A HUSHED UP SENSATION

AIM, ZAGREB, August 13, 1994

In the background of the big media uproar made over Karadzic's "Yes" or "No" to the proposal of the Contact Group, the dispute that ensued on that account on the relation Belgrade - Pale, and the third attack of NATO planes on the positions of the Bosnian Serbs, a truly sensational piece of news, went unnoticed and insufficiently explained. Namely, on August 5 the Croatian Television briefly reported and the daily papers also published that Hrvoje Sarinic, the chief Croat negotiator with the Serbs from Krajina and the signatory of the Zagreb Agreement and Dr. Ivic Pasalic, internal policy adviser to the President of the Republic had visited Knin.

From this brief piece of news it was possible to learn that the talks with the leaders of "Krajina" - Milan Babic and Borislav Mikelic lasted five hours and were dominated by issues of the so called second stage of the Zagreb agreement, i.e. economic problems, such as the opening of the Zagreb-Beograd highway, railways, roads, water and electricity supply, oil, pensions, the blockade of UNPROFOR. The only official assessment on the success of the visit was made by Sarinic who said that the Krajina Serbs didn't know what was really going on and what they should do.

The very fact that the Zagreb talks were resumed after a four-month pause, and in Knin at that, deserves special attention, but in the context of the times and events, the importance of the unexpected Knin picnic is multiplied. Namely, the meeting took place when Milosevic decided to close the borders towards the "Republic of Srpska", and when his assessments came into conflict with Karadzic's ones and when he publicly stated that he would and could no longer support the war option. And if such announcements are sincere, because Milosevic is never to be trusted, especially as the conflict around Bosnia may easily spill over to Serbia and start eroding his charisma of leader of all the Serbs and the champion of the idea "All Serbs in one state", then this inevitably must be felt in "Krajina" and his people (and Martic and Mikelic are his people undoubtedly) must decide to sit at the negotiating table again.

In addition, it is becoming ever more evident that Russian diplomacy is no longer ready to back the Bosnian Serbs, nor consequently, the Krajina ones, which is best attested to by the fact that the "state delegation" of the Knin Serbs did not, despite Gracovlev's picnic and the outburst of orthodox love, reach Moscow. Previously the so loudly and pompously announced visit of Mikelic to Italy was cancelled. All this and the blockade of UNPROFOR which have considerably reduced assistance to "Krajina", and even called the harvest into question, are reasons which probably, together with almost certainly direct pressures from Belgrade, forced the leadership of Krajina to return to the negotiating table.

When we add to all this the fact that only a day before Sarinic's and Pasalic's trip to Knin a statement was published of the Croatian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which, besides demanding that UNPROFOR be stationed on the borders of Croatia, reiterates the proposal on the mutual recognition of all the former Yugoslav republics (it is known in what borders), then the mosaic begins to assume definite shape. Some tend to add to all this the recent manoeuvres of the Croatian army on the island of Vir near Zadar, where a possible attack on "Krajina" was evidently being practiced. But despite the fact that this military exercise seemed impressive and that there are many in Croatia who believe that ultimately the only solution for the reintegration of "Krajina" will be a military one, it seems that the Knin leadership was not particularly impressed by the strength of the Croatian army.

Naturally, they are aware that Croatia now has much stronger military potentials and better trained manpower, on which, as the well-known military analyst Fran Visnar wrote, the stamp of the Foreign Legion is visible, but the Croatian side must take account of the possible disastrous consequences of the military option.It is no secret that the frontline is extremely well fortified on both sides and that the area teems with the most modern weapons. Although there is certainly much exaggeration and propaganda in all that, statements such as the one made by Dusan Badza, a former parliamentary deputy must also not be neglected: "In case of Croatian aggression on any part of Krajina we shall not defend ourselves but attack hundreds of targets in Croatia, especially areas where Croats least expect an attack. We shall also attack those regions which were spared war so far. You can be sure of one thing: our response will be much stronger than any previous one".

The Croatian side certainly takes due account of that fact and that is why the resumption of the talks is seen as a major success in the Zagreb political circles, because, despite the fact that they have yielded no specific results they are nevertheless considered to be a step towards a peaceful solution. And while there are no larger conflicts on the Knin front and while the truce is being maintained, something "strange" is happening in the region of Dubrovnik, on the borders towards the "Republic of Srpska". On Thursday, seven shells were fired from the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the area near Cilipi airport, and thanks to the letter sent by Tudjman to the president of the UN Security Council, the public learned what was already public knowledge, i.e. that the attack on the area of Dubrovnik on July 24, was not as innocent as stated in the papers in a few short lines. Tudjman now disclosed that on that day Karadzic's army fired 52 grenades and that there were human casualties. Attacks on Zupanja are no longer even counted and are barely recorded, so it is difficult to conclude whether they are merely a response or a "provocation".

But, when we know that Zupanja is in the immediate vicinity of the Posavina corridor,and is of so vital importance to the Serbs, Croats and Moslems alike, then constant shooting in that region is no surprise. The similar pertains to Dubrovnik, where the Serbian side at all costs wants an outlet to the sea in return for which it would be ready to give up several kilometers of rocky ground in the hinterland of Dubrovnik. This points to the close connexion between the Croat and Bosnian question in both political and military terms. Namely, Croatia cannot apply one principle to "Herzeg-Bosnia" and another to the "Republic of Srpska" or the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" because attempts, especially on the part of the Herzegovinian lobby, to annex western Herzegovina to Croatia, or to make it a satellite statelet, essentially legitimize these two small Serbian states and their right to unification with Serbia. Efforts for an integral B&H are actually the best defense of Croatian borders. In military terms therefore, the possible taking of the corridor would prevent such unification and break up the conceived Serbian state into several islands, despite the strength and size of the backing of Serbia or FR Yugoslavia.

If a solution in Bosnia is achieved, and if the borders of "Krajina" are closed, the Knin leadership will have no alternative, that parastate will not be able to survive because it is vitally oriented towards integration. Although there are different opinions, i.e. those who think that the current proposal of the Contact Group is not just or good, because it not only rewards military conquest and ethnic cleansing, but also represents the nucleus of the next war, or more precisely the continuation of the war, it seems that those who believe that Milosevic is trying to save what can be saved are right. Naturally, it is clear to Milosevic - as Josip Manolic stated a few days ago - that if the war were to end right now, one could indeed speak about the attainment of military goals. In this we should look for the reasons of Sarinic's and Pasalic's unexpected visit to Knin, which should directly be understood as a message to Karadzic.

But, at the same time, it is a big present to Tudjman too, in a situation with a still ongoing parliamentary crisis, when it it still not known whether the opposition will return to Parliament in September and when extraordinary elections are still a certainty. Perhaps Tudjman will not need an "action of the Maslenica" type for an election victory this time, because Milosevic will do that instead of the Croatian army. All this raises additional questions such as for instance: is Karadjordjevo a thing of the past, and is not all this just a big political farce?

GOJKO MARINKOVIC