"PRACTISING ROUGHNESS" ON MT.OZREN

AIM, BEOGRAD, July 4, 94

The offensive that the Sarajevo Government forces launched in the last fifteen days against the South-West parts of Mt. Ozren was, from the military standpoint, relatively successful. The Serbian forces were taken unawares by the charge of the Government units and suffered great losses (even several hundreds of dead are mentioned). At least ten villages were taken, and the Government forces came close to Vozuca, one of the major Serbian strongholds in this area. Over 5,000 Serbian civilians were forced to leave their homes and find refuge in Doboj and other places.

Last Wednesday an unidentified Serbian officer confirmed in Banjaluka that the Serbian forces had launched a counter-attack and got reinforcements. A unit of the so called "Panthers" arrived to this region from the area of Bijeljina and Majevica in North-East Bosnia, and large quantities of military materiel and heavy weapons were brought into this region. UNPROFOR sources from Sarajevo confirmed on Friday the allegations on a Serbian counter-offensive and said that the Serbian forces had succeeded in recovering a part of the territories occupied by the Sarajevo Government forces.

At this moment it is not altogether clear how successful the counter-offensive of the Serbian forces on Ozren was, but it is certain that they managed to keep some main positions, such as Vozuca, and to retain control over the communications and still are in the position to threaten Zavidovici, a village abutting on the south-west slopes of Ozren.

The target of the Government forces which mostly consist of Moslems loyal to Alija Izetbegovic was to take a part of Ozren and throw the Serbs back from Zavidovici and Maglaj and assume full control over the Zenica - Tuzla road. In this way Doboj, which is controlled by the Serbs, would also be directly threatened. By surrounding this town and possibly taking it the Moslem forces would open up a broad way towards northern Bosnia, i.e. the Sava river valley, which is currently mainly under the control of the Serbian forces.

Mount Ozren, as it is usually said "historically" belongs to the Serbs. The majority of villages scattered over it have been Serbian since time immemorial. Observed from that point of view it is somewhat surprising that the Government in Sarajevo decided to launch a fierce offensive precisely at that point. Obviously, strategic reasons were decisive. And, if they did not have control over Ozren, Izetbegovic's forces could not sovereignly control the broad area of central Bosnia which belongs to them, according to all the maps drawn till now.

Intelligence services in Sarajevo also must have known that for several months now "rumours" had been circulating in Banjaluka that Karadzic had "sold" Ozren, Donji Vakuf (Srbobran), Teslic and some other parts which are now under Serbian control, so as to "meet" the required 51 percent of territories which should go to the Croat - Moslem Federation, according to the proposal of the international community. Such speculations were fuelled especially in the first days of the Moslem offensive, when the Serbs were rather inactive and the Pale leadership did not exert too much effort nor showed much concern over the events on Ozren. The rating of Izetbegovic's forces suddenly started going up those days, and stories of their increased power and reinforcements in materiel and forces which arrived after the alliance with the Croats was renewed, started spreading.

However, it seems that the Serbian military top leadership concluded at the beginning of last week that things were going too fast and unfavourably, and therefore decided on a more serious intervention, the actual achievements of which are still not known. Even if it were true that Karadzic "had sold" Ozren (and he has to "sell" something as he controls over 70 percent of the territories), the leadership on Pale could not allow events to develop so fast.

By deciding to mount a counter-offensive the Serbian top military, just before the negotiations are to resume, probably wants to demonstrate that it is not yet inferior in the military respect and that it can control the increased military power of Izetbegovic's troops. Generally speaking, Mladic and Karadzic did not want to allow the Moslem side to continue the negotiations convinced that it could achieve in the military sphere as much as it wanted, endeavouring to show that the taking of a significant part of Ozren is not a consequence of the weakening of the Serbian military power but rather its "restrain from military actions" and resolve to respect the truce.

It is a paradox that the strategic target of the Moslem side was to win control over a mountain which, ethnically belongs to the Serbs, and that the strategic target of the Serbs was to take control over the east Bosnia region, along the Drina river, particularly around Gorazde. The Moslems always constituted a majority in towns along the Drina river, and now they are practically gone. The achievement of both "strategic targets" is followed by the mass exodus of the civilian population, while the proportions of Moslem sufferings in east Bosnia in the last two years can hardly be compared to the current exodus of the Serbian civilian population from Ozren.

All things taken into account, it turns out that because of "strategic interests" the civilian population is forced to abandon regions in which they have lived for centuries, while their armies are expelling "the other side" from their regions, so as to round off control over their territories.

What strikes the eye is that the forces of the Sarajevo Government are also on offensive around Donji Vakuf (Srbobran) and Teslic, i.e. precisely in the places believed in Banjaluka "to have been sold". In case the thesis on this barter proves true, it would suit Karadzic and the Pale leadership more to give up these territories because they are unable to have military control over them, than to simply sign surrender and thereby shake their political position. However, this is not easy to accomplish in practice, as shown by the example of Ozren. Villages, towns and even whole mountains could not be moved by tyrants much greater than those who are now reigning over war and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dragan Janjic