CROATIA AND KRAJINA

No roads for reality in Krajina

Summary: The official contacts between Belgrade and Zagreb, and especially the announced Muslim-Croatian federation in B&H and its confederation with Croatia, raised the issue of the present position of Krajina. There is a fear that the division of the war loot will be at the expense of Knin. Should Belgrade readily let go of Krajina and leave it to Croatia, Belgrade's official position will be seriously burdened. There are signs that Churkin, having arranged direct contacts between Zagren and Knin, counts on a confederacy between Croatia and Krajina. But, although Mikelic, the new candidate for the prime minister of the Krajina government, is a man fully trusted by the Serbian political leadership, who will not make any obstructions, the outcome of the negotiations between Zagreb and Knin are completely uncertain. Both parties have already plainly indicated that they are ready for concessions only if absolutely forced to make them. Further pressures are expected both on Belgrade and Zagreb in order to find a solutuion for the status of Krajina. The Russians are expected to play the role of Serbian protectors.

AIM, Belgrade, March 18, 1994

After Vitalii Churkin, the special envoy of the Russian President Yeltsin, talked Milo Martic, the President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, into sendin negotiators to Zagreb on March 22, the Krajina President nominated Borislav Miletic as the prime minister candidate of the new Government of this self-proclaimed state. Both events put an end to a specific political stalemate which had kept Krajina in a lethargy for several months; direct negotiations with Croatia are renewed, and, an attempt to solve the Krajina parliamentary crisis seems to be at hand. At the same time, the process for normalization of the relations between Belgrade and Zagreb is under way (their offices in Zagreb and Belgrade may be opened any day now), as well as the combined Russian-American peace initiative, which many link to the sudden activities of Krajina leaders.

AGREEMENTS

Joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia and the FR of Yugoslavia, the visit of Yugoslav Government Vice-President, Zeljko Simic to Zagreb, and especially the announcement of the Muslim-Croatian federation in B&H, and its entering into a confederacy with Croatia, greatly shook up the present position of Krajina. It appears, namely, that the beginning of the end of a bloody drama in the area of former Yugoslavia is slowly coming into sight, or to be more precise, grabbing of the best possible loot by the war masters, which will, slowly but surely, inevitably end up at the expense of Knin. The war in B&H and the war in Croatia operate according to the principle of connected vessels - no partial solution is possible. There are calculations that, should a way to end the Bosnian chaos be found, eberything else - Krajina inclusive - will be solved by itself. The priority for Belgrade is to terminate the "job" in B&H, and for Zagreb - in the circumstances forced to withdraw - the major preoccupation is reintegration of the UNPA's. In other words: support to the integration of the Republic of Srpska with Serbia in exchange for leaving Krajina to Croatia. Of course, it is not all that simple. On the one hand, there is the powerful Westwrn-Herzegovina lobby which is not satisfied in the least with any form of leaving Herzeg-Bosnia within B&H, and on the other, after three-years-long brain-washing, majority in Krajina is not ready for any type of unity with Croatia.

That the things are getting out of hand was evident at the Krajina parliamentary and presidential elections. Although both presidential candidates - Mile Martic and Milan Babic - had almost identical programs, the President of Serbia by no means wished to accept Babic who had once before refused to obey him, on the occasion of the first great political shift (singning of the Vance plan in 1991). After great pressures on the electorate, Martic hardly won the elections in the end; but, as it seemed at first, it was a Pyrrhic victory, since the coallition of Babic's Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina and the Serbian Radical Party won the majority in the parliament. Therefore, a prime minister to the liking of the parliamentary majority (it insisted on Babic himself), annulled Martic's position. Since neither the president, nor the coallition were ready, at least verbally, for concessions, it seemed that the internal conflict will become dominant. But, at that very moment, after the Sarajevo ultimatum, things began to gain in speed.

But, should the official Belgrade readily let go off Krajina, it would become a heavy burden on its hands. Martic therefore, was entrusted with the task to strain the relations with Croatia to the utmost. The aim of such policy is to maintain the pressure against Zagreb at its high (primarily because of the arrangements from the Washington Agreement) in order to prepare an honourable withdrawal from Croatia - to seek solution of the problem of Krajina on the level of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia. It is believed, namely, that a confederacy between Knin and Zagreb is in prospect, Belgrade sees the chances for something like that in the activities of Russian diplomacy (statement of Vitalii Churkin about "a state within a state"), i.e. in the division of the Russian and the American sphere of influence in the Balkans. But, regardless of the intentions and desires, these are all plans which too far-fetched and their implementation is completely uncertain. The men in Krajina must, therefore, be disciplined, so Martic nominated Borislav Mikelic as the candidate for prime minister of the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, a man of confidence of the Serbian leadershjip. Should he fail to be elected in the Krajina parliament, it would strain the relations between Milosevic and Babic even further, and this could be an introduction into Martic's coup d'etat, but also an indicator of the weakening of Belgrade influence, which would lead to ceding of Krajina to Croatian authorities, regardless of the consequences. It should be noted that an opinion is established in the European public (no matter whether founded or not) that Krajina and Kosovo are symmetrical: what Croatia is to Krajina, that is Serbia to Kosovo, and vice versa...

WHAT HAPPENS NOW

The beginning of Serbian-Croatian normalization was initiated, primarily, due to the problems both regimes faced because of their involvement in B&H. The key problem - Krajina - was bridged over, as the time demanded, by a formulation that this issue will be solved in a direct dialogue between Knin and Zagreb.

Both parties saw to it to be perfectly clear that they are ready to make concession only if forced to. Trying to demonstrate sovereignty and inflexibility, Martic in that sense, fabricated the affair at the bridge over the Sava near Gradiska, dispersing the members of the UNPROFOR, trying to show that all agreements reached without his participation were untenable, even the one on opening of highway E 94. Similarly, the four airplanes, "Jastreb", shot down by NATO planes over Bosnia, had taken off from Udbina airport in the RSK, according to Boutros Ghali's report; it was obviously a local initiative (regardless of the actual ordering party) to sabotage the Muslim-Croatian agreement. But, the Republic of Croatia also did its best not to lag behind: the offensive on the Lika front was supposed to show that Zagreb does not intend to give up the reintegration of Krajina at any cost. But, the latest international diplomatic activities finally forced Serbia and Croatia to arrange the direct contact between Croatian and Krajina's negotiators. The solution was found in the peace initiative of Russia; on the one hand, the Russians have become new Serbian protectors, and on the other, Zagreb does not wish to appear uncooperative. Vitalii Churkin could feel how extorted it all is, when he was asked to explain the actual sense of the negotiations; Zagreb insists on a political determination of the status of Krajina, and Knin solely on interruption of hostilities, counting on any type of international recognition of its self-proclaimed statehood. Neither of the parties are too pleased with Churkin's understatements, although due to its "higher causes", the Serbs are considerably more restrained. But, further pressures both on Belgrade and Zagreb are to be expected, in order to seek a solution for the status of Krajina, because the situation there is increasingly resembling that of Cyprus. Anything of the kind would be difficult to maintain for long, without resulting in a second round of Serbian-Croatian conflict with consequences truly unpredictable for the entire region.

FILIP SCHWARM