ALBANIAN REALISTIC POLICY

Summary: Accusations and divisions in Albanian political circles between "realists" and "non-realists" concerning the issue of Kosovo are quite frequent lately.

World diplomacy has finally somehow managed to reach a common formula for Bosnia, and set both itself and the parties in conflict the deadline of four months to accomplish peace and find a solution. There are few who believe that four months will be sufficient and that the formula will succeed, but diplomats have at least gained the time to work in peace behind the scene, with no pressures due to the dramatic events on the battlefields like before. If the conflicts around Brcko are not renewed, both Bosnia and the Balkans in general could finally have a more peaceful summer.

The four-month deadline for Bosnia seems to have postponed bringing Kosovo on the agenda. At the Ministerial Conference held in Geneva on May 12, the great powers were busy dealing with Bosnia. But, their stance concerning Kosovo is well-known since a long time ago, to be precise, since the Washington Agreement of the five in May 1993, which stated that Kosovo ought to have a high level of autonomy within Serbia. The same offer was brought by the British Secretary of State, Douglas Hogg, when he recently visited Kosovo. Mr. Hogg's offer of autonomy within Serbia caused much commotion in Kosovo. It caused division among Albanian political factors. They were present before, but in a latent form, and now they just deepened. Disputes about the contents and the nature of what the world is actually offering Kosovo have started. Several comments, primarily those published in the weekly "Koha" edited by Veton Suroi, as well as the statement given by Adem Demaqi, had a "realistic" tone, suggesting that the judgement of world factors should be taken seriously, in other words, that Albanian policy would have to consider accepting autonomy as a necessary transitional phase towards other solutions. Reactions to such suggestions were quite sharp. Fehmi Agani, Vice-President of the leading Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK), assessed this readiness to accept the judgement of the great powers unreservedly as "quasi-realistic" and "defeatist". Mr. Agani thinks that the Albanian party has no reason to lower its ambitions before the negotiations even started.

But, contrary to earlier controversies concerning the similar topic, the present one has not ended by silencing and excommunicating the "realists". The reason for this lies not only in the fact that just those Albanian politicians who are considered to be moderate anyhow publicly presented their views (Dr. Fehmi Agani belongs to the moderate, "realistic" wing of the DSK), but also in the fact that the project on the autonomy of Kosovo originated in the centres of world power, and the local politicians simply expressed their opinions about this project and "realistically" or "unrealistically" assessed how much strength the Albanians have to resist the "verdict" of the world power-wielders. Altogether, these polemics gave the impression that the Albanian leadership is after all closer to realism. But, of course, Albanian leaders are faced with the problem how to reach a pragmatic formula in the existing circumstances, which would enable the beginning of a dialogue with the Serbian party, as the foreign factors demand.

When speaking of the relations with the world, the Serbs enjoy the privilege of being in the position to stipulate conditions, play various tricks and give false statements, because they have a military advantage and control the territories. The Albanians enjoy no such luxury to appear as the lords of war and peace. They can rely only on the democratic choice of the majority of the Kosovo population, and on remaining democratic procedures for solving problems. However, for a democratic resolution of the crisis, abandoning of militaristic methods by the other party is necessary, but this is not the case in Kosovo. Milosevic's regime in Kosovo relies solely on military force. Any democratic solution would destroy Serbian military control of Kosovo. Serbia, in fact, has no other possibilities but to keep Kosovo under its control but by force.

The project of renewing the autonomy of Kosovo coming from abroad, although very easily accepted by Milosevic, as Douglas Hogg claimed, will actually cause much greater problems to the Serbian side. The current policy of the regime and that of the majority of the opposition as well, was erected on the denial of the autonomous status for Kosovo and there is no tendency in Serbia to return elements of statehood to Kosovo which it had pursuant to the 1974 Constitution (Assembly, Government, Police, courts...) and which, with the absolute mojority of the Albanian population (9:1), would actually mean the loss of Kosovo.

