IS RUGOVA GOING TO BE ARRESTED?

AIM, Pristina, March 15, 1994

A demand for the arrest of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova has repeatedly been heard from the extremist Serbian circles lately. In commentaries of the Serbian and the world press there are also speculations on this subject. It is claimed that Milosevic's regime wishes to use a trial to the alleged paramilitary Albanian organizations and the "Ministry of Defence of Kosovo" to compromise Dr. Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (DSK). After the trial which would supposedly prove that the "minister of defence" and the "headquarters of the Kosovo army" were under their command, Serbian authorities could easily ban the DSK and arrest Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.

At a recent press conference, to a question what he thought about the threats that he would be arrested, calmly and self-confidently, Rugova answered: "I do not wish to comment on speculations, but it is true that there are threats directed not only at my address, but that of other Albanian leaders as well. Let them do what they want. I am here and doing my job in a civilized way, just as the people of Kosovo are behaving".

Why has the issue of Rugova's arrest become topical nowadays?

Since 1990, and especially after the war in Croatia and Bosnia started, a silently agreed status quo was established in Kosovo. Both the Serbian and the Albanian party set as the objective to avoid war (the first because it did not suit them to have a second front, and the latter because they were inferior in the military sense), and therefore, parallel courses of political organizing were tolerated. Rugova's election for the president of the Republic of Kosovo was tolerated, even the referendum on the independence and the elections for the pluralistic parliament of Kosovo were organized. On the other hand, Serbian authorities destroyed all the autonomous institutions in Kosovo to such an extent that it practically meant establishment of a specific apartheid.

These parallel systems in Kosovo, which are mutually exclusive, cannot last for ever, of course. All the analyses indicate that the conflicts in Kosovo will intensify again, and maybe even turn into armed conflicts as soon as the circumstances which had led to the status quo change. The analysts link the issue of Kosovo to the war in Bosnia. While the present war lasts, the position of the stalemate in Kosovo should be maintained. Since the war in Bosnia has already drawn close to its end, the tensions on the Southern wing of the Balkan crisis have already increased significantly: Greece has brought its schizophrenic policy towards Macedonia to a climax, and Serbia fears that it will have to pay for its Bosnian conquests in Kosovo.

The Yugoslav crisis has been sufficiently studied by now, so world diplomacy is aware that the end of the Bosnian war will not mean much for the Balkan crisis, if the potentially even worse focuses of the crisis, Kosovo and Macedonia are not eliminated quickly. After all, that was the reason why the instrument of preventive sending of blue helmets into Macedonia, was used for the first time in the history of the UN. It remains to be seen whether prevention can be applied in Kosovo, too, and by what means.

In Serbia, both the regime and the opposition parties are aware that serious challenges are in line for them. Even if war does not break out, noone in Serbia sees the way to untangle the complicated Kosovo knot, and keep Kosovo in Serbia. The only argument left is force and threat with a new war. But, it appears that Serbia has already spent all the war credits it possessed, so that a new war would just intensify its isolation and open prospects for introduction of even more drastic punitive measures against the Serbs. That is why Serbia has been busy in the past several months in securing the best possible position for itself in the future negotiations on Kosovo. The concessions offered by the Srrbian party in Bosnia were linked to reducing pressures in Kosovo. It appears tha Milosevic offered peace in Bosnia and a lasting agreement of its three nations, demanding guarantees that Kosovo would remain part of Serbia as the counterfavour.

Milosevic's ingeniousness as a "strategist" is, of course, also at stake in the game around Kosovo. Last year, when the West began preparations for turning the Kosovo issue into an international affair, Milosevic responded by sending away the CSCE Permanent Mission for Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, under the pretext that these were the issues within the internal domaine. Milosevic wished to gain time and to slow down diplomatic activities of the West concerning Kosovo. Instead of imposing upon Serbia essential new demands concerning Kosovo, such as the once formulated idea about sending a civilian UN unit, the issue is now the demand to have the Mission returned to Kosovo and negotiations on the conditions and the mandate of such a Mission. Thus Milosevic has gained at least two steps ahead of the slow and burdened with matters of procedure diplomacy of the CSCE, the UN and other international factors.

