SHIFTS ON THE ALBANIAN POLITICAL SCENE?

Summary: In the past few days, the knot of events which once disturbed the entire public of what is now Yugoslavia, Kosovo inclusive, seems to have begun to unravel. The confession of a police inspector, Dragan Mladenovic, verifies that suspicions that protagonists of numerous attacks on police patrols in Kosovo were actually their colleagues were not completely without foundations. First, Mladenovic's public confession reminds of the case in Glogovac when five policemen were wounded. Although it is assumed that Mladenovic might have problems due to such a confession, one cannot but observe that something, not exactly minor, is happening on the Serbian political scene. There might be a logical connection between the fight in the Assembly of Serbia of Serbian Radicals and the Assembly Security officers and the incidents in Kosovo, both being, as analysts believe, staged. While settling of accounts among Serbian leaders lasts, primarily through washing dirty linen in public, the atmosphere on the Kosovo political scene seems to be calming down. Namely, some wished to take over the leadership from the first man of Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, by accusing him for having deserted "national interests", in other words, for an insufficently radical politics aimed at realization of an independent Kosovo. Although not without influence, these persons did not get the support of Albanians living in Kosovo.

Repeated attempts of Serbian secret police to "prove" the terroristic nature of Albanian movement in Kosovo through various campaigns, trials and staged incidents, so far did not succeed. The Albanians refused to be tricked by police provocations. Mass repression failed to induce rebellion or formation of extremist Albanian groups which would start counter-actions with the following explanation: "Terrorism has exceeded all limits. Serbia must be retaliated!" Some of the provocations were only too obvious. For instance, in May last year, just before President Cosic was removed from office, an attack on a police van was staged in Kosovo, and allegedly two Serbian policemen were killed, and several were wounded in it. The incident took place in Glogovac, and although specific indications, and the political timing pointed out that it was staged or that it was actually an internal conflict among the policemen, Serbian propaganda accused "an Albanian terrorist group" for the attack. It was also noted then that after the state-organized funeral of the killed policemen, while "combing through" Glogovac and the surroundings, the police looked only for arms, money and valuables in Albanian houses, and not evidence of alleged terrorists, and that there was practically no serious investigation, nor were the results of it ever presented.

Had just a bit more serious investigation been possible, it would have easily exposed police rigging. Nowadays, after more than a year, there are new, very serious indications about the fraud. An inspector of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, Dragan Mladenovic, in an interview to the local B-92 radio station, spoke about the connections between the heads of this Serbian Ministry with organized classical and political crime, and, among other, he mentioned the Glogovac case, as one of the incidents staged by the police. Serbian authorities, naturally, will not do anything to reveal the truth. After all, the latest incident in the Assembly of Serbia when special police units beat up the deputies shows that Serbia has turned into a state run by the police. Last year, Vuk and Danica Draskovic were beaten up and deputies of their Serbian Renewal Movement were arrested although they enjoyed immunity, and now the deputies of the Serbian Radical Party were beaten up. Who will be next? For the Albanians who were the first to experience the terrorist nature of Milosevic's regime, this policy has become too transparent. Even those who are most radical among the Albanians do not propagate terrorism and are very cautious about police provocations. This is the main reason why the Albanian movement in its main course and in the spectrum of other currents in Kosovo, remained true to its nonviolent means of struggle for the independence of Kosovo.

But, domestic and foreign analysts constantly put the "logical" question - how much longer will the Albanians be able to remain patient? Something will have to happen within the Albanian movement which practically did not budge for four years. In the past few months the expectations that something will happen have grown. After resignation of some of the leading personalities, public attacks on the policy of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) and Ibrahim Rugova, and other indications, the analysts have reached the conclusion that great splits are impending within the Albanian movement in Kosovo. This conviction was intensified by repeated postponing of the Assembly of the DSK.

