BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA AFTER THE SERBIAN REFERENDUM

IN ANTICIPATION OF THE STORM AIM SARAJEVO, September 9,1994.

As expected, the euphoric Serb referendum at which the plan of the Contact Group was rejected almost 100%, led the Bosnian-Herzegovinian crisis into a completely new stage. For, the hard-core leadership at Pale, headed by Radovan Karadzic, has proved that it has grown into an independent subject which can at the same time, wage war against the Croat-Moslem coalition and quarrel with the entire world and the, until yesterday, friendly Serbia and its president Milosevic.

Moreover, instead of desperation and repentance, the Bosnian Serbs loyal to Karadzic are clearly indicating that in future they shall dictate the rules of the game, despite the sanctions introduced at the Drina river. That they really mean it, is seen from a series of events of late. From Karadzic's speech in Banjaluka where he self-assuredly tells his followers that they can survive the imposed isolation almost painlessly, to the last assembly held at Pale.

And the Assembly, no more no less, sent a message to the leaderships in Belgrade and Podgorica, giving them a month to declare whether they were in favour of the creation of a common Serbian land which would encompass Serbia, Montenegro, the so-called Republic of Srpska and the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, or, if not, it would request international recognition of the so-called Republic of Srpska, and, most probably, unification with the Serbs in Krajina.

Karadzic supports his new strategy, in which he by no means intends to be an extra, by threats on the domestic scene, thus announcing a "complete blockade of Moslem territories", in particular a blockade of Sarajevo "so that not even a bird can pass", which would last as long as their borders with Serbia were blocked. Further, with no fear whatsoever, he announced the shooting down of planes, the taking of UNPROFOR soldiers hostage, and ultimately, war to the last breath.

Indicating to the West what would make him desist from carrying out these threats, he asked for corrections of the maps to an extent fulfilling the elementary Serb interests, while he would be willing to return some territories. Since Serbian strategy for the forthcoming period is clearly outlined, it is interesting to look at the parameters from which Karadzic draws his self-assurance and stands up alone against everyone ?

Although cursory analysts might at first glance think that the Serbian leader uses big words exclusively for intimidation purposes, and that actually he lacks the strength to do what he says, it seems that things are a bit different. In addition to the classic statement that the Serb leadership at Pale must go to the end, because they had, as Momcilo Krajisnik said, "gone too far", there are important elements supporting his intentions.

Primarily, the isolation imposed by Serbia, if it lasts and if it reflects a genuine break between Belgrade and Pale will only additionally help the homogenization of the Bosnian Serbs which has already been shown by the recently held referendum rejecting the plan of the Contact Group. The empty stories of some media on manipulation of the people are simply unacceptable, because actually the same process is taking place as e.g. in Serbia and Montenegro after the international community imposed sanctions on them. The stronger the pressure of the world - the stronger Serbian unity. The more pronounced the feeling of danger among the people, the closer the ranks drew.

Karadzic is too crafty not to know of this law and is, ultimately, not defending himself too much from the satanization from Belgrade, because he knows that, in this case, Milosevic is working against his own interests. The more attacks on him from the Serbian capital, the stronger his position in Bosnia. In addition, if the current conflict with Milosevic lasts, there will be a differentiation on the political scene of Serbia with the pressure of parties inclined towards the Bosnian Serbs (such as Seselj's) growing, but also the rebellion of those dissatisfied with the turnabout in the policy of the Serbian president, primarily the numerous relatives of the Bosnian Serbs,of whom there are many in the territory of the present Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, although the isolation will create certain difficulties for the functioning of life in the so-called Republic of Srpska it will in no case be efficiently implemented. This too is best illustrated by the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, for despite all the control of their borders by the international community, all sorts of goods enter these states, and the three years of their imposition have not made them give up their policy. One needs no special foresight to understand that it will be much more difficult to impose a blockade of borders between Serbs on this and that side of the Drina river because that is, after all, completely unnatural. At worst, a veritable heaven will be created for smugglers.

