WHAT CAUSED THE GENERAL STAFF OF

THE ARMY OF YUGOSLAVIA TO WAVER AT ELEVATION 1703

AIM, Skopje, July 5, 1994

Summary: Withdrawal of Yugoslav soldiers from Cupino Brdo was received with great relief by the Macedonian public, but with a certain doubt about what had forced the General Staff in Belgrade to issue such an order. It is certain that noone believes that it was the military power of Macedonian army that tipped the balance. The opposition is trying to use Belgrade's decision to withdraw its soldiers as evidence of the thesis that Belgrade and Skopje are acting in agreement in order to divert the attention of the public from real problems, and in order to justify Gligorov's policy before the autumn elections. Macedonian opposition claims that Belgrade is thereby scoring points internationally, showing that whoever chooses to negotiate with it can easily reach solutions. Macedonian press also sharply criticized UNPROFOR soldiers who, after inspection of the situation, withdrew to a safe distance. It is believed that informing of the UN Security Council about the problems at the border greatly influenced the peaceful solution, as well as the attitude of the USA that stability of Macedonia is important for the Balkans in general, and the appeal of the CSCE that territorial integrity of the FYROM should be respected. The problem of Macedonian-Yugoslav border remains open, though: for Skopje, the border is final as it is, but for Belgrade the former administrative border is dubious along more than two thirds of its length, in other words, along its 140 km.

Friday, July 1, was ther last day set for withdrawal of the Army of the FR of Yugoslavia from elevation 1703, Cupino Brdo, not far from Kriva Palanka. This deadline was set by Defence Minister of Macedonia, Vlado Popovski, who said that the Army of Macedonia would take over the elevation, if diplomatic action failed.

Few people in Macedonia actually expected that about ten Yugoslav soldiers in trenches would actually withdraw, threatened by the new and lightly armed Macedonian Army. The news about the withdrawal was received with great relief, but accomplanied by certain doubt what could have forced the General Staff in Belgrade to issue such an order, because certainly noone believes that it was the military force of the Army of Macedonia that tipped the balance. It can be claimed with a hundred per cent certainty that political and diplomatic action was decisive, but whose? Detailed information from reliable sources have not begun to flow in yet.

Among the journalists, the threat of Minister Popovski, made on June 17, was received with wonder. Not only because it is a generally established fact that the Macedonian army cannot by far be compared with the military power of the Yugoslav Army, but also because the resoluteness of the Minister somehow did not fit into the policy of Macedonian leadership always to seek ways to resolve disputes peacefully, it departed from the proclaimed peaceful policy at all costs. But, the Minister of Police, Frckovski, in an indirect way denied all journalistic speculations emphasizing in a TV program that "the publicly made statement of the Minister is actually the attitude of the Government". To a question concerning the occupied elevation, President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, stated in an interview to the Zagreb Daily "Vecernji list", that he believed there would be no war.

And yet, during the long fortnight, Macedonian leadership did not come out with its view about the expected time limit, and the media devoted more attention to the population census, a murder in Tetovo, and growing interethnic tensions in the western part of the state with predominant Albanian population. Only the weekly "Puls" of June 24, published an article about the occupied elevation point, concluding in the end that Macedonian Army, when the ultimatum expires, should take action and simply "expel the ten Serbian soldiers". According to the journalist, one may deduce that this was an easy job to do, which caused astonishment among the well informed.

It remains unclarified whether the Yugoslav Army withdrew on the day of the ultimatum (Friday about 24.00 h) or a day later. Namely, several journalists spread unverified news on Friday that the the elevation was abandoned, and that a celebration was already under way at the Defence Ministry. All attempts to get an official statement failed, only the sources close to the Ministry claimed that these were just rumours. The following evening, Macedonian TV carried the news without any details. Was the Ministry being cautious and decided to wait and see what would happen at the elevation point after another night passed? This is what the young editor of the Saturday late evening news said: "Wishing you a good evening, dear spectators, and farewell to the Serbian Army, without "see you again!"

The last journalist crew which visited the elevation point was the crew from the weekly "Puls", which witnessed a relaxed atmosphere on both sides. Until one moment, when suddenly, out of nowhere, members of a special military unit of the Macedonian Army appeared in field vehicles, armed with automatic rifles and in bullet-proof vests, who, according to what the journalists said, cut off the food supply route of the ugoslav soldiers. The route was on Macedonian territory, and according to certain sources, the Serbian party had intended to promote this route as the future border in the region.

Did the FR of Yugoslavia intend only to test the pulse of the Macedonian Army and more than that, to test the resoluteness of the American members of the UNPROFOR ? According to views expressed in Macedonian newspapers, members of the UNPROFOR did not pass the test, because after they had surveyed the initial situation, they withdrew to a safe distance, denying their "combating significance, which they objectively do not have", as "Nova Makedonija" daily established. It further stated that the presence of several hundred American soldiers was the result of a standard political compromise "to warn Serbia, to satisfy Macedonia, and not to insult Greece".

The latter statement starts from the hypothesis that this is a classical example of military pressure, but that it has as the objective additional complicating of internal political and problematic events which were more than abundant in the past fifteen days.

The thesis, which is, of course, impossible to verify, and which was often presented by the opposition in the past three years, is that Skopje and Belgrade are acting in agreement about certain moves in order to divert the attention of the public from real problems. Namely, the policy of President Gligorov could be justified by such a move, before the autumn elections, since it favours peaceful solutions, but in this case, manifested an efficient decisiveness as well. On the other hand, Belgrade is scoring points on the international level in this way, showing that it is ready to establish dialogue with whoever chooses to negotiate with it, "contrary to the administrations in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia which reached out for arms".

For all that, it is believed that informing of the UN Security Council greatly influenced the course of the events, as well as the expression of concern which came from Washington right after that and its statement that stability of Macedonia is important for the Balkan in general. A day before Friday, the Permanent CSCE Committee reached a decision concerning the situation on the border between Macedonia and Yugoslavia, which, besides expressing concern, calls for withdrawal of military units and respect of territorial integrity and independence of the FYROM. CSCE Chairman passed the message to the authorities in Belgrade, calling them to establish a joint expert border commission as a matter of urgency, in order to resolve the existing differences. Certain sources in Macedonia add that "red" telephone lines between Skopje and Belgrade were very busy in the past days.

Be that as it may, the worst has been avoided, but the problem of the border remains open: for Skopje, it is final, while for Belgrade it is the former administrative border, meaning that it is problematic along more than two thirds of its length, i.e. 140 km. So far, Belgrade has refused to form its expert group, and general opinion is that nothing of the kind will happen until the day these two states recognize each other.

The differences between Skopje and Belgrade are great, not only concerning the border. Economic, commercial and even human relations challenge them. Both states would suffer nothing but damage from further straining of relations. A new adventure would be just one too many for Yugoslavia. For Macedonia, the attempt of an armed forcing out of a foreign army from the elevation point could have meant a dangerous venture, doubtlessly at a much greater cost than the strategic significance of the elevation. And nothing to say about further development of democracy. Maybe that is the reason why Macedonian Government silently endured criticism by the media, but remained cautious till the end.

PANTA DZAMBAZOSKI