TO UNTIE OR CUT THE KNOT
Who Will Get Prevlaka?!
Summary:
Four years after Montenegrin reservists, allegedly for the purpose of defending Prevlaka and Boka, set out against Croatia and two years after the signing of the agreement on the peaceful settlement of that problem, this subject is again in the focus of Montenegrin politicians and public. The cause of this disquiet was information from Zagreb according to which the State Commission of the Republic of Croatia had already drawn the state border towards Monenegro so as to include Prevlaka in its territory.
The accusations of opposition parties that Montenegro will lose Prevlaka, were answered, instead of President Bulatovic, by Foreign Minister Lekic, who said that the statements coming from Zagreb were irresponsible and arbitrary and that the international factors were supporting Montenegro's efforts to solve the problem of Prevlaka by agreement, on the basis of arguments and in a manner conducive to stability in this region. What is the reason for such a hard core Croatian position - the only answer could be pressure on Montenegro and FRY to recognize Croatia, even under the condition that Prevlaka be ceded to Montenegro after that. What are Monenegro's arguments for annexing this peninsula to its territory. The worst thing is that it is not only uncertain what will happen with Prevlaka, but also in which way the dilemma will be solved - by negotiations, at court or by a new war.
Text:
"Pobjeda", the only daily in Montenegro, informed its readership on October 2, 1991 that a day earlier, a bit after 5 o'clock "YPA units launched a heavy attack from large caliber artillery from ships, from Prevlaka and Lustica, as well as from Prijevor and Mojdec, villages closest to Croatia", and that their targets were the "positions of Ustashi paramilitary formations in Molunat, Konavli, Vitaljina and other places in the surroundings of Dubrovnik".
That was the first day of war because, according to the regime propaganda of the Serbian - Montenegrin side, allegedly the borders of Montenegro and the military barracks on the peninsula of Prevlaka, which Croatia treated as its territory, were endangered. The outbreak of war in this area was, as will be seen later, part of a strategic plan of the then (and present) Serbian leadership and military top with the aim of rounding off its territory, retaining privileges and, by drawing it into war operations, keeping Montenegro "in the joint state" with "those who so wish".
Armed conflicts in this area stopped after the agreement between the Croatian President, Dr.Franjo Tudjman, and the former President of FRY, Dobrica Cosic, on October 1 in Geneva. The eight-point agreement, namely, envisaged the withdrawal of armed formations of the "third" Yugoslavia from Croatian territories around Dubrovnik and the demilitarization of the entire area around the disputable peninsula of Prevlaka with the deployment of UN observers there. The agreement came into force on October 20, of the same year, when the last soldier of the Army of Yugoslavia colonel Miodrag Mladenovic left Prevlaka, handing it over to the "blue berets" until the final settlement of the dispute by peaceful means.
Less than two years afterwards, and after various combinations concerning the disputable peninsula, the news was published that the State Commission of the Republic of Croatia on Borders, led by Dr.Hrvoje Kacic, had drawn the state border with Montenegro so as to include part of Prevlaka. Thus, for God knows which time in the last three years, this question, embarassing for both Montenegro and Croatia, is again in the focus of public interest. Especially provocative for Montenegro was the statement of Dr.Kacic that the future border between Croatia and Montenegro will pass "accross Cape Kobila in the place of Konfin" and that negotiations with the Montenegrin side were impossible.
This called into question the assurances of Montenegrin officials, primarily of the President of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, that a " gentlemen's agreement" had been reached on Prevlaka with the Republic of Croatia. These suspicions are, in any case, constantly stirred up by the leader of the People's Party of Montenegro, Dr.Novak Kilibarda, so that the news on Croatia's unilateral drawing of borders was an additional argument to raise the issue of the responsibility of President Bulatovic before the Montenegrin Parliament. Furthermore, Dr.Kilibarda appealed to the military leadership of the federal state "to protect Yugoslav territorial waters in time", announcing at the same time that the People's Party would "work at making the broadest Montenegrin public take an interest in the 250 sq.km. of sea in Boka Kotorska, which the Croats had drawn into their map as naturally accompanying Prevlaka".
Montenegrin President, Momir Bulatovic, failed to respond, pushing forward instead the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, Miodrag Lekic, who, in a public statement, reminded that the FRY had, after the London Conference, "accepted a compromise, temporary solution, namely for the territory of the peninsula of Prevlaka to be under UN control".
"As it is knwon, such an approach enabled the stability of this region in the past period. At the same time, in numerous contacts, the representatives of the international communty assured themselves of the geo-political and strategic importance of Prevlaka and of other aspects of this issue. The representatives of the international community also appreciated our efforts to solve controversial issues in a peaceful manner, as well as our arguments in favour of a lasting and just solution. We assess that the efforts of the relevant factors of the international community are also along those lines, which is confirmed by the recently advanced views of the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg in Geneva, after their recent visit to Montenegro and Croatia", said Minister Lekic. At the same time, in view of developments so far, he expressed the expectation that lasting stability in this region would be reached through a definite territorial delimitation, within the overall settlement of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. "Therefore,", said Mr. Lekic, "we consider all statements and approaches which through unilateral projects and wishes prejudice the solution of this issue, outside realistic and established frameworks,to be irresponsible causing of instability to the detriment of peacefully and justly solving this exceptionally important issue for us".