It would be quite in the spirit of Milosevic's arrogant and risky politics to order the arrest of Dr. Rugova soon. Whenever he finds himself in difficulties and faced with prssures, he usually reaches out for drastic measures which skock the public and his opponents, changing the initial position enormously and reversing it to his benefit. Let us recall that he had paralysed the Albanian movement in this way in its initial great swing in autumn 1988 and spring 1989, by ordering the arrest of Azem Vlasi and "isolating", without investigation or trial, i.e by arresting and beating up several hundred Albanian intellectuals. He acted similarly in his settling of accounts with the Serbian opposition, in the affair of the arrest and beating up of Vuk Draskovic. Milosevic likes to set the rules, and therefore makes sudden and risky moves which stun his political opponents. By the time they recover from the shock and reorganize their ranks, he is already surfing on the crest of the destructive wave he himself had set off. This technology of remaining in power will last until he goes too far and one of these waves pulls him down.

In the last several months, the West has made the first steps in preparation of the Kosovo negotiations. In December last year, major European powers (Germany, England, Italy, France and Austria) invited Dr. Rugova for a visit, recognizing his position as the legitimate representative of the Albanians and the Albanian option for resolving the crisis. In the beginning of February this year, Dr. Rugova even met the American President, Mr. Clinton, and his Vice-president, Mr. Ghore(?), at a reception. These gestures of Western diplomacy were highly encouraging for the Albanian party, regardless of the frequent warnings of the analysts that it should beware excessive expectations. Rugova has practically invested all his political credits in the diplomatic struggle and a gradual solution of the status of Kosovo. For that reason he has for quite some time now, repeated almost every day his single thesis: that placing Kosovo under the protection of the UN, is the only transitional solution which could lead to the independence of Kosovo peacefully.

The Serbian regime does not want negotiations on Kosovo under international control. Kosovo is the internal issue of Serbia, Milosevic says. All the efforts of Serbian diplomacy in the past several months were directed towards exchanging the "concessions" in Bosnia for elimination and reduction of pressures concerning Kosovo. The objective of Serbia is to exclude the issue of Kosovo from the conditions it is expected to fulfill in order to have the sanctions lifted.

But Milosevic is aware that the West will force the issue of Kosovo upon him, and Rugova as the Albanian negotiator. He does not like it. He does not like things forced upon him, so he is seeking for a way to lead to it in his own way. And his way of opening issues is through arrests and bans, in this case that of Rugova and the DSK. It is not at all by mere chance that the Serbian extremists raised their voice at the very moment Rugova was in the USA. This too, is a notorious scenario. Milosevic enjoys listening to the wound-up "voice of his people". The arrest of Rugova and the ban of the DSK is, therefore, not a matter of speculation, but it is the result of the "logic" of the regime. The only question open is the question of the timing and the internal and external opportuneness of such a step.

Should Rugova be arrested or isolated, during all the time he will spend in prison, the major problem will be his liberation, and not negotiations about the status of Kosovo. The regime is probably counting on the effects achieved with the arrest and trial to Azem Vlasi, during the crucial period of changes in the former federal system. Kosovo was left without its leadership and united movement, and almost a year passed before the Albanian movement managed to reorganize and "produce" Rugova. Each and every month of delay of the unpleasant Kosovo negotiations is to the benefit of Milosevic's personal power. It is also expected that the arrest of Rugova and the ban of the DSK could lead to a division within the Albanian movement, and thereby to weakening of the Albanian negotiating position.

But, the problem of Kosovo is not as simple as to fit in any prearranged patterns. Just as Milosevic did not dare clear off Kosovo with arms when it seemed so attractive (1990/1991), he will have to think twice before he dares make any of his shocking moves. He knows only too well that the NATO military mechanisms have already been set to motion, and he is aware of the statements made by the American administration that it will not allow any tensions and war in Kosovo. The arrest of Rugova would be a great challenge to the world. The wave of protests that would rise should that happen, the direction the Albanian movement would take, the involvement of the world - all that could accelerate launching of Kosovo towards independence, and would not assist the regime in maintaining Kosovo within Serbia. Therefore, Milosevic should beware of the effect of the boomerang more than ever.

But, Milosevic's acting in the Kosovo crisis might be more the question of his personal fate than any rational decisions. Many have already predicted that, for Milosevic, everything has begun in Kosovo, and will therefore end in Kosovo.

Shkelzen Maliqi