FEARS AND HOPES

Beograd Mar 3, 1994

Serbian reactions to negotiations between the Croats and the Muslims in Washington D.C.

Summary: Belgrade is confused about the US initiative for the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. It is assessed that the chances for success of the agreement between the Muslims and the Croats are small, especially if the solution is sought on account of the Serbs. Through this initiative, Washington has virtually shown that it is opposed to creation of a Muslim state in the Balkans. Messages about a wish to unite with Serbia are openly sent from the Republic of Srpska. On the occasion of Russia taking the role in resolving the ex-Yugoslavia crisis, Belgrade expresses satisfaction because of the protective role of Moscow.

AIM, Belgrade, March 1, 1994

"We are deeply concerned", the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, said in Moscow today in answer to the question on the Muslem-Croatian negotiations in the Department of State in Washington convened at the initiative of the US. He also mentioned the "coallition of Muslims and the Croats" in the last world war, in this context, as well as their mutual agreement on joint struggle against the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of the current conflict in Bosnia&Herzegovina.

At the same time, the President of the FR Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic, at the press conference in Belgrade today, assessed the negotiations between the Muslims and the Croats as "hypocritical", because "the Serbian party does not participate". And yet, the head of Yugoslav diplomacy, Vladislav Jovanovic, was much more cautious. He expressed, just indirectly, his reservations by saying that "the American initiative could be acceptable only under the condition that it was solely a function of creating lasting peace in Bosnia".

The true and overall views of the official Belgrade could be reconstructed from several commentaries of the state news agency, the Tanjug, which bluntly claim that Washington D.C. is offering now its own resolution of the Bosnian crisis - on account of the Serbs. "Diplomatic circles in Belgrade assess that there is little chance for a possible agreement between the Muslims and the Croats. If the solution is sought on account of the third party, in this case, the Serbian, the possible agreement is bound to be a failure", Tanjug states.

Belgrade state news agency also concludes that "the idea of Washington about uniting the Muslims and the Croats practically means that the USA are opposed to creation of a Muslim state in the former B&H." And it adds that "the future support of Washington to Bosnian Muslims can be observed only in the context of their union with the Croats".

Just a few days before, the Minister of the Exterior of the Government of the Bosnian Serbs in Pale, Aleksa Buha, explained in detail the diplomatic strategy of the "Republic of Srpska". He stated expressly that the Bosnian Serbs would not even try to obtain diplomatic recognition for their "state", because that is "complicated". He further explained: "it is the wish of our people to unite with Serbia in as near future as possible".

But, Buha evaluated that this attitude was not opposed to the latest platform of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina which stated that together with the representatives of the other two nations in B&H, they would, when the time comes, negotiate "from the position of an independent and sovereign state".Namely, he assumed that something like that was fully "in line with the Owen-Stoltenberg plan", although he said that he was aware that the Muslims had already twice rejected the plan: first in its original form, and then as the French-German peace initiative formulated in the name of the European Union. Believing that the Muslims and the Croats would probably first try to settle their disputes and then, as a union of two republics (Croat and Muslim) talk about a state alliance with Croatia, Buha expressed the opinion that it would be "a far more realistic approach" than the one which would imply that they should "as a unique entity" enter an alliance with Croatia.

"Both the Croats and the Muslims first wish to have their own state, their own territory, and then to enter some kind of confederate/federal relationship on the level of B&H or the Republic of Croatia", this official of the Bosnian Serbs said, obviously relying on the possibility which would suit the Serbs the most. Asked what kind of relations would the Bosnian Serbs prefer if the union with the mother country occurred, he said that this should be decided by a referendum. The offered options would be: (1) "Serbian Republic" as one of the equal republics within the FR Yugoslavia, or (2) simply union with Serbia.

In the end, Buha stated that the "established "political climate" between Belgrade and Zagreb in the near future would bring about mutual recognition between the "Republic of Srpska" and "Herzeg-Bosnia". He also said: "Although due to technical reasons, their office in Pale has not yet been opened, as agreed, nor ours in Herzeg-Bosnia, it will soon happen, certainly in the course of next month".

Therefore, should one combine the first mentioned assessments of the Serbian party which reflect fear and an open doubt about the good intentions of the USA, the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, and the latter which show some hope, an integral picture of Serbian confusion and wonder about what is happening in Washington D.C. could be obtained.

One, should, of course, add that many Serbian media put great emphasis on the words of the Russian Minister of the Exterior, Koziryev, who in a statement to the American TV network NBC expressed open disapproval because Washington did not consult Moscow prior to its latest step. "What kind of a partnership is it, if such important decisions, be they good or bad, are made without previous consultation with President Yeltsin?" Koziryev wondered.

The official Belgrade, and especially the state media which express accurately the viewpoints of Milosevic's regime, are not even trying to hide that they find increasingly protective role of Moscow extremely convenient. Not for a minute did anyone in Belgrade, at least not publicly, express fear of possible unpleasant consequences in case of additional strain of the relations between the East and the West, should the line of separation be drawn across Bosnia. The impression actually is that many in Serbia find the role of a "client" under protection of Russia perfectly convenient. Ones because they are tired of living in isolation without anyone on their side. And the others, obviously, because they believe that with such a powerful patron such as Russia, whose armed force must still be respected by the entire world, the Serbs could continue to wage war as long as they please. Because, whenever things get too critical, the "Big Brother" would always be there to help...

Serbia, quite naturally, has all reason to cherish and develop good relations with Moscow. But, it can be useful for Belgrade only if both Belgrade, and Moscow, simultaneously establish and develop good relations with other countries, both those in their immediate and those in more distant neighbourhood, and with all the others who the peace and the officially proclaimed partnership might depend on. STEVAN NIKSIC