WHAT WILL PRESSURE ON KARADZIC BRING?

AIM, BEOGRAD, July 11, 1994

Janjic - Summary

Like in all previous "decisive" moments of coordination attitudes concerning peace in Bosnia, the warring parties have not moved from their initial positions. The only change in the political course towards attaining peace has occurred in the stance of official Belgrade. The break between President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and the leaders in Pale is becoming increasingly obvious and it will soon become impossible to hide it. After the peace plan was made public, Milosevic met in Belgrade with the second man of the Republic of Srpska, Nikola Koljevic, and not with Karadzic, which is interpreted as an attempt to find a substitute for him in the moderate Koljevic. It is difficult to predict what the reactions of the leadership from Pale to pressures coming from Belgrade will be like. Should the pressures of the international community, supported by increasingly cooperative Belgrade last, the situation in Bosnia could finally turn towards peace. It is still hard to believe that any sharp turn will take place, though, since the relations in the field are still strained.

The peace plan, offered to the warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their "study", is experiencing a fate similar to that of previous attempts to solve the conflict at the negotiating table. After being warned by the most degveloped countries of the world that they must say "yes" this time, the political and military leaders of the warring parties are, truth to tell, making somewhat milder statements than before they received the peace plan, but they are showing no signs of having more radically changed the political courses which brought them to war. Formulations such as "it could be a good basis for negotiations", "the Assembly will decide on everything" and similar ones were used previously also and brought no progress.

The key to everything are, it goes without saying, the maps of the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina with which the Government in Sarajevo, objectively, can be relatively satisfied. The areas controlled by the Serbs are practically divided into three parts and linked by a sort of corridor. The Moslems get access to the Sava river at Brcko, which seriously endangers the present vital thoroughfare between the eastern and western parts of the Republic of Srpska. The so-called corridor, wide only about 800 meters in the region of Brcko remains, but at the critical part its width is reduced to about 200 meters.

The enclaves in the east, along the Drina river, have been expanded, and in case of an escalation of the conflict, Moslem forces could relatively easily cut off the northern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina from eastern Herzegovina. Even if it agrees to 49% of the territories, it is difficult for the Serbian side to accept such tearing of territories under its control.

Such an observation, naturally, proceeds from the factual state, i.e. from the fact that the Serbs, who are superior in military terms have managed to put 70 percent of the territory of Bosnia under their control and that the Moslems forces, despite great efforts have not managed to score any major or more permanent military successes in the past month. Counting on the suppoort of the international community, the Government in Sarajevo does not consider such a division just and asks for more, while the Bosnian Serbs think that such a plan turns the victor into the loser.

This time also, as in earlier "crucial" moments, neither side budged an inch from their initial positions. The Government in Sarajevo considers itself the only legitimate representative of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and wants to preserve it in its present borders, while the Bosnian Serbs are creating their own state and dreaming of its unification with Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia. Not a single official at Pale or in Sarajevo made in the past seven days a single statement which could lead to the conclusion that anything had really changed in that respect.

However, changes are more and more visible in the case of other actors in the Bosnian crisis who are not direct participants in the conflict itself. This primarily refers to Belgrade, which is showing serious signs of changing its political course. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic no longer even mentions the unification of "all Serb lands" and his split with the leadership at Pale is becoming more and more evident and it will no longer be able to conceal it.

The fact that Milosevic talked to Mladic and Koljevic unleashed the imagination of the Belgrade "political gossip circles" which immediately saw this as a sign that the Serbian President was trying to find a substitute for Karadzic in the moderate Koljevic. The meeting with Mladic, considered an advocate of the "hard line" is interpreted as an attempt to ensure his support for the change of political course.

The president of the Parliament of Bosnian Serbs, Momcilo Krajisnik, and member of the top leadership, Biljana Plavsic, both supporters of the "hard line" have remained on the other side. The message of the Prince Tomislav Karadjordjevic for the Serbs not to waiver was sent through Biljana Plavsic to the public. Despite Plavsic's request that the message be broadcast in "prime time" news, the Belgrade media generally turned a deaf ear. Patriotism and fiery national cries are evidently no longer fashionable, but not because of "fashion" itself, but because of the whim and interests of the people creating the main political trends.

At this moment it is very difficult precisely to estimate how Radovan Karadzic and the leadership at Pale will respond to the pressures coming via Belgrade. If they decide to change course and really accept the agreements and offered maps, a painful cut will ensue which the present top political men can hardly survive. The room for "faking" the agreement is very limited since the easing of the sanctions, which is of vital interest to Belgrade, can be expected only if the agreement is indeed implemented in practice and not only signed. Most of the Serbs in Bosnia, including members of the Army cannot understand what is happening and think that the acceptance of such an agreement would seriously endanger the existence of an independent Serbian state. And over the past several years, everyone, including the Belgrade media assured them that an independent state was the only solution and that every other arrangement would lead them to death and extermination. There is very little time to create a different political climate.

Basically, the situation is the same with the Moslems. They too are assured by the media that they should embark on the "liberation of the occupied territories", but it is generally not clear whether this invitation refers to the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina or just to those (still officially undefined) areas which belong to the Moslems and which the Serbs have occupied. It is difficult to convince them to divide the state with "Karadzic's Chetniks".

The reasons for hatred are measured by tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of victims, thousands of burned down villages and towns, hundreds of thousands of refugees. Even when the whole world, including Belgrade unites around a request, it is very difficult to "push it through" in such an atmosphere. The international community most certainly also feels that and has established a single block of pressures on the actors of the conflict in Bosnia. If such pressure were to continue and if a concerted action were carried out, it is certain that with the support of the increasingly cooperative Belgrade things could change. A sudden turnabout, however, is hardly possible since relations in the field are still extremely tense.

Dragan Janjic