HERZEG - BOSNIA LASTS

AIM, ZAGREB, February 27, 1994.

When several days ago, before the Croat - Moslem negotiations in Washington, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman met with the leadership of his party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), so as to brief them on the actual state of affairs, he could not but point out that precisely his forecast had come true: the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such was impossible. He did not, on that occasion, radiate with triumph because he was right, as in some earlier instances.Probably because representatives of the international community, the USA primarily, in addition to having agreed for the first time with him that Bosnia and Herzegovina in its present borders was not possible, had not only recommended but also insisted that the Croats and Moslems should agree on the establishment of a joint federation on part of the territory of B&H, which would then establish a confederate union with Croatia. And this does not exactly fit into Tudjman's vision and that of his Party. At least not of its most influential part. Especially given the fact the American initiative allows that the Bosnian Serbs, after the establishment of the Croat - Moslem federation and delimitation with it, annex their part of Bosnia to Serbia.

Namely, despite the quite strong opposition in Croatia itself and also on the part of most Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tudjman's policy sailed at full speed towards the establishment of a Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be comprised of three states - the Croat, Serb and Moslem Republics. Concurring with the Serbs in this respect, it seemed that the realization of a Union of three Republics was at hand, because it was assessed that the Moslems, who opposed this, would not be able to withstand the pressure brought to bear on them by the two sides for long. The concept of a Union, from the standpoint of Tudjman's policy seemed optimum also because it did not encroach on the present internationally recognized borders of B&H, whose change it was believed, would not be allowed by the world. Even if this was reckoned with, it was thought that it would end with the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts, wherein the Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia would be the Croatian part of the cake of the dismembered territory of B&H.

Such estimates were counted on ever since the beginning of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although immediately after it broke out, an alliance was established with the Moslems for the protection of all parts of B&H in which Croats and Moslems constituted a majority population. But from the very moment when it was assessed that in the face of the superior Serb military power it would not be possible to defend all those territories, not even those where the Croats were a majority, like the Bosanska Posavina (the Sava river valley), Tudjman opted for defending that part of Croat territories in which such defense could be organized more efficiently and which it would be easier to support from Croatia. Namely, territory of greater strategic importance for Croatia because it used to and still does constitute the Dalmatian hinterland. They did not draw a line only at military organization, but also started organizing a state, which finally resulted in the constituting of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg - Bosnia. The establishment of Boban's Herzeg - Bosnia however, immediately broke off the alliance with the Moslems and shortly led to their mutual armed conflict in central Bosnia.

Apart from the conflict with the Moslems, the more Herzeg - Bosnia became a state within a state, the more dissatisfaction it aroused among the Croats outside its territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of almost all the opposition parties in Croatia and in part of Tudjman's HDZ itself. Their main objections were that this meant assent to divide B&H whereby Serbia as a state, would cross the Drina river and by continuous links with the UNPAs' in Croatia directly endanger Croatian state territory. For, the very moment a precedent is made and changes allowed of B&H borders, there would be no further international guarantees that the borders of Croatia also would not be changed. In addition, two thirds of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained outside Herzeg - Bosnia and owing to this in the future, in such an ethnically divided B&H, the majority would most probably leave their homes for ever.

That is why it was insisted more and more persistantly on changes in the Croatian policy in B&H: instead of insisting on Herzeg - Bosnia, the re-establishment was demanded of an alliance with the Moslems and the advocation of an integral Bosnia and Herzegovina in its internationally recognized borders. Last autumn they went even farther than demands and political pressures. The Croats from Bosanska Posavina convened an Assembly at which they formulated their demands and organized themselves politically. This was followed by Assemblies of Croats from central Bosnia, Sarajevo and other parts of B&H, which had remained outside Herzeg - Bosnia, which culminated in the Assembly of the Croats of B&H in Sarajevo. Herzeg - Bosnia did not remain idle either - almost at the same time the Croats there also held an Assembly which got the support of Tudjman and of the Croatian authorities. Although Mate Boban stepped down from the post of the President of Herzeg - Bosnia on that occasion, which was attributed to changes in Tudjman's policy, the Assembly nevertheless adopted documents which only negigibly revised the hitherto policy. The impression can be gained that all those revisions, including the departure of Mate Boban, are more a result of pressures, especially those from without, than of a sincere wish for changing the hitherto policy in B&H. True, the softening the policy and the concessions were to a certain extent designed to accommodate the Croats from other parts of B&H so that they too could, in the projected Union of B&H, win a larger degree of autonomy.

That these were secondary reasons is seen in Tudjman's explanation of why Croatia agreed with the American initiative and accepted negotiations on a possible alliance with the Moslems. In the first place he spoke of the wish to stop the war in B&H "for its continuation under the present circumstances would bring Croatia itself in danger". These present conditions are actually dictated by the demand of the UN Security Council that Croatia withdraw its soldiers and arms from Bosnia. Otherwise, sanctions which would be disastrous for Croatia, would be imposed. Also, Tudjman himself said that the settlement of the crisis in B&H was a prerequisite for solving the problem of Croatian UNPAs.

Before that the American Ambasador in Zagreb, Peter Galbraith, had made it clear to the Croatian public that he was surprised that Croatian policy had chosen the worst of all ways for settling the B&H crisis - "the non-recognition of the territorial unity of B&H , which could entail the non-recognition of the integrity of Croatia and by the sending its army to a neighbouring internationally recognized state". In this way, according to him, Croatia had been brought to the verge of sanctions, with the possibility of loss of part of its territory. Tudjman, of course, laconically ommitted that part in his explanation, but it was implied. That is why he spoke much more about the promises made if Croatia were to decide on a alliance with the Moslems: assistance for the restoration of the country, membership of European institutions and participation in all integration flows... For just as he was pushed by the Americans by the carrot and stick policy into negotiations and agreement with the Moslems, he used the same method to convince the leadership of his party and the Croatian public that negotiations and an alliance with the Moslems were of interest to Croatia and Croats in B&H.

However, despite all the arguments advanced to support the decision to embark on negotiations with the Moslems, Tudjman finally uneqvivocally said that he would not give up the essentials of his Bosnian policy: "It is our task to ensure the survival of the Croatian people in B&H in the territorial sense also, for without that Bosnia could soon be lost for the Croats". In other words, he does not give up the concept of Herceg - Bosnia, but just adjusts it to the new conditions. The creation of a Croat-Moslem Federation in B&H is possible, but only under the condition that the territory of the Croat state unit in the future federation is precisely known. As the Moslems, on the other hand, firmly inssist on a federal state without ethnic states with firmly defined borders in it, it will be hard to arrive at an agreement. By firmly promising to insist on the delimitation and definition of Croatian sovereign territory before the creation of a federation with the Moslems, Tudjman does not only wish to precisely define the territories with which the Croats and Moslems will enter the joint state, but also wishes to settle accounts in advance in case of the possible future disassociation of the state being created today. In any case, after all, it is illusory to expect him to abandon the essence of his policy

• the realization of Croatia's thousand-year-old dream - the creation of a national state which implies ethnic delineation and the rounding off of its national territory.

ZORAN DASKALOVIC