FEAR OF CYPRUS
AIM, ZAGREB, March 31, 1994
Asked by journalists about what was actually going on in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb and how were the negotiations progressing, the head of the Croat delegation Hrvoje Sarinic, who was just coming back from yet another consultation with President Tudjman, where on this occasion, and it took place around 7.00 p.m., he stayed only about 10 minutes in contrast to an earlier "journey" to the neighbouring hill, when he had stayed a full hour, he only replied: isn't the fact that I am smiling a good enough sign? This was the first sign that things were moving ahead, but when after that Vitaly Churkin stated that he was not interested in the progress of the negotiations but rather the signing of the agreement, it was completely clear that this time the Russinas , the Americans and the Europeans would not allow any postponement and that they would thrust pens into the hands of both the Croatian and the Serbian side.
And that is what happened. Around six in the morning, after a full thirty hours of negotiations, signatures were affixed to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities which should come into force on April 4. With the aid of 36 precise maps (scale 1:50,000) the way was specified of carrying out the basic idea on the pulling out of the infantry by one, mortars by 10 and heavy artillery by 20 kilometers into the territory held by one or the other side.
UNPROFOR units will be stationed in that empty, demilitarized area, together with the Croatian and Serbian police, while the existing state of affairs was taken as the basic criteroin of delineation. Except, naturally, in those cases in which this was not technically feasible or where both sides agreed to depart from this basic principle. Thus, it was decided that the Serbian villages Kasic, Islam Grcki and Smokovic, which were taken during the "Maslenica action", as well as the Croat Skabrnje which has been under Serbian occupation for already two and a half years, would be included in the demilitarized zones. The Croatian units will have to withdraw from some parts of Mt.Velebit, but not from the Zemunik Airport or Peruca. The particulars are not known yet, but the basic intent of the Agreement, which should be carried out in a period of ten days, is to render any military operations, particularly those which depend on the arbitrariness of the local commanders,impossible.
This completes the first stage of the world plan for the establishment of lasting peace in Croatia. Already in 14 days negotiations should start on economic issues - roads, watercourses, telecommunications, the oil pipe-line, while the most difficult point: the political solution, has been left for the end. But, even now, after this easiest part of the job has been completed, as both sides have egreed that destruction and killing must stop, there are doubts regarding the sincerity. The reason for this are various comments of the Zagreb signatures. Namely, while Sarinic and Slavko Degoricija persistently repeat that this is the beginning of the process of the reintegration of "Krajina" into Croatia, as it is expected that the motor-road and many other local roads will be soon opened, and that this is in no way some sort of border drawing, different undertones are coming from Knin.
It is true that the "Krajina" leaders have to polish a little what they have signed, but the statement is dissonant of rear admiral Dusan Rakic that the Croatian authorities have given up on some territories, or that by this Agreement UNPROFOR has finally sided with the Krajina side, as Croatia will no longer be able to carry out aggression against its territory. All this shows that there are no technical points in politics, as it is well known that the phones could start working this very moment, but the problem lies in the code number, Croatian or Yugoslav? Degoricija is an optimist and thinks that the economic round of the negotiations could be carried out in an "equally productive fashion", but admits that the third stage is the most difficult one. His trump card for the claim that everything will nevertheless be solved in six months, a period for which UNPROFOR's mandate has been extended, are the great powers which will no longer have either the patience or the will to stall.
According to this Croatian negotiator the Serbs would not have embarked on the negotiations if they had not been ready for a political solution, but he suspects that there will be some new blackmailing in the process and that Croatia will have to (naturally, primarily under international dictate) give the Serbs something more than what is now written in its Constitution and Constitutional Law whereby the Districts of Knin and Glina with a majority Serbian population are established. He himself says that there might be some corrections. But what is out of the question is trade in territories, so that it is specifically emphasized that neither Baranja nor Prevlaka, which are most frequently in play, will in no case be ceded in exchange for peace in the Knin Krajina and Western Slavonija. On the contrary, Degoricija even states: the exiled will return to Glina, Petrinja, Vukovar already in the following six months.
When the statements of Churkin, Galbright and others are taken into account, it can be concluded that it has finally been decided that no borders will be changed, at least when Croatia is in question, since regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, that most complicated country in the world, as the Constituent Assembly in Sarajevo also proved, many things are still not clear. What is not known at the moment is the model that the world powers will impose on both the Croats and the Serbs, except that the same rules will apply to the Serbs in Croatia, as well as to the Albanians in Kosovo. Absurd as it may sound, it can easily happen that precisely Serbia will be the one to be bogged even deeper in the treason of its Knin brothers, or to decide, which is not improbable, on the self-amputation of a part of Kosovo, which it has anyway lost a long time ago and can keep only by military force. In both cases Milosevic will foot the tab.
The strongest opposition party HSLS (the Croatian Peasant Liberal Party) has somewhat hushed its voice of dissatisfaction, but it keeps repeating its thesis that the negotiations should not have been held as long as Serbia doesn't recognize Croatia within its internationally recognized borders, that there should be no negotiations with criminals, that Croatia has degraded itself by allowing the Serbian rebels to come to Zagreb in Chetnik uniforms, now adding to it fear of the Cyprus syndrome.
Not only the liberals, but also representatives of other parties, and also numerous journalists are of the opinion that Degoricija's six months will last much longer, and do not see sufficient guarantees for the establishment of a unified Croatia in the behaviour of the world powers. Therefore, Drazen Budisa proposes that peace forces be deployed along the Croatian borders, and not guard "Krajina", and to apply a procedure similar to that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. annul the results of the ethnic cleansing.
Since UNPROFOR's mandate has not been changed, and when it was extended three months ago it was said that it would finally enable the exiled to return, which was not done till now, there are proposals that they should decide to return on their own. The columns of these exiles should be headed by world dignitaries, Nobel prize winners in particular, which would guarantee that there would be no bloodshed and shooting of innocent people. In all this it is necessary to bear in mind the position of the Second Assembly of the Exiled, who decided ten days ago that March 31 would be their "D" Day, i.e. that they would endure and stay silent till then, and start returning after that on a massive scale. The Croatina authorities will have numeorus problems with their embittered nationals who are fed up with empty promises.
Even the high officials of HDZ, including Slavko Degoricija himself, criticize the authorities, meaning themselves, for having no programme of resettlement whatsoever, for the inactivity of the Offices for Return and Reconstruction, and for not having found any substitute for the former Ministry of Reconstruction. All this only points that a very complex process is in question, for what will happen, for example, with those who now live in other people's homes, what will happen to those whose houses have been burned or razed to the ground?
Finally, who will and in what way rectify the damage done by the so called humane resettlement, which was for the first time publicly and in an official document, sponsored by Europe, mentioned a year and a half ago in Geneva, when Tudjman and Cosic signed the first document on the normalization of Croatian - Serbian relations. A cynic from among the ranks of the ruling party called that "humanism" a humane suicide, as it is better to shoot oneself from a gun than to hang oneself. It hurts less. Croatia can rightfully claim that it is a victim of aggression, but it is hardly likely that some of its moves (and then the names will be known) will be easy to justify before history, if anyone at all isbothered by this in his messianism.
Although there are only indications of a political solution, although it is almost certain that Knin will not be the capital of any state, but the degree of autonomy will have to be greater than that presently offered by Croatia, no matter how much it is officially denied here that any federalization of Croatia is possible, some other cynics ask: After that third stage, will there be a "Croatia outside the Krajinas" or a Croatia proper.
GOJKO MARINKOVIC