However, when the session of the Assembly of this party was finally held, it turned out that all the predictions were incorrect. The session of the Assembly was organized in such a manner that no room was left for opening debates on delicate issues and for divisions. As the leading political organization in Kosovo, the DSK did not wish to risk anything, and it had learnt a lot from the experience of other minor parties which either split after internal conflicts of different factions, or were considerably weakened and lessened.

After the staged session of the Assembly of the DSK, Ibrahim Rugova did not emerge weakened. On the contrary. Like in previous critical situations, Dr. Rugova manifested a subtle skill for political timing. Although for several months he left the impression among analysts that he was too inert, that he hesitated all the time, that his influence weakened, that he allowed his own party to disintegrate right in front of his eyes, that he did nothing to prevent the highly educated and capable members to leave the party, etc., it turned out that the effects of such "inert" and "indecisive" policy were just the opposite: that Rugova has reinforced his leader's position and prestige and that the leading party, at least from the outside, not only retained its high degree of monolithism and operativeness, but even strengthened its superior position in relation to other parties and movements in Kosovo.

Instead of the predicted conflict between the moderate and the radical faction within the Albanian movement, what actually happened was clearing up of the relations of power between the centre and the extreme poles of the movement, or between the DSK as the leading political power, and numerous minor political parties, which mainly function as satellites in the national movement. It turned out that the minor parties lost their identity and influence because they had no opportunity to form as internal opposition, and they could not be competitive as an alternative within the ethnic movement.

The patient and cunning Rugova managed in the meantime to clarify who his main opponents were, because they stuck their necks out and are now left without any serious political support. In the first place, it was the excessively ambitious member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts, Redjep Qosia, who desired the role of the spiritual father of the nation and the all-Albanian political leader, and Adem Demaqi, as the legend of the Albanian liberation movement who also did not care to hide ambitions to take over the leading role in the Albanian movement. Qosia and Demaqi initiated few offensives against the DSK and Dr. Rugova during the winter, accusing him of bureaucratism, incompetence, and potential treason of national interests. Such criticism, however, was left without an echo, and it did not even have any impact on gathering of alternative political forces. Their problem was that, besides criticism and verbal radicalism, they did not offer any other political platform. In the case of Demaqi, his propagation of a more active resistance did not mean armed resistance, but readiness for self-sacrifice in defense of rights and institutions, while on the other hand, some of his statements led to a conclusion that he was ready to accept even less than the minimum of Albanian demands. Namely, he declared that he allowed the possibility of accepting the special status, or a lenient autonomy for Kosovo. After the latest unsuccessful public attack on the DSK and Ibrahim Rugova and the reactions he experienced in his encounter with the masses, Demaqi gives the impression of a man who is a little disappointed with daily politics. He is gradually withdrawing from public life under the pretext that he is finishing writing his new novel.

According to certain opinions, however, he is by no means the loser, but the greatest winner in the silent shifting of forces within the Albanian movement. Supporters of this view believe that Demaqi is strategically the strongest figure in the movement and verify this by the fact that the faction of former political convicts from marxist-leninist groups within the DSK has gained strength, and Demaqi was, with no doubt, their spiritual leader back since the sixties. But, the opposite possibility also exists, that the radical factions among former Marxists have already written off Demaqi as the leader, and some of them have reached key positions in the movement, which enebled them to manifest their own ambitions. The pact between Dr. Rugova and the organizers of the 1968 and 1981 demonstrations led to a new structure of the Main Board of the SDK as a potentially great coallition of patriotic forces. This coallition, besides being the highest body of the party, controls the only daily newspaper in Albanian language, the "Bujku". Its editor-in-chief, his deputy and four members of the editorial board have become members of the Main Board of the DSK.

Demaqi has reserved the role of the moral power of the movement for himself, so he is still satisfied with the leadership of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms. Whether he will become active within the party at a certain moment and in what way, still remains to be seen. For a time, the Albanians thought that he could be an ideal personality for the role of the president of the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo, should it be constituted. But that would mean that he and Rugova should somehow settle disputes and find a common language, which was not the case very often in the past.

