YOU CANNOT CREATE A STATE BY THREATS

AIM, Belgrade, March 11, 1994.

An Interview: Aleksa Djilas

Washington Agreement on creation of a Muslim-Croat Federation, i.e Croatian-Bosnian Confederation, was received with more scepticism than optimism on all sides. Whether the latest round of the "Bosnian poker-game" have a more favourable outcome than the previous ones, and how it will affect the Muslims, the Croats and the Serbs, and also the broader framework of Yugoslav drama, we are discussing with Aleksa Djilas, the scientific associate of the Harvard University in the USA, the author of several papers (books: "The Disputed Country" and "The Serbian Issue") which deal with the history of the Yugoslav community and its dissolution. Aleksa Djilas is the son of Milovan Djilas, the first communist dissident. Due to his attitudes, he also experienced the destiny of a dissident - after 11 years of emigration, it was not until 1990 that he was permitted to return to Yugoslavia.

My interlocutor still declares himself as a Yugoslav and he belongs to the group of intellectuals whose attitudes concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the civil war and the national issue greatly differ from the prevailing ones. Yugoslavia has a future - Djilas thinks. Once peace is established, the Yugoslav cultural and economical space will be rehabilitated, although Yugoslavia as a state, most probably will not be renewed.

* The Agreement between the Muslims and the Croats on federation. i.e. the Croatian-Bosnian confederation is regarded by many as a "forced marriage" under the patronage of the USA. How do you assess this Agreement? Osim toga, ne zna

• From the American standpoint, this Agreement means that the American engagement in this space is increasing. I think that after this move, it will be difficult for them to withdraw from the Bosnian and the Yugoslav crisis. Since the Agreement is directly the result of their initiative and pressure on the actors here, it would be very embarassing for them if the Agreement failed too soon. I think that the Americans will exert much effort to maintain it, even as an illusion, if necessary. This Agreement can contribute to the cessation of war activities between the Muslims and the Croats, which is also very significant. Pressures and threats can prevent conflicts. And yet, by pressures and threats you cannot create a community. That is essence of the idea of a "forced marriage" which is mentioned and which I support. I do not believe that such a community between the Muslims and the Croats can survive. First, we are speaking of a confederation - today, confederations practically do not exist anywhere in the world. Besides, I have never known of two hostile states uniting into one, it is especially hard for me to imagine that they could have an army under joint command now.

What will happen? I think that a period of political maneuvering will follow. The Muslims will strive to transform such a federation into a centralized state, and the Croats will try to make a confederation out of it. Within the Croat-Muslim confederation, the Muslims will insist on the confederation, while the Croats will strive to transform it into a federation with Croatia. Whoever is the minority will try to get away as much as possible, and when in majority to unite as much as possible in order to dominate over the other. This is part of nationalistic ideology, it is not anything exclusively linked to political programs of this or that party and their leaders. It is a way of political thinking deeply embedded in this space.

* How do you see the position of the Serbs, regarding that the Serbian options have just been vaguely outlined - they are offered, for instance, to join the federation? Do the Serbs have reason to be suspicious towards this Agreement?

• If we look upon this Agreement as a kind of pressure against the Serbs, it has certain effects). The fact is that the conflict between the Muslims and the Croats is dying down, it is making them stronger in relation to the Serbs, and it is not impossible that they might unite again to oppose the Serbs. This is creating quite an efficient pressure on the Serbs in order to make them more willing to make concessions. It is clear that the Bosnian issue cannot be resolved without the Serbs, and it is only a question of what territories the Muslim-Croat federation will demand.

The fact that the Muslims and the Croats in Croatia are drawing closer will broaden the gap between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats on one and the Serbs on the other side. I don't know how aware the Americans are of this. I assume that they are, which means that they agree to a division of Bosnia into two instaed of into three parts. Because, I do not believe that the Serbs could join the Croatian-Muslim federation in Bosnia and then enter into the confederation with Croatia. For the Serbs it would be as if they had been offered a new Independent State of Croatia. It is quite an unrealistic plan, although even at this moment there are Croatian nationalists who fear that this means renewal of the former Yugoslavia and that the Serbs will join the confederation together with the Muslims.

I am in fact a supporter of creation of a Muslim state in Bosnia.

* Does it means that you have given up the idea of united Bosnia&Herzegovina you once supported?

• Yes. I supported united Bosnia until even the slightest chance for its survival existed, and that was mid summer 1992. Then the civil war escalated tro such proportions that it became clear that united Bosnia is impossible and that the division is inevitable. This is not a good solution, of course, but I did not see another, and I still do not see it.

Unity of Bosnia could be saved only by numerous troops of the United Nations, had they been sent to Bosnia right after the conflict broke out. But, noone in the West was ready for such a sacrifice.

When I saw that Bosnia could not be preserved any more, I was in favour of a just division - of Muslims getting enough territories for their economical and cultural survival, because the Serbs and the Croats had taken more than had ever belonged to them. According to me, the Muslims ought to get one third of Bosnia in the central part and Sarajevo as the capital, wuth the access to the sea and the River Sava, and partly to the river Drina.

*But, aren't these the very disputable issues which have caused failure of all peace negotiations so far?

• In this space of ours, various nations feel protected only within their own states. That is why, they generally crave to create them. I myself, am in favour of a civil state, but it is a fact that both here and in the whole of Eastern Europe, the model of a national state prevails. If the Muslims do not get their own state, they will be the only ethnic group which does not have it, and they will be left without any protection, and the Serbs and the Croats will constantly try to divide them.

* If everybody knows that without an agreement of the three parties there is no solution for Bosnia, why do they insist on negotiations of two sides? Does that mean that there is no solution, or that they do not wish it, or is it a way to make the opposed parties resolve at least a part of their mutual problems?

• There were such bilateral negotiastions before. Before the war, Milosevic and Tudjman agreed about the divison of Bosnia. Then the Muslim-Croatian alliance followed, and then dissolved, later the Serbian-Croat alliance was established against the Muslims, and finally the agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims from Western Bosnia. Th Americans assessed that such communication was possible . On one hand, they want the war to die down, and on the other, they wish to take the Serbs by surprise and exert pressure on them (although I believe that there would have been pressures against the Serbs even without this Agreement).

One of ther hidden motives of the American Administration, in the long run, is to prevent creation of a Muslinm state in the Balkans. I think that the Americans are wrong about that, because the chances for Islamic fundamentalism are smaller should the Muslims get their own state, because they could develop some kind of identity of theirs. Should they be forced to live in a state, where the majority of the population were Catholic, they would insist much more fervently on their Muslim identity and be much more radical. Imagine, for instance, the Serbs found themselves in a state with 20 million Catholics, they would instist on their Orthodox religion much more than they are doing now in this state of theirs. One should just think of Irishmen and their Catholicism in relation to the English Protestants.

Indeed, should the Muslim part of Bosnia become a separate state, it would probably at first have aspirations to change its borders and strengthen Islamic fundamentalism. But, should they not get their own state, these processes would be even more predominant and radical. That is why I think that numerous UN troops will be needed to guard the borders and maintain peace.

Vesna Bjekic