THE WEST DOES NOT REALLY CARE ABOUT BOSNIA

AIM, BELGRADE, 29. 05. 1994.

Interview: Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, Director of the Institute for Federalism, University of Freiburg, Switzerland

Dr Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, a Swiss expert for international, constitutional and administrative law, deals with Balkan situation in many ways. He was a member of a European Community observation mission in ex-Yugoslavia at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict; he was also an expert consultant of a group of scientists who were preparing the law concerning the position of national minorities in Serbia during Panic's government. At the end of May 1994 he took part at the conference held in Belgrade on governmental issues in postcommunist countries.

* The Yugoslav conflict has not yet calmed down and it seems that the international public is facing a new emerging one, between Russia and Ukraine, over Cremia. In what ways are these conflicts comparable?

• Both ex-Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Union have faced armed ethnic conflicts. In both cases it was history and tradition of the communist system that has helped, or maybe even caused, the conflict. Firstly, it created collective values as the only possible ones. When communism failed, the collectivity needed new ideology - again based on collective, not individual values; it was found in nationalism. Nationalism was a clear consequence which emerged from the communist tradition. Secondly, in the seventies, the regime, especially Yugoslav President Tito, tried to use nationalism, through the Constitution, to help communism - by creating nations and giving every nation a certain kind of mother republic. In this way nationalistic communist parties were promoted. These nationalistic communist parties have started to dissolute Yugoslavia within the communist system at the time. If one looks at the Soviet Constitution, this can also be said for the Soviet Union.

It is true, however, that the Soviet Union has dissolved peacefully. One of the major differences, in comparison to the Yugoslav case, is the position of the Soviet army. I think that the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) was one of the major factors, which is usually overlooked, in creating and causing the conflict.

The problem of Cremia is comparable to the Serb-Croat conflict over Krajina from the aspect of the right to self-determination. It is a very tricky issue, who really has the right to self-determination - the ethnic nation, the Russians, or the Serbs, regardless of the borders, or all the people on a territory within given borders? On the other hand, it can be compared in a way to the Kosovo problem. The Russians, as well as the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, had a referendum, they have their parliament and they want autonomy and even maybe also secession.

I know about Cremia situation only as a reader of a few Western media, but I see a major difference now. Although the Russian army is of course very much interested in Cremia, apparently there are no Russian military barracks in Cremia and the army has no reasons, for the time being at least, to intervene as the JNA did in Croatia.

* Is this difference sufficient to secure a peaceful resolution of the conflict? Has the world learnt something from the Yugoslav tragic experience?

• I always said that what we were facing in former Yugoslavia we would be facing, maybe in a different way or in a much more crucial way, in former Soviet Union.

The situation in Cremia depends very much on persons in charge in such very tense and difficult issues. If on both sides, or better to say - on all three sides, there are persons devoted to peace, then there might be a possibility for a peaceful solution.

This was not the case in Yugoslavia. Political leadership in ex-Yugoslavia came to power by instrumentalizing nationalism. But once nationalism emerges, it gets out of control. If hatred has started and fear has spread among the population, then political tactics cannot change a lot of things any more.

Here I would stress the issue of the media. If hatred is fabricated and spread thorough the media, then the conflict is unavoidable.

* Judging by the Bosnian experience, will the international community be of any help in solving a new war conflict peacefully? How do you evaluate the behavior of Western countries in the Bosnian conflict?

• When I was leading the EC mission to Yugoslavia in 1991-1992, I heard all over the area - Europe must, Europe has the responsibility, Europe has to do this or that... I think that this perception of Europe is totally wrong. You cannot expect Europe to act and prevent any kind of war. In principle, every country - maybe here I am talking as a Swiss, because in Switzerland interior policy always has the priority - should have internal priorities, and as far as external priorities are concerned, it is to have peace outside and good international relations and that is it. You will not expect European countries to go to Ruanda and help bring peace to Ruanda as they should not go to Yugoslavia.

