THE KOSOVO ISSUE AND THE STABILITY OF MACEDONIA

Summary:If Kosovo were to become independent and Macedonia remained a state of special interest and under international protection, alarming tensions would cease to exist in the region. The existing tensions and explosive situation in the Balkans would suddently deflate and be reduced to bilateral disputes. Likewise, if Kosovo were to become independent, the Albanians would lose interest in splitting up Macedonia and in provoking a mass-scale war. Both Tirana and Pristina, as well as Tetovo have an interest in the survival of Macedonia as a multi-ethnic state open towards its neighbours and, naturally, open for direct communication with Albania and Kosovo. Therefore, contrary to what some Western diplomats claim: Kosovo would not become a fuse for setting off Macedonia, but on the contrary its independent status would become a direct condition for its internal stability as well as for establishing a balance and peace and security in the region.

The census organized in Macedonia is a new fiasco of European policy on the Balkans. Although its preparations lasted for a year and half and were financed by the Council of Europe which provided 2 million ECU for its implementation, the census began with irregularities and very small chances exist that it will be completed in a regular way. Western diplomats and experts did not actually find an adequate way of coping with the inter-ethnic distrust which is quite expressed in Macedonia and which could not be eliminated by way of finding "compromise solutions" and exerting political pressure. Instead of providing precise statistical data on the overall population, and what is more important, on the ethnic composition of Macedonia, the results of the present census will probably become a new source of manipulation with numbers and of deepening the existing distrust and differences. Considering that elections are to be held soon in this young state which as yet has not ensured internal stability, the failure of the census will certainly stir up passions and destroy the hitherto very thin thread of the Macedonian-Albanian consensus (the fall of the present coalition government can be expected with certainty), which will then create room for additional complications and deterioration.

If some kind of modus for easing tension is not found, in the first place in the relations Tirana-Skopje, a sudden shit of the crisis to the South of the Balkans can be expected. Not only in Macedonia, but even more so in Kosovo, an escalation of the supressed Albanian issue may crop up. If world factors do not find a global Balkan solution and adequate instruments which would obligate all the protagonists to refrain from causing new conflicts, not even the end of the present war in Bosnia would contribute much to the lessening of tensions in the South, but on the contrary a compromise solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if not accompanied by the application of the same isntruments in the South could destroy the delicate status quo in Macedonian and Kosovo.

In all the analyses undertaken so far on the issue, the Macedonian and Kosovo problems are closely corelated. In essence, both problems are a derivative of the unsolved Albanian question. The internal stability of Macedonia depends on the status of the Albanians in it, as the second largest ethnic community whose percentage in the overall population is controversial (between 21%, according to Macedonian estimates and 35 to 40%, according to Albandian sources). In Kosovo, although the issue of the overall number of inhabitants and their ethnic composition is uncontestable ( Albanians make up over 90%, the Serbs less than 8%) Serbia and the international community are denying the majority population the right to self-determination and independence to Kosovo.

In some European diplomatic circles the Kosovo and the Macedonia issues are causatively connected, when it is asserted that Kosovo cannot gain independence because that would jeopardize Macedonia's existence, and thereby peace and security in the region. Judging by everything, this contention originated from Serbian sources, and if the assumption is correct, it is used as proof that Belgrade has maintained its influence on part of European diplomacy. The claim that independent Kosovo would become a detonator for Macedonia is acatually an alibi for a conversion of thesis regarding the main cause of spreading the war to the South of the Balkans. A war will not break out in Macedonia and in the South of the Balkans due to the existing Serbian threats in Kosovo, nor because of Greek's open threat to Macedonia, but rather it will break out because as soon as they get Kosovo the Albanians will become sufficiently powerful to make the move and conquer northern Macedonia with the aim of creating Greater Albania. The present war-mongering policy of Serbia and Greece is identified with something that could happen in the future and what Albanians today are not manifesting either in Tirana, or Pristina or Skopje. i.e., Tetovo.

The above mentioned argument certainly originates from the Belgrade propaganda kitchen. Since as of late Belgrade has been developing the image of a peace-loving center, it no longer lays so great an emphasis on its decisiveness to defend Kosovo at any price, including the price of causing of a new war, but rather gives priority to the notion that Kosovo should remain in Serbia because the independence of Kosovo would certainly not bring peace and stability to the region but would, on the contrary, cause war for the annexation of Albanian Macedonia with all the adverse consequences, frequently mentioned in the catastrophic visions of numerous analysts: the drawing of neighbouring countries into a war, a war between Greece and Turkey which would jeoparadize the survival of NATO, the spreading of the conflict to the other foci of crisis in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, etc.

It is evident, however, that the fate of Macedonia does not depend solely on the Albanians and their aspirations, since its status represents a very complex issue. Naturally if Kosovo were to become independent, the Albanians from Macedonia would gain much stronger Albanian support, whereby they would also strengthen their internal negotiating position vis-a-vis the Macedonians which are now trying to keep the status of a nation building people only for themselves. In any case the present stability of Macedonia depends on the relationship between the Albanians and Macedonians, namely, on how adequate and equitable a status the former will get. However, although the Albanian factor would thus gain in strength, it could not change (except in some adventurous versions) the basic geo-strategic relations which dictated the creation of Macedonia in the first place.

To the present day the Albanians have not manifested any aspirations to destroy Macedonia ( on the contrary, such aspirations are nurtured by the neigbouring countries, before all by the Greeks and Serbs, as well as the Bulgarians who do not recognize the existence of the Macedonian people), but rather have manifested only their vital interest in promoting their status in a joint state.

The creation of the Macedonian state is perhaps a historical coincidence, but has today become a reality of more permanent resulting interests which should as such have more permanent forms of international protection. It is no coincidence that for the first time since the existence of the UNO the instrument of the preventive presence of blue helmets has been applied precisely in Macedonia. Paradoxically, Macedonia's strength lies in its weakness, as a critical spot which has to be under international control. Macedonia is practically under some form of international protectorate.

Of course the stability of the Balkans will most certainly depend on the resolution of the Albanian issue as the next serious and dramatic problem. If stability and peace depend upon it, then the views which seek a solution in the maintenance of a status quo, a state in which the Albanians would remain divided and subjugated are completely wrong. The supression of the Albanian issue, the non-recognition of their right to self-determination will sooner become the generator of problems than if adequately treated in given circumstances, both in Kosovo and in Macedonia.

If Kosovo were to become independent and Macedonia remained a state of special interest and under international protection, aggravating tensions would cease to exist in the region. The existing tensions and explosive situation in the Balkans would suddenly shrink and be reduced to bilateral disputes. Likewises, if Kosovo were to become independent, the Albanians would cease to be interested in the breaking up of Macedonia and of causing a mass-scale war.

Tirana and Pristina, as well as Tetovo are interested in the survival of Macedonia as a multi-ethnic state open towards its neighbours, and of course, open to direct communication with Albanian and Kosovo. Therefore, contrary to what some Western diplomats claim: independent Kosovo would not become a fuse for Macedonia, but would rather be the immediate condition for its internal stability as well as for establishing a balance and peace and security in the region. The second possibility is the one constantly insisted upon by the Kosovo leader Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, namely, the placing of Kosovo under internatioal protectorate. What has become imperative in the case of Macedonia, should be applied to Kosovo too, naturally if peace and the finding of an adequate solution are the real aims.

However, the manner in which Europe has approached the census project in Macodonia shows that it is not ready to deal more seriously with the Albanian question and all its consequences.

Shkelzen Maliqi