Let us make an imaginative experiment. Let us suppose that the world super-powers succeed in imposing the model of a maximum autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia. Regardless of what legal competences of the Kosovo parliament would be after free elections, it would have such composition that it would defend the interest of the majority of the Kosovo population (the Albanians) much more openly than it was the case with the Assembly in 1990 when signatures in favour of the Declaration on Independence were not at all easy to collect. It would be impossible for Serbia to control and manipulate by democratic means a parliament of Kosovo with an absolute Albanian majority. Such a parliament would be an insurmountable barrier for any issue jeopardizing the interests of Albanian majority. Therefore, one has to imagine a situation where the parliamnets and the governments of Kosovo and Serbia would constantly be in conflicts about competences in making decisions and adopting laws. There are no illusions in Serbia about what would happen. Any type of autonomy for Kosovo is considered in Serbia as silent capitulation and opening of possibilities for a peaceful secession of Kosovo in a parliamentary manner. Therefore, the following opinion is spreading in Serbia: "It would be better to proceed with an ethnic demarcation with the Albanians in the very start than renew an autonomy which would be an obstacle for normal development of Serbia. All the more so as the outcome will in the end be the same - the loss of Kosovo."

But, let us return to the Albanian political scene. Recent events have reaffirmed that the differences in views, when speaking of essential issues, are very small. For instance, when speaking of the "radicals" and the "moderates", of the "realists" and the "non-realists" among the Albanians, the gap between them is usually much smaller than one would usually imply by these terms. The overall Albanian policy is actually non-militaristic and realistic, so the differences may be sought only within this common option. The latest meeting of the two Albanian leaders, Sali Berisha and Ibrahim Rugova in Tirane, on May 18, also confirms this. The statement given after their meeting reads: "The two Presidents consider that establishment of a dialogue between Prishtine and Belgrade in the persence of a third party, is an imperative, in order to determine the measures for normalization of life and political resolution of the problem of Kosovo." Such wording opens the possibilities for unconditional negotiations with Serbia and it is much closer to the "realistic" and "moderate" opinions. The "radicals" among the Albanians who would like to negotiate solely about the possibility of secession of Kosovo, do not approve of such wording and they are complaining against both Rugova and Berisha now. But, the Albanian party must have as open a position in negotiations as possible. Berisha and Rugova are aware that such wording of an offer for negotiations has advantages. After Milosevic's statement that there will be no problems about the autonomy of Kosovo, the Serbian side has gained an advantage of a negotiating party which accepts dialogue on the solution offered by the world powers. But, this advantage could shift to the Albanian side now, because it appears that there is an attempt at adopting again the negotiating tactics applied from September 1992, when the objective was to discuss specific issues and normalization of everyday life, i.e. to talk about problems such as schools, health, putting a stop to police repression, before the issue of the status of Kosovo is even mentioned. Such an approach may arouse suspicion that the dialogue, just like the previous one, will not be fruitful, but the response to this incredulity could be that the previous dialogue could have been just a prologue. Certain speculations, although unverified, claim that the statements of the two Presidents (Berisha and Rugova) are actually the result of diplomatic mediation of Romania. These speculations are based on the fact that Bucarest has in the past month been the centre of diplomatic activities in the Balkans. First, the Serbian President Milosevic visited Romania, then the Albanian Foreign Minister, Alfred Serechi, and immediately afterwards, President Berisha. After Milosevic's meeting with Iliescou, Romanian press wrote about surprising proposals made by Milosevic for the establishment of some kind of a Balkan alliance which would include Albania. The press in Serbia mentioned this very shyly, and the President of Serbia never speaks much. Did Milosevic have a specific and attractive offer for the Albanians when he planned them as partners in the Balkan alliance?

Judgement about it must remain on the level of pure speculation. But, the important thing is that Albanian policy, nevertheless, retains the realitic and moderate direction in resolving the problem by political means. This is evident from the relation the two Presidents, Berisha and Rugova, have towards Macedonia. They stressed in Tirane that "stability and independence of Macedonia were very significant for peace and stability of the Albanians and other nations in the Balkans". They encouraged the Albanians in Macedonia "to be cooperative both in the sphere of consolidation of Macedonia and in the sphere of securing freedoms and human and national rights of the Albanians, since this is a condition for stability of this Republic". Does this mean that after the split among the Albanians in Macedonia, when it seemed that the relations between Tirane and Prishtina are also strained, an overall Balkan policy is being established again, with realistic and moderate preconditions, but with better chances for realization of long-term objectives. Albanian realism should be encouraged by statements such as the one given by the former US Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, when he said that American administration ought to consider the possibility of Kosovo remaining in Serbia, should Serbia continue with its repressive policy in Kosovo which is aimed at silent ethnic cleansing of the province. Zimmerman's voice is not lonely on the international scene.

(7 pages)

Shkelzen Maliqi, AIM Prishtina