SARAJEVO: A CITY WITHOUT A FUTURE?

Sarajevo May 25, 1994

Waiting for its chance

Is Sarajevo's destiny to be a divided city like Jerusalem, Nicosie, Beyrouth, or former Berlin? What are the chances for this city which has become the symbol of resistance in the two-ear war, to be reconstructed and to become again the distinguished capital of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural way of life?

AIM, Sarajevo, May 1994

These are the questions which torture every true citizen of Sarajevo, but at the same time, these are the questions manipulated by both politicians in Bosnia and the actors of the international establishment. Because, since shelling of the city has ceased, the assessment could be heard from several significant places in Europe and the world that the problem of Sarajevo was resolved, and that, with the withdrawal of the heavy arms, it was practically taken off the list of priorities. As key arguments used to support such an insupportable thesis, banal examples of "normalization" of life are listed, such as starting of the trams to transport passengers, repair of traffic lights downtown and lights in the streets... But, things look quite differently.

The key issue which is carefully avoided is that Sarajevo is still under siege, and that free movement in and out of the city is still impossible without special permits and the escort of the UNPROFOR which provides protection. Opening of the lines towards the suburb Hrasnica at the foot of Mount Igman, and towards Visoko and Zenica, do mean certain progress, but that cannot be a lasting solution. The procedure for acquiring permits for crossing in these directions is exceptionally complicated and implies a month of searching for the necessary papers in order to gather the documentation needed to leave the city. Besides, the UNPROFOR itself has noticed that mostly the elderly get permits, because they are not in the category of conscripts.

One of the rare good things is the opening of the so-called blue corridor across the runway of the Sarajevo airport through which the much needed food is coming in, without the control by the Serbian forces. As a tangible result, the prices in the city have drastically decreased in comparison with the past period, but they are still very high. As an example, a liter of oil costs 7 German marks, sugar costs 5, as well as a kilo of potatoes, a kilogram of chicken costs 20, a carton of cigarettes from 20 to 30, and roasted coffee 40 marks. If one knows that the average salary of the employed not in the private sector is about two German marks payable in Bosnian coupons, it is possible to place things within a realistic context. Not to mentioned the retired whose pensions are mostly paid in flour, 5 to 10 kilos a month on the average.

When politics interferes, then the whole picture becomes additionally complicated. It is quite vague to what extent the American diplomat, William Eagleton, a politician with forty years of experience in various missions, knew what he was getting into when he was nominated United Nations special coordinator for Sarajevo. On the occasion of his nomination, Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, said that his task was "to make an integral assessment and a plan of actions for the reconstruction of the major public services in Sarajevo." This practically meant that the original idea about nomination of an administrator of the city by UN was abandoned, which was strongly opposed by both the Muslim and the Serbian party.

Such a political decision simply had to fail after the first trial. Namely, as the newly nominated mayor of Sarajevo, Kupusovic (one of whose first decision was to prohibit selling of alcoholic beverages in the city!) admitted, the zealous Eagleton had already offered an already prepared plan, but they refused it. According to Kupusovic, the reason for the refusal lay in the fact that Eagloton's plan anticipated development of two parallel infrastructires in the city - one in Grbavica under Serbian control, called the "Serbian sector of Sarajevo", and the other - for the remaining part of the city.

Like any American, Willian Eagleton, is primarily a practical man, but there is no doubt that a definite diplomatic strategy is also implied by the offered project, which in the present situation cannot be publicly presented. On the other hand, it is well known that the USA have always respected the principle of force, so the question is whether they could or would instruct their man to do otherwise. Because, how significant Grbavica is for the Serbs, as an urban part of the city which penetrates like a wedge practically to the heart of Sarajevo, is best illustrated by Karadzic's words uttered when he toured that part of the city during the holidays. He said then that "Grbavica - a Serbian fortress" had become the symbol of Serbian resistance in Sarajevo and that it should never be forgotten. Not to speak about the fact that only two weeks later Radovan Karadzic declared that concerning the division of Bosnia, one should not speak of percentages and suggested an exchange of 5 per cent of the territory for the center of Sarajevo, and his close cooperate, Momcilo Krajisnik, resolutely rejected the proposal of Douglas Hogg that the Serbs should accept only 49 per cent of the territory, calling it a "provocation".

Practically, the destiny of the city of Sarajevo is stretched between the arrogance of the local authorities and international factors who do not know what to do with it. Because, as hard as one may try to be an optimist, it seems that the solution for the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be offered before the final end of the war, meaning further continuation of its agony, at least if one would judge by the words of Boutros Ghali who has expressed fear that it is possible that the war in Bosnia might develop into a lasting conflict.

There are, of course, other aggravating circumstances which cause doubt that the future of Sarajevo is certain. The two-year war with the innocent victims has led to an immense "brain drain", especially of the young and highly educated. Draft laws are now prepared which will forbid, for example, all medical staff and physicians to leave the country for the period of at least 5 years, after graduation or specialization.

The structure of the city population has changed significantly in the past months, the share of the rural population having increased greatly due to the refugees who have arrived from the bordering parts of B&H, especially the River Drina region around Foca, Srebrenica, Gorazde... Such a situation leads to an internal conflict between the "natives" and the "newcomers", where the first try to impose their cultural patterns to the others and vice versa, which most frequently ends up in a conflict, and rarely in assimilation and a compromise. Besides, the inertia of war produced a logical tendency of the newcomers to remain in the city, just as, before the war, it was easy to explain that the majority of the officials had actually been from small places in the periphery of Bosnia. This, again, leads to new conflicts and grasping of positions, apartments, status...

Finally, it is necessary to put the question where Sarajevo will get the funds for reconstruction. Of course, while the war lasts, there are attractive offers and promises from all sides, but caution demands to step back and think how realistic this may be. The promises are, probably, intended to bring to cessation of animosities, and such generosity will gradual disappear as the attention in the media slackens. After all, the West would not have been as developed as it is, had it squandered money in vain, so one should have no doubt that foreign investors will invest their capital in Sarajevo only if they are certain about its revival, and it is difficult to believe in it in a divided city.

Therefore, gestures such as the ten million dollar gift Madelaine Albright, the USA Ambassador to the UN, made when she visited Sarajevo for the reconstruction, should be considered only as a symbol. It is, probably, the matter of an advance payment for the obedience of the Bosnian leadership, because a gift usually implies a counterfavour.

To make Sarajevo at least a pale copy of the city it used to be before the war, a minimum number of preconditions must be fulfilled: use of the city for the sake of propaganda must cease, local power-wielders who are destroying the spirit of the city by their incompetence and despotism must be removed, adoption of a special UN resolution should be insisted on in order to enable full deblocking of the city, especially when speaking of roads, and the public should be prepared for the fact that in the present relation of forces the divided city can be united only through a political compromise of the parties in conflict.

If there is insufficient understanding and readiness for that inside, it would be high time, for the sake of saving the cheek of the international community which has already been significantly marred concerning the problem of former Yugoslavia and B&H, to exert pressure on Karadzic and Izetbegovic to hand over the city to a UN administration. Although that too is not the best solution, at least one could say that an attempt was made to save the most valuable thing Europe has.

Because, despite everything, Sarajevo deserves another chance.

Goran Todorovic