WHAT WILL TUDJMAN AND IZETBEGOVIC SIGN?

AIM, Zagreb, March 16, 1994

What do the 52 pages of the Vienna Agreement which will be signed by Tudjman and Izetbegovic say, is still a mystery for the Croatian public. All that is known is that the package of documents includes a draft constitution of the future federation of the Croats and the Bosnians- Muslims, draft principles of confederate links of the federation with the Republic of Croatia, an agreement on transitional arrangements and the system of authorities in the B&H until the elections of a constitutional parliament and an agreement on military issues which was already signed by generals Rasim Delic and Ante Roso. Even such a superficial knowledge and mildly put, incomplete insight into the contents of the documents, could not prevent increasing polemics about the Croatian-Muslim agreements.

It is evident that the participants in the polemics, no matter how mutually opposed they may be, all support the agreement between the Croats and the Muslims. But, President Tudjman is reproached for breaking off the Croatian-Muslim alliance formed at the very beginning of the war in Bosnia, and for the shifts in the policy towards the Muslim party which had led to the year-long war-waging. Tudjman and the participants in the negotiations on the Croatian side persist, however, in claiming that the Vienna Agreement is an expression of continuity of the ruling Croatian policy. Even among the supporters of this allegation there are obvious differences. Namely, Tudjman and the representatives of Croatia are constantly trying to prove that there have been no sudden shifts in their policy towards Bosnia and changes in their relations in the past period, rejecting in this way the accusations of being responsible for the Croatian-Muslim armed conflict, and therefore for the victims it caused. But the opposition and eveyone else who has criticized the attitude of Croatian policy towards the Bosnian Muslims insist on just the opposite. But, they are not the only ones to do it. Even within the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) such assessments can be heard.

In an interview to the "Feral Tribune", the once second man in Croatia and the HDZ, Josip Manolic, is almost merciless: "As you can see, the allegation that there were no shifts in Croatian policy and that it was consistenly implemented is in circulation. But, if you looked closely at the development of Croatian-Muslim relations, both political shifts and changes are visible. Didn't we at first fight together with Muslims against our common enemy - the Serbs, and then clash with the Muslims, to seek again now, ways for coexistence in B&H and a peacful solution of the conflict? Any man in his right mind could see that there were two shifts! (Since President Tudjman also claims that there was no shift in the policy towards the Muslims, one could conclude that he is not among the "men in their right mind", as Manolic put it). I have nothing against anyone persisting in one's claims and allegations, but it is inadmissible to try to impose the conclusion on one's opponent, by cheating and reversing the issue, that those who claimed from the very beginning that the war against the Muslims should not have been waged at all were wrong, that all the destruction and genocide both parties share the responsibility for, had not been necessary in the first place."

The negotiators from Herzeg-Bosnia also insist that the present Croatian-Muslim Agreement is an expression of the continuity of Croatian politics. Thereby, they wish clearly to stress that the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is also part of the continuity. And, although it is not diffcult to conclude that this is partly an attempt to convince the Herzegovina Croats that Croatian- Muslim federation is not an annulment of the Herzeg-Bosnia, that state within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is clear that the people from Herzeg-Bosnia have no intention of abandoning a great deal of their past policy, although they are seemingly accepting the compromise with the Bosnian Muslims. Stressing that their primary objective from the very start was to protect Croatian national interests and to fight for the equal legal status of the Croats in Bosnia&Herzegovina, they are joining the present agreement and interpreting it as a final establishment of the Croatian and Muslim sovereignty embodied in a precise territorial division of Bosnia & Herzegovina. According to them, the cantons are the fundamental state units in the future federation. They are the main holders of sovereignty, and the federation will have as much of it as they decide to assign it.

