THE END OR THE BEGINNING OF A NEW WAR?

AIM, ZAGREB, July 7, 1994

Consideration should be given to the idea of creating a confederation between Croatia and Krajina as a provisional solution in the process of reintegrating the UNPA zones. In the process, Croatia'internationally recognized borders should under no circumstances be brought into question, and the international community should establish the terms and modalities of such a confederational model that would guarantee the Serbs in Croatia local and territorial autonomy,however, with close links with the central authorities in Zagreb. This is how the leaders of the Serbian National Party, Milan Djukic and Veselin Pejnovic presented their proposals a few days ago and immediately brought on the wrath of the turbo-Croats who demanded Djukic's instant removal from the office of Vice-President of the Assembly and the prohibition of his Party.

However, Djukic is not overshooting even when it seems so. He only repeated what the American Ambassador, Peter Galbraith said a few days before. Speaking of the solution to the Serbian issue in Croatia, the American in Zagreb said that a significant level of autonomy can be achieved on the basis on an agreement for the regions in which Serbs are a majority. As an example, he mentioned the model of the American states, the Canadian provinces and Bosnians cantons. Galbraith was explicit that the autonomy would include the right to electoral legislation, the levying of taxes, control of the police, education and culture, and probably symbolic elements. The American Ambassador mentioned, on that occasion, how the American states have their own flags, and that he sees no reason why the same should not apply in, as he calls is, in "the Serbian autonomous region, canton or state."

On their part, the Serbs will have to, according to Galbraith, give up their aspirations for an independent state. The alternative to such an outcome, which irresistibly calls to mind what a year ago Vitaly Churkin formulated as a state within a state, could only be further division or war. If the Croats decide that they cannot live with the Serbs, then they can choose to have a divided country, Galbraith pointed out. If they should choose war - the American concluded - Croatia could loose it. And America would not come to her aid in such an effort. It was later confirmed by Croatian sources that Croatia had not solicited international support for its idea of recovering the regions that are now under Serbian control.

When a year ago Vitaly Churkin mentioned a Serbian state within the state of Croatia, the public here was shocked. Political circles reacted in the same manner: Churkin's statement was interpreted as an expression of traditional Russian-Serbian bargaining. A year later, the identical statement of the American ambassador was not met with such hostility. Time is a powerful element, and the Crotian public has learned that the American Ambassador is almost as important as Tudjman for Croatian state politics. Some of the media jokingly, while other seriously, claim that by his influence Galbraith is the number two man in Croatia, actually, they are still not certain who is number one. The spokesman of "Croatia's most powerfull ally", as Tudjman likes to call him, took the liberty to publicly retort to the President of the Republic, and the Croats already had the opportunity to hear and had to listen to some very unpleasant things. Amon other things, how in athe speace of ex-Yugoslavia no one leads an autonomous policy any longer, and that foreign factors are very influential in the shaping of Tudjman's sovereign will.

The fact that on this occasion too Galbraith's words did not ring with a hollow sound, was confirmed, although bashfully by Croatian sources too. The Croatin Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mate Granic, told the journalist in Spain a few days ago what he still hesitates to say out loud in Zagreb: that Croatia is ready to accept international control of Serbian autonomy in Croatia and that the European Union observers would monitor and guarantee the autonomy of Serbs in the UNPA zones. "The finding of a solution" was announced a few days back by the head of the Croatian Bureau in Belgrade, Zvonimir Markovic. After a two-hour long talk with Slobodan Milosevic he said the international community is pushing towards a definite solution of the Croatian- Serbian issue and the achievement of a new Croatian-Serbian agreement. A meeting between the Croatian and Serbian presidents could possible help bring it about, and Markovic said that Milosevic too "was in favour of such a meeting."

A close encounter at the highest level has already been announced by the Cabinet of the President of Serbia. There is still no word of such a meeting from Tudjman's Office, but approximately at the same time in an interview to "Vecernji list", answering the question of whether he believed in a peace agreement with Serbia, the President of Croatia literally said: "I believe there are sufficient signals to indicate that the responsible politicians in Serbia have become aware of the untenability of the occupation of Croatian regions. (...) Some of them, even the highest ranking ones have become aware that the normalization of relations and that on the basis of the international recognition of Croatia and Serbia would be a historical necessity."

Tudjman in fact claims that a dramatic change has taken place in Serbian policy in support of which he says: they have demonstrated that among other by their public statements on the need of ending the war and normalizing Croatian-Serbian relations, and by the very fact of consenting to the establishment of bureaux." (the Bureau of Yugoslavia in Zagreb and of Croatia in Belgrade). According to Tudjman these are "sufficient signs". The President of Croatia is manifesting an inclination to forget that Milosevic has no problem with saying one thing -institutionally and doing another - non-institutionally. This benevolence was later made relative by Minister Granic, who claimed that Croatia on her part is making conditional the meeting Milosevic-Tudjman, - by "the unconditional Serbian recognition of Croatian borders and sovereignty."

Therefore, the question is "have the responsible politicians in Serbia"become aware of the "untenability of the occupation of Croatian regions", and are they accordingly ready to normalize relations "on the basis of the international recognition of Croatia and Serbia", or does Milosevic perhaps want the top level meeting because he has problems at home? Perhaps he is stalling for time, since Geneva is mandating - the modified "take it or leave it plan" - i.e., the mutual recognition of all states created on the space of former Yugoslavia? Perhaps he has problems with the entire Geneva package which is not exactly pleasant for anyone, but is nevertheless most unpleasant precisely for the Serbian side.

Although some doubts still exist( perhaps they have been left on purpose) to its definite goal - the preservation or division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the pieces of the puzzle with more certainty than previously the final solution can be depicted. Not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but for the entire ex-Yugoslav area. It has three cricial elements - the insisting opon the respect of internationally recognized borders and within that open space for the constitutional arrangement " for the establishment of relations between the Bosnian/Croatian and Serbian entities" and free return of refugees to their "original homes."

Although not thoroughly transparent,it can be deducted out of everything that parts of Bosnia would in some way be closely linked to the neighbouring states. Just like the announced linking of the Muslim-Croatian federation into a confederation with Croatia, thus the Serbian part of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be linked in some way with Serbia, perhaps also into a confederation. Horst Wiesel, the German ambassador to Croatia, analizing the new "peace plan in the form of a ultimatum" of the international community for Bosnia and Herzegovina, confirmed that it "certainly does allow for a close connection of these parts of B&H with the neighbouring states," adding that it was "much too early to speak of the level of that connection." The most important thing now is that all the sides agree to the " last offer plan" and that peace is established.

What will the cooling off of the war be used for? Are the outlines of sone kind of new Yugoslavia looming in the distance? Or is it a matter of a somewhat slowed down but certain realization of Greater Serbia? Will the possibility of an asymmetrical linkage of parts of Bosnia with the neighbouring states become the embryo of these parts associating into a new Yugoslavia? How can the fact be reconciled that part of the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina wish to be closely linked to Croatia, but do not wish any Yugoslav association ? And for the Serbs from Krajina to establish a link up with Serbia? What will be stronger in Bosnia - the centrifugal Serbian- Croatian forces or the Bosnian centripetal force?

Will Serbia temporarily go under cover - freeze a large part of what it has achieved up to now in order to use it one day as a new sprinboard? Is it the beginning of the end of a colossal war or is it the begining of the incubation of a new colossal conflict? The answer to these ad numerous other questions depends on whether the international community has a long-term plan of what to do with this region. Is it developing gradually and patiently the final solution, the outlines of which seem to be appearing, or is it also impseronating but a fireman?

JELENA LOVRIC