THE CRISIS IS REVERTING TO ITS SOURCE

Serbia After the Elections

IT BEGAN WITH THE GREAT AMBITION OF MAKING BELGRADE THE CENTRE OF ALL SERBS, TO REACH TO STAGE WHEN IT HAS BECOME THE CENTRE OF ALL SERBIAN

DISCORDS

Summary: Even after the elections, Milosevic will not have it easy.The balance of power in the Assembly will most certainly cause its blockade, while the Government, regardless of whether it will a one-party or coalition one will stand on whobbly legs. His reputation among the Serbs outside of Serbia, as illustrated by the elections in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, has been shacken. It is quite possible that the President of Serbia will attain fame as the man who deserves credit for the lifting of the sanctions, however each of his major compromises in the peace negotiations, will hardly be benevolently received by the Serbian right-wing nationalists.

AIM, BELGRADE, December 24

Ever since he has come to power, Slobodan Milosevic has not been in such a tight situation as he has found himself at present, when unexpected circumstances are forcing him to come face to face with three major dilemmas closely linked to his continued rule. In chronological order, the first of the dilemmans is connected to the so called Republic of Serbian Krajina which has clearly demonstrated, by the results of the recent elections, that it is slipping away from his control. Secondly, what is to happen in Serbia itself, where the just completed elections held on St. Nicholas's day have not secured the planned stable majority in the republican Assembly. Thirdy, will he be ready and capable of finding a common language with the international community which is unequivocally expecting additional concessions from him and the true relinquishing of the policy of war.

Milosevic's problem is actually in the fact that,having constantly kept the initiative in his own hands, he had gotten accustomed to the idea that he was the one who creates events,not only in Serbia but on the territory of entire former Yugoslavia. Now things have changed to his detriment, events are increasingly overwhelming him and compelling him to possibly change his style of work.

In all these years he was the one who shaped, gave meaning and dramatic potential to all the problems and events connected with the Serbs outside of Serbia. Without him nothing could pass, from the time of the "log revolution" and war conflict to the establishment of the two Serbian republics. Flinging in this way all around him live war coal into everyone's house, he kept Serbia itself at a distance from armed conflict. This fact he used this as a major trump-card in the election contest with the opposition rivals. Now, the closer to peace we are, this incontestable master of war is turning into a constestable leader. His leading position has seriously been brought into question in the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

The September putcsh in Banja luka is a warning that a latent threat perhaps also exists in the Republic of Srpska. The problem is rather more complex and cannot be reduced to the personal ambitions of political leaders and their groupings. The redefining of the relationship between Serbia and the Serbian krajinas is on the agenda. Coming back to this topic, namely to the mutual explanations will in no way pass without turbulent shifts and turns and unpredictable consequences.

However, the factors that will more than certainly forcefully instigate new crisis events in Belgrade are the results of the elections held on the day of St.Nicholas. The Parliament which is to be constituted according to their results, without a convincing majority, will be faced with a blocakde and decision-making paralysis. The Government,regardless of whether it will a one-party or coalition one will constandly stand on uncertain feet. The lack of mutual confidence and possible antagonism between the Assembly and the President of the Republic, regardless of the their clearly defined constitutional competences, will cause new tensions in the political life.

The situation will be further complicated by the fact that militant groupings in both Krajinas view with disapproval the strengthening of the opposition in Serbia. They have their own very specific reasons for that. At present, according to some sources, 20%, and to other more than 30 percent of the Serbian national income goes to the two Serbian states in the form of aid. Who is the one that make the decisions on the volume of that aid is a secret for now, but the leaderships of both republics will not allow "some" opposition to bring all that into question. They would become alarmed by the very attempt to restore legality to such decisions, through the assembly bodies, for example. All in all, the reverse process will take place - and while up to date Belgrade exerteda decisive influence on the krajinas, now they will come to exert increasing pressure on Belgrade.

In addition to all this, the strength of criminal forces in Serbia itself should not be neglected. The most vital economic trends, before all monetary ones, are now in the hands of the mafia, which will most certainly react violently in case a changed balance of power threatens its interests. If we add to all this the frequently mentioned danger of the proclamation of a state of emergency, then it is clear to what extent the present situation in Serbia is burdened with imminent new conlficts and antagonisms.

Circumstances are, therefore, begining to attain grotesque form - the original plan was to make Belgrade the centre of all Serbs in order to have reached a stage when it has become the focus of all Serbian disputes.

Of course this possibility, and in all truth, at present more a reality, will considerably weaken Milosevic's negotiating position in the international community. Whether he will be prepared to make greater concessions, is at present not known. In any case, he is in a position to turn his weakness into an advantage and to win, by acepting some compromises, for himself the fame of the man who shall take the credit for initiating the lifting of the sanctions. With such a trump-card, and with our well known national trait to easily forget whose fault it was in the first place for the introduction of the sanctions, he could, with peace at heart and sure of bright prospects, run in the following elections.

Indeed, playing the role of the saviour of the nation has its limiting factors - some spectacular peacemaking moves could bring down on Milosevic, whose prestige is somewhat on the downward trend in all the territories inhabited by Serbs, the revenge of the unrelenting Serbian nationalists. And then, new complications are sure to appear in Serbia which would not exclude the threat of the use of force.

Such an analysis does not have to be in contradiction with the fact just published by the American CIA, namely, that there is no acceptable alternative to Milosevic in Serbia. Therefore, this will, with many difficulties, go on. During that time Milosevic will have trouble with Serbia, just as Serbs will have trouble with Milosevic. But out of that incestuous marriage, neither the Serbs nor Milosevic will come out easily, and one can only pray to God that it will all happen without any bloodshed. After all, it is the inevitable law of any nationalist policy - it constantly stirs up great trouble for all those around it, that is up to the point in time when those troubles begin to strike back. It seems that we are knee deep into this other stage of our over-ripe nationalism.

DRAGOS IVANOVIC