SANCTIONS AT THE DOORSTEP OF CROATIA

AIM, Zagreb, February 6, 1994

The sanctions are at the doorstep of Croatia, too. Noone can say that this was completely unexpected, because it could have happened practically any time in the past months. And yet, the announcement of the sanctions in Croatia met with disapproval like a faux pas of world diplomacy, with Mate Granic stating that it was unjust to punish the victim of the war, and Mario Nobilo adding that it was an expression of impotence to punish effectively the Serbian party which had started the aggression in B&H, and before that in Croatia.

Such reaction is nothing unexprected either - it would have been too much to expect that Croatia could agree to the sanctions - but an oversight is involved, a deliberate oversight, one should say. Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) was punished with sanctions three or four months after it had got militarily involved in B&H, and yet this sin was not mentioned in connection with Croatia and it was abolished for at least a year. Therefore, those who keep their finger on the trigger of the santions have not forgotten the difference between Serbia and Croatia. Moreover, one can say that they had the difference in mind even more than Croatia itself, because its policy in B&H was so "Serbian" that it almost openly provoked such penalties. The holder of the trigger did not react for a number of reasons - they will be mentioned later, because they are still topical - among other, because the international community did not know what to do with B&H.

For a moment it seemed that this lack of an objective was so hopeless that the world would simply accept the aggression, both Serbian and Croatian, and thus sew up the festering sore it could not find a cure for. Now, it appears, this crisis of objective has passed, and the international community has returned to the concept of a united Bosnia. But even if this had not happened, noone should have believed that it would openly approve and put its signature on aggression against B&H. On the contrary, it could have been expected that the aggressors would not only have to assume their respective parts of the responsibility, but that, should things turn in the wrong direction, they would be put together as those who have threatened the world peace by igniting the gunpowder of ethnic division in B&H, regardless of the fact that such a division is the common denominator of all plans supported by the international community itself.

Yes, it too is playing a double role! But, in the space of former Yugoslavia, there were so many such instances that it had become an expert by now. That is why Croatian reactions, let us return to them again, appear as a mix of the expected diplomatic affectations, but also as a naive bewilderment difficult to understand. Mate Granic claims that the strategy of Croatian external policy is doubtless (?!) and that the sanctions are an unjustified pressure exerted on a country which is "doing its best to bring to a peceful solution", which is again a part of the "pressure on all the three parties" to reach an agreement. Interesting! That is exactly what the international community is expected to do - to strive for peace, even by using pressure! That is exactly the reason why Croatia had, in the first place, invited it to the conquered part of its territory, and later on to B&H, demanding even the use of force in order to stop the war and punish the offenders. What is it doing now, if not exactly what it was invited to do?

True enough, it is doing it in a way which was not difficult to anticipate. According to what has reached the Croatian diplomatic services, Croatia was threatened with sanctions in order to stop the Croatian-Moslem conflict and initiate an alliance between them. In that case, the part of B&H held by the Serbs, as Izetbegovic proposed not long ago, would be treated as occupied territory (just like Croatia treats its UNPAs). The aim is not to create an anti-Serbian block, but to return to the concept of a united Bosnia, which would corner Milosevic and Karadzic to either accept this, or to impose on the "Republic of Srpska" the status of a separatist creation again.

Of course, Croatia was also forced to make its mind quickly. Should it continue to refuse the alliance with the Moslems, it is threatened not only with the sanctions, but with its role of an assistant (or better still "cabin-boy") to Serbian politics in Bosnia becoming fully revealed. At first sight, there is not much cause for hesitation here. What is it for Croatia to renounce the concubinage with Milosevic and Karadzic, and win the favour of the majority of the world (which supports the Croatian-Moslem alliance as a secular creation with the exclusive task to ensure the disturbed balance in the Balkans). But, nevertheless, it is difficult for Tudjman to make up his mind to do it. For some time now, he is not linking his expectations and ambitions to that part of the world, but he has shifted them and even made a fixed-term deposit with Milosevic. He hopes to divide Bosnia with him (this being the prime aim of the Serbian party) and to humour him by it to "return" the so-called Krajina (which is of prime importance for Croatia).

This is more than a simple alliance, because the two parties are getting close not only in respect to political and military issues, but also in respect to their general conceptions and doctrines. It was only just an implied affinity for a long time, but it was recently made public by Tudjman himself, loudly and probably pointedly, criticizing the "Christian universalities" and "liberal democratic" forces in the world. The Croatian leader is obviously angry with Europe for not having entrusted him with the mandate of an authorized border guard of the "Catholic" West against the "Orthodox/Islamic" East. And although this bizzare expectation implied a latent antagonism towards Serbia, his refusal brings Tudjman sloser to Milosevic (it is not mere chance that the only support Croatia got concerning the sanctions was from Radovan Karadzic), and through him even to Russia.

It is, therefore, not certain at all, whether Tudjman will accept the political conditions he needs to fulfill in order to dismount the sanctions (the military ones do not matter, because it is certain that the presence of Croatian army in B&H was "revealed" in time). In any case, this is a turning point of Croatian politics, which will soon have to resolve the dilemma, or it will find it difficult to swallow, whether it will accept the standards of the international community or not. If the opinion that these standards are too strict should prevail and that it is easier to live without them, it will be a triumph of that part of the Croatian Democratic Community which can hardly hide its desire to have the sanctions introduced, convinced that only behind a high wall it is possible to construct a "true" Croatia. We will not describe this "true" state, partly because it is already visible, but it is certain that very soon, maybe in a month or two, it would make Croatia resemble the state Zirinovski desires (although Zirinovski did not visit us on this occasion, but a "love letter" was sent to him by one of the authorized ideologists, whose sincerity should not ne questioned).

Opposite to this profound effort of Croatia not to avoid the sanctions, there are several circumstances pointing out that this will not happen after all. In the first place, there are the refugees and the displaced, and there are few who would take the responsibility for making them suffer the consequences. The other element are the UNPAs the status of which would become completely uncertain under sanctions (should the sanctions be introduced, would the obligation to reintegrate Croatia peacefully remain?). These two weak points were noticed immediately and it was announced (by Adalbert Rebic) that in the case the sanctions were imposed on Croatia, the refugees would be sent to the countries which voted for them, and a hardly concealed threat was uttered (by Mario Nobilo) that Croatia would charge at the "Krajina". These two declarations sound as a "manifesto of the desperate". Such statements are never all true, but it is characteristic that for the first time the statements so close to open blackmail are heard from the official sources. There is another reason which speaks against the sanctions, and it is implied by the mentioned viewpoint of the international factors Croatian diplomacy was informed about. It is the fact that there will be no sanctions until Geneva negotiations continue, but only if the negotiations proceed in the direction of a united Bosnia, so that the trap for Croatia remains, although it appears from the other side now.

Therefore, much may be clarified as soon as February 10 in Geneva. Or, to be in better conformity with the most recent course of development - must be clarified.

MARINKO CULIC