CHRONOLOGY OF A LOSER

FIKRET ABDIC - ONCE THE FATHER, NOW A CRIMINAL

ABSTRACT: The Muslim leader of the so-called autonomous province of Western Bosnia Fikret Abdicc for the second time has become the target of severe criticism of the official authorities - first in 1988 when he was proclaimed enemy number one of the self-management socialist system, and nowadays when he was characterized as a "greater criminal than Radovan Karadzic himself" and "the greatest moral degenerate and traitor of the Muslim nation". Having survived the political trial as one of the most successfull directors during the communist period, he has confirmed his image of the Father ("Babo") of the Cazin Krajina in which he brough economic prosperity. In the elections for the Presidency of B&H he triumphed with about a million of votes but was forced to surrender to his party chief - Izetbegovic. An increasing antagonism between the economically minded Abdic and the nationally and religiously oriented Izetbegovic culminated in formal establishment of the autonomous Cazin Krajina which accepted open support from both Milosevic and Tudjman. The period of worst bloody conflicts between the three B&H parties and the most terrible shortage of food, for Abdic's autonomous province was a period of full economic, political, and even military affirmation. When partnership with Izetbegovic for Croatia became far more important, the "Father" from Cazin was given the new role of an unnecessary and dispensable ally. Military and political collapse of Abdic became inevitable, and his removal and protection by the rebellious Serbs expected. This still does not mean that stubborn Abdic is politically defeated. As the greatest collateral in his political conflict with Izetbegovic he still has tens of thousand of Muslim refugees.

AIM, SARAJEVO, August 27, 1994. In a general campaign in the media against everything that might even resemble the so-called autonomous province of Western Bosnia, Sarajevo state radio characterized Fikret ABDIC as a "greater criminal than Radovan Karadzic himself". This controversial Bosnia-Herzegovinian politician thus became for the second time in a comparatively short period of time the target of severe criticism of republican authorities - first in 1988 in the "Agrokomerc" scandal as a "subversive and enemy number one" of the self-management socialist system, and nowadays as "the greatest moral degenerate and traitor of the Muslim nation", and "collaborator of the agressor and destroyer of a united Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina".

The chronology of Abdic's political controversies dates back to the times when he was the director of the cooperative farm in Velika Kladusa. Carefully building the image of the Father of the Cazin Krajina ("Babo"), Abdic subordinated his entire activity to the objectives of an overall development of this Muslim enclave in the North-West of B&H. Cleverly establishing connections during the communist period with the once powerful political lobby of the Pozderac family, and by means of profitable loans and incentives from socialist state funds, he quickly succeeded in creating a true economic giant within Bosnia-Herzegovina relations - the miracle called the "Agrokomerc". But, just as by some special touch of Bosnian destiny in this land things suddenly emerge and grow, and with the same unbelievable speed disappear again, the Velika Kladusa "Agrokomerc" with all its hundreds of thousand of turkeys, rabbits, hens, de facto disappeared, as well. The relentless current daily policy, tore down the Agrokomerc in full swing practically overnight, and its Director, the Fathwer of the Cazin Krajina, found himself in jail marked as enemy of the society.

A circle of Muslim intellectuals, people who are nowadays mostly close to the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and Izetbegovic, later assessed the scandal concerning the "Agrokomerc" as an organized anti-Muslim conspiracy and the first form of aggression of the Serbian, Milosevic's regime against B&H. This stance later significantly influenced F. Abdic to join the Muslim national party - the SDA, although it was very difficult to fit this Bolshevik entrepreneur into a team of people completely different in structure and mentality, among the former "young Muslims" and party leaders of the time, A. Izetbegovic and O. Behmen, or the newly established SDA set such as I. Ajanovic or M. Cengic. But, induced by the wish to restore the "Agrokomerc" to life, which could be achieved only with the support of the new government, similar to Izetbegovic who intended to use Abdic's joining the SDA to compensate the withdrawal of A. Zulfikarpasic and alleviate the results of the split in his party, Abdic disregarded the differences. In a general euphoria of the election campaign, the embrace of the three "national leaders"

• Izetbegovic, Karadzic and Kljujic - and the coalition of their three parties (Party of Democratic Action /SDA/- Serbian Democratic Party /SDS/ -Croatian Democratic Community /HDZ/) gained power in a landslide, and F. Abdic triumphed with about a million of votes in the elections for the Presidency of B&H. But, Abdic was forced to surrender the most prominent post among the equals in the Presidency of the state to his party chief - Izetbegovic, who won an incomparably smaller number of votes, but was more agreeable for the coalition partners in the SDS and the HDZ in their long-term schemes, with his past of an "Islamic fundamentalist" than Abdic with his curriculum vitae of a successful entrepreneur. Biljana Plavsic who was a member of that very Presidency at the time, commented on Izetbegovic's election for its President instead of Abdic as follows: "It does not matter how many votes he won, dear God himself has sent Alija Izetbegovic to the post of the President!" A month later, the SDS of Biljana Plavsic started distributing leflets with the worst millitant extracts from Izetbegovic's "Islamic Declaration".