The unilateral drawing of borders between Croatia and Montenegro in the area in question was shortly commented on by the spokesman for President Bulatovic, Mr.Momcilo Stojanovic, who emphasized that it was "in complete contravention of the opinions of all relevant factors of the international community, as well as of the agreement signed between FRY and Croatia", and that accordingly "the decision could not produce any practical consequences".
What led the Croatian side to prejudice the definite outcome of the dispute concerning Prevlaka and unilaterally determine the border towards Montenegro - cannot be said with certainty, but it can be assumed that an act resulting from political statements on not giving up a single inch of Croatia's state territory is in question. The position on Prevlaka can illustrate the resolve not to depart from that principle, even when a piece of land of minor importance for Croatia is concerned, but can also be pressure on Montenegro, i.e. FRY, to recognize the Republic of Croatia if it wishes the question of the disputable peninsula to be solved in its favour.
This latter assumption fits into the mosaic of speculations made late last year, when the possibility was topical of an agreement between the Bosnian Serbs with the Croats on their access to the sea via Prevlaka. At that time it was mentioned that the problem of Prevlaka would be solved soon after the mutual international recognition of FRY and Croatia. Allegedly, President Tudjman had reached agreement with President Bulatovic on resolving the dispute in favour of Montenegro, while Bulatovic had, like a gentleman, undertaken not to spread the news and thus make Tudjman's position in Croatia more diffcult.
There were speculations at that time that the agreement was not an oral one only, but that it had been confirmed by an appropriate document to be made public at the moment "when all the pieces in the region fit in". A statement of the President of the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs, Momcilo Krajisnik, also aimed in that direction, when on Herceg Novi radio he mentioned two proposals to the Croatian side: "either to give us access to the sea south of Molunat, towards the Montenegrin border, in exchange for certain areas in the hinterland of Dubrovnik, or to give us part of Neum". On that occasion he stated that the "Croats had agreed it to be along the very border with Montenegro, on condition that FRY and Croatian relations are normalized".
President Bulatovic's evasion of the frequent questions of the People's Party concerning Prevlaka could, to a certain extent, point to the conclusion of the existence of some sort of an agreement between the Croatian and Montenegrin sides. But, apart from that, the regime in Podgorica has, over the past two years, permanently expressed the conviction that Montenegro will get Prevlaka, even at the cost of war, as President Bulatovic himself said on one occasion.
If we, however, disregard the political or emotional reasons for Montenegro's ties with the "rocky finger" 2,500 m. long and 500 m. wide, which closes the entrance to the Bay of Boka Kotorska, Montenegro has a number of strong trump cards in possible arbitration proceedings on Prevlaka.
For instance, the administrative border between the two former Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Montenegro, went along a ridge to the north of Prevlaka, in the northwest-southeast direction, parallel to the seashore at a distance of about 1,500 m., it approached the Herceg Novi part of the Bay to about 500 m. southwest of Cape Kobila. Thus, the external zone of the shore was in Croatia and the internal in Montenegro. If this line became the final border between Croatia and Montenegro, i.e. FRY, both sides would aspire to some twelve miles of territorial sea (15 according to some estimates). In that case the Bay of Boka Kotorska would lose the status of inland sea waters and become part of the territorial sea of Montenegro and Croatia.
In that case, when the demands of the two sides coincide, an international straits from Cape Ostra to the Island of Mamula would be created, in which both states would have to ensure unhindered and safe passage for all ships, merchant or war ones alike. According to that variant, Croatia could keep its war ships in its part, which would, if we assume that the present not exactly friendly relations are maintained over the long term, be equal to lighting a match under a powder keg. This is why the Montenegrin opposition politicians most often speak about such a possibility in metaphors such as "the water mouse-trap" or "a neighbour keeps the keys to your own door". Thus, as further arguments for Montenegro's right to Prevlaka, are assessments that Croatia would need the peninsula "more out of spite than to increase its defence capacity" and that as such it would be a potential source of constant military skirmishes or a fisheries war.
All things considered, it is still not known who will get Prevlaka. What is even worse, nothing is known about the way in which a final solution will be arrived at - at the negotiating table, in court or in the battlefield? The former FRY Prime Minister, Milan Panic, had the idea of dealing with the problem of Prevlaka by blowing it up and thus, like Alexander of Macedonia, solving the problem of this tangled knot. Still, it seems, when Prevlaka is in question, that there are wiser solutions.
Dusko Vukovic AIM Podgorica