On the contrary, Kasim Trnka, one of the representatives of the Bosnian-Muslims claims that the Agreement determines that the federation is the main holder of sovereignty, and that the cantons and the municipalities are just forms of state organization. The difference is evident both in the interpretation of the role and the position of the Chamber of national cantons. While Herzegovina Croats stress its significance saying that it will be the continuation of the present Assembly of Herzeg-Bosnia, Kasim Trnka speaks of the mere coordinating and advisory role of the cantons. Until the contents of the documents is published, and that will happen only after its signing in Washington, it is difficult to say who is right. And yet, these disputes show that the differences in views of the future federation are great and that all those who speak of the continuity of Croatian policy, are after all, not completely wrong. Their interpretation of certain parts of the Agreement shows that the issue at stake is how to incorporate the Croatian Republic Herzeg-Bosnia, in spite of the international pressure, into the future federation of Croats and Bosnian Muslims, with just a changed false front. Even Josip Manolic indirectly affirms that this is the actual issue. He assesses that some of the Croatian officials who had a decisive influence on Croatian policy towards Bosnia & Herzegovina so far, must leave their posts because "they will be an obstacle to the implementation of the Agreement with the Muslims". That he implies those who had established the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia becomes clear when he says that he thinks that Gojko Susak, the Minister of Defence of Croatia must go: "He must not be regarded only as a carrier-pigeon between Zagreb and Gruda, but also as a man responsible for that policy and for the statements and the moves that brought about the conflict between the Croats and the Muslims". It is hard to believe that Susak and his supporters will actually leave, however. At least not in the near future. Because it would be simply unbelievable that these men had created Herzeg Bosnia with no knowledge and agreement of President Tudjman, so that their elimination from Croatian politics can hardly be expected, because it would mean that he too could be washed away with the tide. And yet, this does not mean that there will not be individual removals, such as that of Mate Boban.

Although there is a principled agreement of the Croatian public on the necessity of establishing the Croatian-Muslim federation, and on cessation of war conflicts, opposition to the initiative for establishment of the confederation between Croatia and the federation of the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims is growing. Primarily due to a doubt that a possible joining of the Bosnian Serbs to the Croatian-Muslim federation "under equal conditions", would actually satisfy their demand for a confederate union of such a B&H federation with Serbia, i.e. the FR of Yugoslavia. Namely, a doubt is growing that the world powers are actually trying to resurrect the dead former Yugoslavia. Although both Tudjman and Izetbegovic are persisting in their claims that it is out of the question that the Croatian- Muslim federation will ever enter a confederacy with Serbia, i.e the FR of Yugoslavia, it just might happen that this fear has certain foundations.

This does not mean that Tudjman and Izetbegovic are not right and that the federation of the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims will ever enter a confederacy with the FR of Yugoslavia. But, the afore-mentioned Kasim Trnka, in a Croatian TV programmes titled "TV Parliament", expressed his opinion that establishment of the Croatian-Muslim federation did not mean that the internationally recognized Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would disappear and that it would continue to persist in its present borders. Bosnian Serbs can choose between accepting the present Croatian-Muslim initiative and the federal Bosnia & Herzegovina divided into cantons, and, after territorial division within the B & H, establishing their own state, i.e. legalizing their present Republic of Srpska, and later, based on the Geneva Agreement together with the Croatian-Bosnian federation establishing the Union of Bosnia & Herzegovina in its present internationally recognized borders. Therefore, the Union of B & H would be formed of two republics - the Serbian and the Bosnian-Croatian, and not three as the Geneva Agreement envisaged. Since the Croats and the Muslims are negotiating about a confederacy of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian-Bosnian federation within the B & H, it is clear that the Serbian republic in the B & H Union would remain outside this confederacy. At the same time, "equal conditions" for Bosnian Serbs could mean that their Serbian republic, could join the confederacy with Serbia, i.e the FR of Yugoslavia. Should this happen, the Croatian-Bosnian federation would remain outside such a confederacy. The fact that the Union of B&H would actually be a link between these two confederacies is another pair of shoes, but in this case, it would mean that Tudjman and Izetbegovic are not lying when they claim that the Croatian-Bosnian federation will never and under no conditions enter a confederacy with the FR of Yugoslavia.

Everything is, after all, in the sphere of speculations and attempts to find out the contents of the Washington package of docuuments, based on statements and interpretations of the participants in the negotiations. The fact that the documents will not be published before Tudjman and Izetbegovic sign them, points out that they have many nuances and possibilities and that the Croatian and the Bosnia-Herzegovina public must be carefully prepared to accept them first. Besides, the documents were written in English, which emphasizes the irony of the position of the national leaders such as Tudjman and Izetbegovic whose policies rank their national languages high, but it also suggests that the Americans and other world power-wielders who are moderating the resolution of the crisis in B&H wish to reach an agreement of the parties in conflict in English. Because, the Serbs might eventually be involved in the negotiations, and the past experience shows that the same documents in Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian language do not necessarily mean the same. By introducing the fourth language, the fourth party- the world powers, are completely getting involved in defining the solutions for the former Yugoslavia space, in such a way that they will not even leave it to the local languages and "interpretors" to interpret them, but they wish to do it so that "the whole world can understand them". All those from this space who are just learning this world tongue inclusive. Even if they are learning by means of unpedagogical methods - such as the stick.

ZORAN DASKALOVIC