The following period was marked with an increasing antagonism between the economically minded Abdic and the nationally and religiously oriented Izetbegovic. The first open confrontation occurred at the Congress of the SDA remembered by the public for Abdic's refusal to stand up at the moment all the other delegates rose to salute Izetbegovic. At the same gathering organized on the model of party congresses of single-minded members, Abdic bluntly demanded separation of Izetbegovic's function of the President of the Presidency from his post of the President of the party, which caused a torrent of disapproval and estrangement from Abdic in the Party of Democratic Action. Although a member of the Republican Presidency, Fikret Abdic spent less and less time in Sarajevo, devoting most of his time and energy to the recovery of "Agrokomerc". His unclarified peace missions to Bosnian part of the Sava river valley and Bijeljina will remain recorded from the pre-war period in 1992, and numerous contacts with the leaders of the former Yugoslav Army. The media close to the SDA accused him of being an accessary in the kidnapping of Izetbegovic and the open attempt of a coup on that May 2 when Abdic was in the premises of RTV Sarajevo, and Izetbegovic and Kukanjac desperately demanded their mutual exchange. Whether due to that event or due merely to the climax of all discrepancies they experienced, all communication and cooperation between Izetbegovic and Abdic practically ended since then. Abdic left for Cazin Krajina and reduced his communication with the Presidency in Sarajevo to exchanging letters in increasingly sharp language and strong mutual accusations.

In a situation when the so-called Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia operated in the space of B&H fully supported by the official Zagreb, and the greatest part of the territory in the form of the so-called Serbian Republic was held by Karadzic's army, and the international diplomatic initiatives openly supported the concept of final ethnic division and destruction of B&H, the political leadership of the SDA itself publicly started propagating the national statelet of the Muslims in a part of B&H. Fikret Abdic recognized a favourable climate in such an attitude of Sarajevo authorities and formally declared the autonomy of Cazin Krajina. Judging that the survival of the blocked Muslim enclave in North-Western Bosnia would be impossible without mutual cooperation with the authorities of the surrounding Serbian regions and the neighbouring Croatian state, Abdic accepted open support from both Milosevic and Tudjman. Since both neighbouring regimes personified aggressors on B&H and major originators of war hardships at the time, this move was perceived as open treason in Sarajevo and the greatest part of Bosnia. Both Tudjman and Milosevic, however, used the newly-established Cazin autonomy to try to justify their arguments that no state controlled by Muslim authorities is sustainable, i.e. that division of B&H into the Serbian and the Croatian part only is inevitable. This period, remembered in the remaining part of B&H by the worst bloody conflicts between all the three parties and the most terrible shortage of food, for Abdic's autonomous province it was a period of its full economic, political, and even military affirmation. But, military and later on political defeat of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) in the conflict with the Bosnian Army, and the diplomatic initiative of the USA which resulted in the Washington and Vienna agreement, brought Cazin autonomous province into a hopeless position. In a situation where partnership with Izetbegovic became far more important for Tudjman, the "Father" from Cazin, popular in Croatian media until then, was given the new role of an unnecessary and dispensable ally. And while the roads for the passage of food and arms for the "Autonomous Province of Bosnia" were shut down, new ones were opened, this time for Dudakovic's Fifth Corps of the Bosnian army. Even numerous international diplomats began changing assessments about Abdic's creation. Military and political collapse of Abdic became inevitable, and his removal and protection by the rebellious Serbs expected.

This still does not mean that stubborn Abdic is politically defeated. As the greatest collateral in his political conflict with Izetbegovic he still has tens of thousand of Muslim refugees. In the struggle for political prestige and power, after the collapse of Cazin autonomy, all Abdic still has is the position of a dissident together with the image of an entrepreneur and the already forgotten legitimity of a man who won the greatest confidence of Bosnia-Herzegovinians in 1990 elections. On the other hand, Izetbegovic, safely back on the course of a united and multinational B&H with an increasingly powerful and open support of the American administration, sees the end of this conflict solely in a trial to Abdic as a war criminal. The media in Bosnia-Herzegovina are already put in full operation of propaganda exposing "Abdic's crimes". And yet, is it possible to organize a trial to a man with the greatest election legitimity? Will the idea of autonomy traditionally present in the space of Cazin Krajina die down after the military collapse of Abdic's "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia"? And finally, what will Abdic himself choose - a possible comfortable life of a dissident abroad or continued political struggle with Izetbegovic?

The once intra-party conflict between Izetbegovic and Abdic which culminated in suffering of tens of thousand of citizens of Muslim nationality, has once again confirmed that the tragedy of Bosnia-Herzegovina sprung out from sick ambitions of many of its sons.

Drazena Peranic