In my opinion, Western powers have acted in Bosnia in reaction to their public opinion. And this, I think, is the worst thing. If you just have to accommodate public opinion, you should not have foreign policy. What they do in Bosnia is to accommodate their own public opinion....

* But how was this public opinion created?

• That, of course, is the general question I am asked whenever I raise this thesis. A lot of journalists are sent to the area of conflict. Journalists report what they see or what they can see. The media just want to be sold. Unfortunately, it is easier to sell pictures of horror and human atrocities than analytical background information on a specific situation. These picture of horror create some tensions in domestic public opinion.

Of course, there may be some people in media who are interested in making politics. Lets say, CNN wants to make politics - the way it focuses on Bosnia, it wants to influence the government to make certain decisions. But I have no real information, real evidence in regard to the media, which would enable me to say that this is a willful strategy.

However, the problem is that the media information are the major basis for political decisions. And the problem is that the politicians who are involved in the Yugoslav crisis are much more interested to find solutions in order to be heroes in their own public opinion than to do something in the interest of the people in ex-Yugoslavia. They do not care about what is really going on in Bosnia, they do not care about interests of the people there - they wish to be reelected, to be heroes in regard to their public opinion. This is a major structural failure of foreign policy of Western countries.

There are some international organizations, some nongovernmental organizations - they are really concerned, but in general, the Western foreign policy has experienced a structural failure concerning this issue. This "Sarajevo party" in France, for example, is a pure scandal - to use the distrust and the terrible situation which exists in Sarajevo just for personal politics, it is a scandal.

* Is peace in Bosnia more in the hands of the local or the international powers?

• If local powers want peace I am sure there will be peace. But there no peace is possible as long as the international community has not a clear-cut concept as far as its own policy regarding Bosnia is concerned - either it is a mediator or it is an intervener. It cannot be both. If you want to be a mediator you have to treat all the parties equally. If you want to be an intervener then you have to pay the price. They do not want to pay the price, and they do not want to be a mediator. My own opinion is that the UN should be a real mediator. It must not be an intervener.

* In your expert opinion, what are the prospects of the Muslim-Croat federation in Bosnia? Is its establishment a step on the road to peace?

• I would be glad if any kind of solution could help bring peace, and if this solution could help peace, I would be the first to say - wonderful. However, I have some doubts. My major problem is that the process has started the other way round. They are making a constitution for no constituted territory. As long as the part which is to be constituted does not exist, you cannot make a constitution. You need first to have a state and to know where the state is.

The second problem concerns the so-called cantons. As a Swiss, I am very much opposed to their calling the regions in the Muslim-Croat federation cantons - not simply because of the name, but because it is claimed that they have something which somehow fits the Swiss model. From my point of view, they do not fit the Swiss situation. The concept of cantons presupposes that majority of issues will be solved there, on that level, especially minority issues. They are only tackled on federal level after they have already solved their minority problems. This goes together with great local autonomy - strong local authorities which decide about almost everything. If the federation is to be constituted of cantons, the cantons should first have the power and then they should make the government, not the other way round.

The third problem is the governmental system. To establish a governmental system with a changing presidency, it means to institutionalize a conflict. In my opinion, in all those areas with conflicting situations which last for years, you must find a solution which separates the conflicting parties, or where this is not possible - which makes them reach a compromise on their own.

In general, you can not make peace in Bosnia if you do not take the 3 parties into account. Of course, it is possible to go step by step, but even this approach means that all the three parties have to agree on the first solution. It is not possible to make any solution without Serbs.

* Is there a historical analogy for this federation of yesterday's war enemies?

• After the religious war in Switzerland a confederation was established. But it was a very open confederation and every canton had its autonomy concerning the question of religion.

I think such a federation is possible, but it means separation, accepting as common only what is absolutely necessary and institutions to guarantee that there will always be a possibility for a compromise.

Jovanka Matic