AVRAMOVIC'S PROGRAMME AND KOSOVO
AIM, PRISTINA, March 9, 94
Some Serbian official and semi-official assessments of the reform of the dinar, often mention Kosovo as the model, or the criterion of its initial success. However, judging by developments so far, we cannot say what lies at the core of the Kosovo criterion.
More specific explanations in this respect were given by the author of the reform programme, Dragoslav Avramovic, who most often spoke of Kosovo in the context of the evolution of the reform. In an interview carried by "Borba" of Belgrade, he said that in Kosovo the value of the dinar against the Deutsch Mark may be proved only when dues to the state are paid, that it strengthens the confidence of the people in the state and that the person who thought of that - Sainovic or Milosevic - should, as he put it, get a medal.
If we stick to the field of the economy, then it is not exactly clear why Kosovo should be specific in respect of the obligatory dues, naturally if the programme imposes equal obligations on all. But, it seems that Avramovic is going beyond the framework of the economy and, probably for the first time, in this manner, announcing that in Kosovo the reform of the dinar has far reaching political objectives, primarily to force the Albanians to respect and eventually accept the state of Serbia.
In immediate terms, this is not making any special impression on the Albanians, who already have clearly formulated political views. What is most important is that the Serbian side, the most competent authorites, confirms the prevailing assessments in the Albanian public that the reform in Kosovo will be implemented in the framework of an overall policy of restriction and suppression. Of course, laws do not have to contain discriminatory norms. Selectivity in the consistent, i.e. inconsistent implementation of different measures, facilitated by the complete exclusion of the Albanians from all organs of power is sufficient. That is an already proven way in which the Albanians from Kosovo have been discriminated against for a long time in many areas and even in economic operations.
The Serbian authorities in Kosovo have understood and embraced the reform of the dinar as the loftiest patriotic task, above all as yet another legal form of struggle in reinforcing the foundations of the Serbian state against the Albanians, and also as a means for promoting the aims of Serbdom and Orthodoxy. On the other hand, there were all sorts of speculations about the behaviour of the Albanians towards the reform, accompanied by different threats with a legal state, which all ended with "proclamations" that this "Squipetar" boycott will not and cannot be tolerated, probably with a view to creating a celebratory atmosphere.
At the very beginning of programme implementation, on the last day of January and in early February, the Serbian authorities closed scores of private shops owned by Albanians. According to official data, in the first two weeks of February the authorities of Serbia carried out control in some 1,250 private firms confiscating on that occasion goods worth DM 1,4 million. The financial effects of this campaign are even larger given the fact that charges were instituted in a large number of cases, on the grounds of different irregularities in business operations. Police raids took place concurrently, most often on market days throughout Kosovo with a view to, as it is constantly underlined, suppressing smuggling, and which ended in the seizure of enormous quantities of diverse commodities. That is why, among other things, the Kosovo Albanians saw the reform of the dinar as another way of legalizing robbery and suppressing all forms of activities for the survival of the Albanians in accordance with the generally proclaimed political objectives of Serbia.
At the same time, the purchasing of foreign currency in Kosovo was closely monitored and, although it was clear from the very start that it was not proceeding anywhere near the expected pace, it was presented to the public in a very optimistic manner. Finally, it turned out that during a month of the reform, according to official data, somewhat over DM 16 million were purchased in Kosovo, mainly from organizations, and to a large extent from the citizens. That is not such a large figure, when, according to Serbian sources, the monthly turnover in Kosovo is some DM 200 million. Even if this estimate was much lower, which is more realistic, neither politicians nor businessmen have any reason to boast. And, as for the Albanians themselves, over this entire period, like all the others, they behaved very rationally, in accordance with their interests.
They sold just enough foreign currency to pay their obligatory dues. According to some assessments in Albanian circles, the immediate aim of the Belgrade regime could be to get out of the Kosovo Albanians at least the amount it spends for and in Kosovo. It is, however, assessed that only the maintenance of the police apparatus in this region costs US $ 2 million a day. And the main revenues of the Serbian authorities come from rents, leases, or sales of flats and other retail and service facilities. But, because of the political relations, the tempo of changes is very uneven.
Empty treasuries and the challenges of getting rich fast impose an atmosphere of tolerance which creates space for the inclusion of the Kosovo Albanians into economic life. And although this is all, more or less, associated with the failing economic system of Serbia, which in Kosovo exists only in the form of legal norms and obligations, it may appear that space is objectively being created for them to assume the role which, in view of all the circumstances, they have in the economic life of Kosovo. This process between two confronting sides is of a later date and no side has so far, at least not publicly, scrutinized all its consequences under magnifying glass. But, even without such analyses we cannot escape the impression that the transformation of the imposed tolerance into another, more tolerable form of partnership, could, in the forthcoming period have any more significant effect on the softening of the irreconcilable political stances of today.
Feim Redzepi