Things are different for Redjep Qosia, who has politically practically "burnt down" in open confrontation with Ibrahim Rugova. A few years ago, as a scientist and a national ideologis, Qosia was more influential and had more of a charisma than Dr. Rugova. In a short time, however, he used up all his influence and carisma due to tactless and unrealistic criticism of the DSK and Dr. Rugova, which were interpreted as a sign of personal vanity and hurt leader's ambitions. Qosia did not succeed with his platform of awakening all-Albanian movement which would be headed by him. He accused Albania's President, Sali Berisha and Rugova for treason of national interests because, according to him, they abandoned the Albanian ethnic program which implies support of the idea of ethnic Albania, and in this way, Qosia became an ideologist of verbal radicalism followed only by minor political groups, and in the end he almost completely lost his supporters.

When speaking of other opponents and possible competitors of Dr. Rugova, they were not publicly discredited like Demaqi and especially like Qosia, but almost all have ended up in the team of losers. Veton Suroi, who was a supporter of civic options and true pluralism in 1990, left the position of the leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (at the time it had a social liberal orientation) and now he is the editor of the weekly "Koha", whose greatest sponsor is the Soros Foundation. The "Koha" has taken a highly critical and polemic course towards the DSK. The latest Congress of the DSK was also attacked as a Congress which was staged similar to congresses from the time of communism "where the members served as a numeric basis for construction of the decision-making pyramid, whose top was occupied by comrades who knew how things worked". Suroi and his paper tried to make a problem of the issue of the parallel centre of decision-making, that is, to create a platform for gathering of those who lost their positions within the movement, but this campaign had no visible effects.

A similar action aimed at gathering those who were "rejected" was initiated by Luljeta Pulja Beqiri, the President of a faction of the split Social Democratic Party of Kosovo. This initiative was launched about two or three months ago in the form of preliminary consultations with several independent intellectuals and leaders of possible "opposition" parties within the Albanian movement. According to rumours, it was Qosia who actually stood behind this initiative. But, when the initiative was revealed to the public, Ljuljeta Pulja Beqiri issued a statement verifying that a project to gather influential political forces and personalities existed, but that it was not a project aimed against the DSK and Ibrahim Rugova. Everything was watered down again and the PSDK returned back to its old course of a satellite national party practically without an identity of its own. Similar is the case with the other Social Democratic Party of Kosovo and other minor Albanian parties.

Now it can unoficially be heard that the leadership of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo had similar intentions. Allegedly, there was a circular addressed to leaders of other minor parties inviting them to cooperation. Before the session of the Assembly of the DSK such an initiative still could have a threatening tone, but after it, and the triumphant verification of Dr. Rugova's mandate, it has become out of place at least for some time. In present circumstances noone has any chance to jeopardize the position of Ibrahim Rugova within the Albanian movement.

But there is a slight enigma within the DSK. Among the 55 chosen members of the Main Board of the DSK, who will be on the list of the new Presidency? Although almost the entire leadership of the DSK (with the exception of those who have resigned in the meantime) became members of the Main Board, there will most probably be no room for all of them in the new Presidency. With special attention, analysts are expecting the results of the elections for Fehmi Agani, the present vice-president of the DSK, who was the key ideologist of the party and supporter of moderate options, who contributed most to maintaining of the compromising course both within the party and in relation to external factors. According to allegations, Agani was constantly in conflict with radical and impatient factions within the DSK, serving as a shock-absorber for indirect attacks against Dr. Rugova. If Agani fails to be elected into the new leadership of the DSK, it would be a signal that the relation of forces has significantly changed and that Rugova would have to fight the radical factions within the partry by himself. He will, therefore, invest his entire authority to keep Agani at the post of the vice-president. Rugova and the DSK also need Agani as the negotiator in possible Albanian-Serbian talks because he is the most competent for it and has the richest experience.

Shkeljzen Maliqi, AIM AIM Pristina (9 pages)