BELGRADE IN THE RUSSIAN EMBRACE

AIM, BEOGRAD

Changes and Illusions

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, confirmed last weekend, tete-a-tete, their joint "resoluteness" to stop the Bosnian war, that being "an absolute priority". It was also "jointly pointed out that FR Yugoslavia, with its consistent policy of peace, represents the most important factor for the preservation of stability in the Balkans"...

The latter seems as a suprisingly flattering acknowledgement, doesn't it? Belgrade has not been in such a warm embrace of a foreign country for ages, one opening new, more cheerful international prospects. Naturally, with the remark that in diplomacy, just like in life, everything has its price. In this case, the pronounced cooperativeness of the emissary of Yeltsin's Russia towards the priority needs of Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) could be diplomatic compensation for its gradual consent to the possible introduction and foreign control of crossings over the Drina river.

But, never mind. Given the not so cordial relations between the Moscow and Belgrade authorities in the recent past, this accord was almost touching. It should have had, it goes without saying, the strongest echo among the Serbian leaders west of the Drina. Like some sort of a last warning: forget about your self-satisfaction with the referendum, things are too serious; put aside your obstinacy, what can you do without Serbia and Russia? The warning is indeed serious, but its actual effects could not be measured immediately. Probably because the authorities at Pale tried to belittle the concerted Belgrade - Moscow pressure in advance. Among other things, by the brisk response of Radovan Karadzic. Through the Podgorica bi-weekly "Sjutra", before the referendum, which there was no chance of losing, he resolutely warned the leaders in Serbia and Montenegro that they would "bitterly repent " their pressures and blockade on the Drina. Is he, perhaps, expecting a new quarrel among the big powers on account of which Moscow could be forced to be more considerate towards its warring "Serb brethren"? Or is the use of the cult Serb weapon - stubborness - as a political means in question?

Such challenges have long ago become the fashion among Serbian politicians on both sides of the Drina river, who tend to glorify even the senseless sacrifice of their subjects as a noble virtue of an, above all, proud people. But, Karadzic, although he plunged into the war option of "national interest" with his vocation of a psychiatrist and poet who finds the folk legend on defiance without borders extremely pleasing, should acknowledge the wisdom of others sometimes. For instance, the lesson offered by the learned and crafty Henry Kissinger: It is better to be right than in, in politics...

And to be right, meaning on the side holding the stronger trump cards, can, in this inter-Serbian drama, only mean - be closer to reality - not only in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, but also in the international distribution of power. It is no secret that the Yugoslav crisis, the Bosnian tragedy most of all, caused considerable wavering and even redeployment both in Western Europe (the European Union), and even more, between America and Russia.

Two meetings between Milosevic and Kozyrev in less than a month convincingly prove that the latter is more and more important for Serbia. If they need Russian support (and in all likelihood they need it more than ever before) they must take account of reality. The experience gained through the recent, financially costly flirting with the dogmatic, nationalistic, "east Christian" and similar opposition in Moscow, could come in handy both to the "position" and "opposition" helmsmen of local nationalism. Yeltsin's or anyone else's future Russia, as a Slav, and world nuclear power, can be the "natural ally" of Serbia and of all the Serbs, only if that is in its interest also.

Historical links and "brotherly feelings" are not, nonetheless, to be underestimated. But, this in no way implies the obligation of Russia to be on the side of the Serbs, just because they think that everyone else is doing them an injustice. Or that it needs them as allies in the Balkans. Perhaps it does. But, surely not as "victors" in a war which destroyed the multi-ethnic Bosnia and forced the so-called international community, i.e. the big powers, including Russia, to try to extinguish the fire in the Balkans through concerted efforts. Serbia's share in that war has set the upper limit for Russian diplomacy too. It was precisely Minister Kozyrev who, when he first came here in the capacity of envoy of the Contact Group, defined the new concerted action of the big five and, in that connection Russia's Balkan course: "We have come to a turning point, because we have realized that passions related to Bosnia could lead to international confrontation. We have chosen the only possible alternative: concerted action against those whom the war has deprived of common sense ..."

Thus, under the flag of the Contact Group, i.e. in the company of powers on whose support its justified and political recovery depends, Russia embarked on its, perhaps really long-term comeback to the "hilly" Balkans. But, as the executor of collective will in the top of the world pyramid and only after having assured itself that it can, and must, cooperate with Belgrade, if it wishes to achieve anything either for the Contact Group or for itself.

The key impetus for such efforts was, unless we are mistaken, Russia's estimate that Milosevic, faced with the risk that the continuation of the Bosnian nightmare and the sanctions might call his bare survival into question, embarked on an irreversible turnabout aimed at saving mother Serbia and his support in it by irrevocably giving up the champions and hostages of the military option on the other side of the Drina and their insane aspirations to defend with weapons the questionable achievements of the "undoubted victory".

Thus a new, perhaps decisive era has started in Serbian policy too. The Belgrade political top pushed away Karadzic and other, messianically ambitious "pan-Serbian" challengers in Bosnia, and, of necessity, decisively opened up towards Russia. And vice versa. And all that in a manner which raises its ratings in the West too, i.e. in a role which currently suits it best: as a loyal member of the Contact Group, most suitable and competent to make the soonest and best possible use of the opportunity provided by the Russian turnabout in Belgrade.

This is, nevertheless, only the first step both for Moscow and for Belgrade. The sequel, despite great expectations, remains extremely uncertain. But, not only because of the "no" at the referendum , which the Serbian leaders west of the Drina are proud of, nor even because of the ultra-nationalist or opportunistic support offered by the Belgrade, party and other oppositions.

The more important aspect of the worrisome uncertainty in Serbian oscillations between a gradual return to the world and sinking into an even darker dead-end, can be eliminated only if the most important thing is confirmed: that the abandoning of the war option in Bosnia implies the irrevocable abandoning of national-chauvinist projects in everything and everywhere, as well as the overall democratization of the current order, primarily in Serbia.

Unless this happens, the thunderingly announced, encouraging changes, can hardly be lasting and convincing, even for the very benevolent Russians. And the lifting of the sanctions could also be called into question.

Aleksandar Nenadovic