IT'S THE SERBS' TURN

AIM, ZAGREB, MARCH 21, 1994

The Washington document, actually, means that only the first part of the American plan for solving the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been implemented. Having seen the definitive defeat of the European Geneva policy, American diplomacy with considerable dollar promises, served a solution on Zagreb and Sarajevo, tearing down the Owen - styled projected apartheids. It would be naive to believe that the White House does not have the other, for the time being, secret, part of the plan, namely - the Serbs! By letting in the Russians in the game, of whom not even mention was made a year ago in the context of the resolution of the Bosnian - Herzegovinian crisis, the Americans chose their partner in the Balkans because Europe had proven unworthy of them. The existence of a secret document of the American strategy towards the Serbs is attested to by the initial positions offered to the Serbs after the Croat - Moslem federation.

There is no doubt that the point of departure vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs is what they have already accepted - a union of republics in B&H. However, the change of the number of republics in the union from three to two, completely alters the Serb position, from the absolute winner to the futile conqueror. Namely, Karadzic's clique started the war in B&H with six clear strategic objectives: the territorial separation of the national communities, the linking of the conquered territory with parent Serbia, the Drina river as the backbone of "greater Serbia", the Neretva river as the border of eastern (Serbian) and western (Croatian) Herzegovina, the division of Sarajevo into the Serbian and Moslem part and the access of the so-called Serbian Republic to the sea. Until Washington, only the first two aims were almost certain for Karadzic after two years of war, killing, destruction and ethnic cleansing.

Today, even if they are achieved, their efficaciousness is in question. The American "sweet lemon" offered to the Serbs does not force them at all costs into a joint state with the Moslems and Croats, but the formula of their leaving B&H is changed. According to that formula,the maps, Karadzic's favourite subject, are drawn aggregatly for the Moslems and Croats in a given region, and separately for the Serbs. In this way the maps go up in smoke according to which, when privately and communally owned land is included, as much as 70% of the territory of B&H belongs to the Bosnian Serbs, and there appear a number of places in Bosnian Posavina, eastern and western Bosnia, or central Bosnia and Bosnian Krajina where the Serbs alone are a majority, but cease to be one in comparison with the Moslems and Croats together. The map with the absolute majority, i.e. with the places on which Karadzic can count on for sure when leaving B&H is America's strongest argument in its "take it or leave it" policy. Afterwards it would be difficult to take territories dispersed through B&H!

Similar to the destruction of the Herzegovinian ethnic empire of the Croats in B&H, the first step in "undermining" Karadzic's national oligarchy will be amde precisely by the Bosnian Serbs who have refused to join the flock of the Pale leaders. Namely, next month in Sarajevo an Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs could be held in the organization of a supraparty association - The Serbian Consulting Council. The idea of the Serbian Consulting Council originated in Tuzla and was accepted in Sarajevo and the mentioned Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs will insist on the legality of those present, i.e. on the functions to which they were elected as members of multinational, civil parties, at the communal elections or those for the Assembly of the Republic.

Nevertheless, the final decision with regard to what the reply to the American solution in B&H will be, will be brought in Belgrade. Milosevic will, in addition to "being driven up to the wall" by America, have another motive for joining the new political trends in B&H - possible Karadzic's triumph because of the division of B&H and the creation of "greater Serbia" will not stop at the Drina river, but will also imply a part of the political cake in Belgrade itself. On the other hand, with Karadzic on his back, Milosevic has bleak chances to play the peacemaker. Pragmatic as he is, his career actually started with his alleged showdown with the oppononets of Tito and the Party, he will once again change sides, for which he, indeed, needs a new man in B&H.

Naturally, Milosevic will look for his new favourite among Karadzic's associates, primarily the well known trio: Plavsic, Krajisnik, Koljevic. Biljana Plavsic is ruled out at the very beginning, not because she is a woman (in any case, the said lady after her election, when asked by a journalist how she felt as the only woman in the Presidency, replied that she was a Serb and not a woman!), but because as Arkan's fan she is the personification of a person responsible for crimes and the hardest core faction in the SDS. Momcilo Krajisnik and Nikola Koljevic, on the other hand, have arguments which would satisfy Milosevic's requests. The former is the most influential and politically most independent person in the SDS, with the keen intelligence of a peasant and great persuasive power, which a pretender to the position of leader of the masses certainly needs. Memorable is the marathon session of the pre-war Assembly of B&H at which Krajisnik, as its then President, through hours long market-like bargaining and fooling around tricked the SDA and HDZ deputies into voting for Krajisnik's and not their own proposal, without even being aware of it. (Naturally, when voting they expressed their deep respect and sympathies for Krajisnik).

Nikola Koljevic has what both Krajisnik and other SDS leaders lack - an image of civic descent, urban roots, a university and intellectual halo. And while Krajisnik, coming from Zabrdje, in the vicinity of Sarajevo, a village whose very name says it all (zabrdje - behind the hills), would again stress the rural features of the Bosnian Serbs, the so called Shakespearologist Koljevic could negate that and, although less influential, make it to position number one. And that Koljevic accepts the role of the protagonist of changes in Pale is proved by his recent statements to the effect that the Serbs should not a priori reject the new plan for B&H, and that a joint state is, perhaps, not impossible.

However, international pressure on having those responsible for the war put their signatures to peace will stop at that level. The tedious job of building peace and interethnic tolerance cannot be done with bloodstained hands.

DRAZENA PERANIC