As for the threats addressed to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian side and heads of Western countries whose soldiers are in Bosnia, we should note that Karadzic can carry through those threats to a large extent. Sarajevo is the best confirmation of that, as over the past month a considerable rise of prices has already been registered, and the war psychosis when people desperately searched for goods which were astronomically expensive has returned to the city. Not to mention blackmail with gas, water and electricity, because Karadzic's army almost completely controls all fuels, and, whenever necessary, uses them as a means of blackmail, demanding that their political requests be fulfilled.

All in all, of greatest importance for the new Pale approach and option for an independent policy is the assessment of the military situation. It seems that the decision on not to withdraw was brought precisely on this basis. Serb strategists gave serious consideration to two issues: the possibility of having the embargo lifted, and the possibility of the creation of a federal army by uniting the Army of B&H and HVO (Croatian Defense Council).

With regard to the lifting of the embargo, the leadership at Pale seriously reckons with the disunity of the main international factors, and builds its positions on their conflict and irresoluteness. Karadzic also skillfully uses the media, constantly sending threats to the West, which in no case leaves the public of countries whose soldiers are in Bosnia indifferent. The picture has thus been created that the lifting of the embargo would basically mean the escalation of the conflict, the possibility of its spreading in the region, and in any case, considerable victims among humanitarians and foreign soldiers on the UN mission.

As for the estimates on the new Croat-Moslem alliance, at the beginning it caused much greater concern. But, only several months after the creation of the B&H Federation, under American patronage, it is evident that things have not moved from a deadlock, and that the authorities in both Sarajevo and Zagreb will soon question the efficiency of such purported love. Thus for instance, Alija Izetbegovic, in a recent interview to the "Oslobodjenje" says that "where the Federation is concerned", the Croatian side is divided, even deeply divided, I am afraid. Namely, there is strong resistance both in military and political structures of the HVO".

No less explicit is Rasim Delic, commander of the B&H Army who in an interview to the same paper says that the "hitherto joint action with the HVO boils down to two to three fired missles. HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) policy is directed only to regions with Croatian population. Under the plan of the Contact Group they are to get 90% of the territories in which the Croats were a majority people. I think that is just wishful thinking. It is hardly likely they will get anything without fighting".

It is certain that these cool relationships did not escape the vigilant eye of the Serbian leadership, which, they concluded, had no other option but to secure the attained positions, and wait for a political denouement. With their supremacy in heavy weapons they are still in a position to keep their enemies at bay, and with smaller losses, can maintain such a situation infinitely. It seems that only Ratko Mladic, indisputable authority for his soldiers, who has been glaringly silent ever since the cooling of relations with Belgrade, could make trouble. Allegedly, Milosevic made him an offer to cross over to his camp, promising him a high post in the hierarchy of the army, but Mladic unequivocally refused. Karadzic, undoubtedly, knows he cannot do without Mladic and it is therefore to be expected that he will allow him much greater interference in political life than was the case so far. But, everything has its price.

Thus, Serb positions are well reinforced and Izetbegovic has not missed that either, when he claimed that "regrettably, prospects for peace are not good at the moment. Clouds are gathering on the horizon. Will a southern or western wind disperse them, or will the clouds turn into a storm, it is difficult to forecast. But they are clearly visible and forebode no good".

In view of such an assessment, and with the knowlegde that the lifting of the embargo on imports of weapons is not to be expected soon ("additional arming is not necessarily associated with the lifting of the embargo") it is not surprising that Army General Rasim Delic and one of the leading commanders of the B&H Army, Mustafa Hajrulahovic - Talijan, are visiting Turkey these days. It is evident that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian leadership is thinking about a longer-term option and Delic categorically states that "only arming can bring the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor to his senses, and remove the leadership which led the Serbian people to war, from power. That is the only chance for peace".

When that is taken into account, it seems that Izetbegovic has finally made a correct assessment. Dark clouds are looming. It remains to be seen who will still be in the battlefield after the storm.

Goran Todorovic