being prepared, instead of a war against the "rebellious Serbs". There are opinions that the forty interpellators wish to pressure President Tudjman himself with their demand, because he seems to be enjoying his "presidential capitalism" too much, but this certainly is not their plan. On the contrary, it is more likely that the "hard-core" HDZ, under Tudjman's powerful auspices, wishes to exert pressure on his "technomanagers" who have taken positions in the Government and state agencies which supervise the privatization process, but draw their power from econimic structures and comparatively good connections abroad. This anticipates that the epicentre of political events in Croatia may move inside the ruling party, but one should not expect that the very first earthquakes will be destructive for it.

AIM, ZAGREB, October 23, 1994 Is Croatia getting ready to wage war against corrupt upstarts instead of a new war against "rebellious Serbs"? One quite easily arrives at this unsual and puzzling question by simply combining two facts which are recently in circulation. The first of them has come from the local diplomatic circles, whose members from the East allegedly forecasted that the Croatian attack on "Krajina" would take place in May, and those from the West scheduled it for September, but they all later postponed the "beginning of the attack" for spring next year.

The other fact is the demand submitted by forty deputies of the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) to have the embezzlements and the defrauds that accumulated during the three-and-a-half-year long period of transformation/ privatization of ownership investigated, with an unusual "most serious warning" to the Government to inform the Assembly about it without "passing anything over in silence". Among the signatures on the interpellation, the name of the new Deputy Chairman of the Assembly, Vladimir Seks, is especially prominent, who was a member of the Government himself until recently, but, since he took over the new assignment, he has busied himself with redesigning his own image with, at times, miraculuous results. In the previous issue of a new weekly, the "Pecat", to a question whether he was in favour of the military option for the "Krajina", quite unexpectedly he curtly answered with a "No", and when a man who had until not long ago narrow-mindedly threatened the UNPROFOR says that, one cannot but notice the change.

The change is probably the result of the assessment of this skilful man that the pincers of the international mediators have tightened around Croatia so much that Zagreb (just like Knin) has a long period of imposed passivity ahead of it, with exhausting and painstaking peace negotiations, as the only option that these mediators can offer at the moment. In such a situation, it is always better to be a little on the side, and leave the negotiators to absorb the rage of the frustrated public, and to colleagues with delicate nerves to bite at each other and, if they wish to do so, even to fight. That is exactly what a deputy of the HDZ, Drago Krpina, and a deputy of the Serbian National Party, Dragan Hinic, did - fought, after the latter had qualified the discussion of the first as "nonsense", and after the first later said to the latter in the Assembly cafe that he and his party are engaged in "Chetnik politics". Although even a little blood was spilt in this fight - afterwards pathetically raised by Krpina to the level of a "historical" moment when for the first time in the Assembly Croatian blood was spilt by a Serb - it is quite clear that Krpina and Hinic have less been the victims of their personal animosity, but more of collective frustration provoked by the mysterious plan of the "mini Contact Group", which is broadely discussed although noone actually knows what is in it (Krpina even used this fight as the immediate cause to seek suspension of the the part of the Constitutional Law on the status of "Krajina" on account of it).

This event alone makes it clear that these two Assembly boxers are the kind of person who allow themselves to get easily carried away by crucial events, instead of being able to influence the events. It is, therefore, not by mere chance that the foaming Krpina is not among the signatories of the mentioned interpellation of the forty deputies cunningly led by Seks to some other battles (he and his alter ego, Luka Bebic, are mentioned as deserving credit for preventing the fight in the Assembly to deteriorate into something much worse.) For the better part of the forty deputies this is neither a principled nor a final choice, because among them - apart from several moderates (Pocrnic, Buzancic, Vidmarovic, Zulic, Domljan, Pavelic...) - the majority are hard-core and belligerent rightists (Stanic, Juric, Perica, Vukojevic, Turic, Sapic, Sviben, Busic...). Nevertheless, they are now acting as a comparatively homogeneous and disciplined group which is using the "pause" in the war to initiate a campaign for "clean hands" in the process of transformation/ privatization, which swarms with rich upstarts and probably even organized crime, so that the public can hardly doubt their motives.

A very meagre infow of healthy currency coming in on account of privatization (about 400 million German marks) is what worries the public more and makes it doubtful, since it amounts to hardly one per cent of the value of the total capital in the economy, although money was one of the fundamental motives to start the process of privatization. Namely, it was expected that privatization would bring the cash needed to reinvigorate the slowed down and the worn-out economy and maybe even to supplement the defficiency in the state budget. The Government justifies this modest result by claiming that it was careful not to sell out national goods below price, but this is a feeble repetition of a story noone believes any more (probably not even the Government itself, because it is trying to find excuse for itself by declaring that it was not in charge of the implementation of the transformation in the first place). The public is flooded by stories and articles about purchases of state enterprises "on paper", or purchases below price arranged by the new political establishment for its members or their intimate friends. It is also revealed that there is a developed mechanism of party supervision and control of privatization through a network of HDZ members stationed in about thousand management boards of privatized enterprises.

Noone knows how many of these "supervisors" there actually are - since the data on the composition of management boards are not available even to the members of the central Management Board in the Privatization Fund if they are not members of the ruling party - but it is claimed that they are everywhere in the majority (allegedly there is only one exception among these enterprises), including Istria where the HDZ ranked four in the elections. Since recently there are even special instructions on the criteria for selection of members of management boards, some kind of rules on new "moral and political aptness", so that it is obvious that someone wishes to be sure that the process of privatization will for the time being remain a closed book for the aggraveted public, the trade unions, the opposition, and even for a large portion of the ruling party. Who that someone is, one can only guess.There are speculations that the Deputy Prime Minister, Skegro, pulls the strings, since he is the President of the Management Board of the Privatization Fund, but he appears to be insufficiently powerful to do it on his own, so that the strings are probably pulled from a higher level, all the way up to the powerful men who surround President Tudjman, and even the President himself.

There is, therefore, nothing surprising about the fact that some people believe that the forty interpellants actually wish to exert pressure on Tudjman himself. The statement of the Presidency of the HDZ fits quite well into this presumption, since it supports the Assembly discussion on this topic, but also immediately rejects the "unfounded accusations concerning the process of privatization", giving full support to "the course it took so far". But, although Tudjman is personally vulnerable on this issue, because he seems to be enjoying his "presidential capitalism" more than sensible caution allows it, it is quite certain that the forty deputies have no any such plan about him, although they definitely have some plans. They could be to make the President exert pressure on the HDZ "technomanagers" who have assumed positions in the Government and state agencies which they supervise (including the Privatization Fund), and who are drawing their power from economic structures as well, from comparatively good connections in the world, etc. The forty deputies have in fact already started exerting that pressure with their interpellation, and the ardent dispute on the state budget and responsibilities of the Government, so that the past few days even forced a confession from Prime Minister Valentic, that his team might not manage to remain in office until the end of the year.

This announces that in the following months the epicentre of political events in Croatia could be transferred into the ruling party, but it would be unrealistic to expect that the very first earthquake will destroy it. The cement of power still links the two rival factions in the HDZ firmly enough to make them try to keep the conflicts within the limits which will not jeopardize their positions. That is the reason why the forty deputies did not allow the opposition to join them in their demand (although there were cases of such cooperation lately), meaning that controversies will, at least for the time being, remain on the level of a family squabble. But it also means that signals about possible large disputes will come in time, maybe as soon as this autumn or winter.

MARINKO CULIC