Spectre of Terrorism Uniting Sworn Enemies

AIM Sarajevo, September 28, 2001

B&H authorities have managed to largely absorb the impact of the anti-Bosnian and anti-Moslem campaign gaining in momentum after the terrorist attacks on the USA in which Bosnia was being focused as a zone of a potential terrorist threat. Local authorities denounced terrorism, did what the Western allies asked them to do (a check of 18 individuals on the Interpol wanted-list), showed willingness to extradite the suspects and used the occasion for embarking on the unification of an otherwise loosely-nit security system. On Tuesday, September 25, the Bosnian government (Ministerial Council) headed by Zlato Lagumdzija adopted an anti-terrorist plan of action of five points. The reinstatement of control over the entire border-line a quarter of which is under no supervision at the moment and the authentication of all passports issued to foreigners, due to be completed by October 15, are at the top of the list. The plan also encompasses tasks such as: providing the necessary legal framework (concerning privacy rights, authorization issues in terrorism-linked and organized crime investigations, etc.), cross-checking of accounts with possible terrorist links, airspace security measures and so on. In short, fear of terrorism and the globalization of this evil have given the authorities an ideal chance to start building the needed state security system - an enterprise lacking the necessary political will up to now.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, being a country with a Moslem (Bosniac) majority, Bosnia & Herzegovina found itself stigmatized by the media as a safe haven for terrorists, in full accord with the simplification that the Moslem faith and terrorism are one and the same thing. The fact that a number of volunteers coming from Islamic countries did in fact join the ranks of the Bosnian army and that some later acquired B&H citizenship, certainly did not help much. All the needed prerequisites for abuse in the media and on the political plane - whether internally, in the immediate neighborhood or beyond - were there, threatening to deeply affect a society and a state already destabilized by the effects of the '92-'95 war.

In a news report aired immediately after the terrorist attacks on USA, the state TV of Republika Srpska from Banja Luka informed its audience that the key player behind the atrocities was the Saudi dissident and terrorist Osama bin Laden, "a holder of an B&H passport". Similar allegations appeared in a number of media throughout the world as well. But, the most damaging accusation came from the reporter of the Voice of America (VOA), Berry Wood. In an in-depth coverage of the activities of bin Laden's Al-Qaida terrorist organization in the Balkans, aired on September 18, Wood claimed that bin Laden's men operated in Albania in

1. It was also said that there was reason to believe that "some radical Islamic groups in B&H are closely linked to the same terrorist web." While admitting that there was room for speculation as far as Osam bin Laden's presence in B&H itself was concerned, VOA voiced no doubts concerning another aspect of Wood's story: the one alleging that bin Laden's followers were to be found within the B&H Federation, many recruited from the ranks of the local population.

The story of the mujahedeen lurking virtually around every corner of the Bosnian territory gained great publicity. On September 17, Zagreb daily Vjesnik published a commentary stating that "Croatia has no intention of being classified among states notorious for allowing Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists to freely wonder about their sovereign territory, as is the case with B&H. "Miroslav Lazanski, an expert on military issues and commentator of an esteemed Belgrade daily (reputed to be surprisingly well informed on secrets of the international intelligence community) came forth with an allegation that a village near the Bosnian town of Zenica is, in fact, a training camp for the mujahedeen, prudently avoided by the Nordic-Polish brigade in B&H. The Sarajevo SFOR spokesman described Lazanski's claim as "pure nonsense", explaining that international forces control the entire territory of B&H and that the location near Zenica singled out by Lazanski is in the jurisdiction of the Turkish UN contingent. Once more, Sarajevo issued an official denial concerning Lazanski's allegations (in this city, he is considered a quack and remembered by his claim that the massacre on the Markale market in February 1994, resulting in the deaths and mutilation of around 150 Sarajevo citizens, was not caused by a shell fired from Serbian positions, but by "mines set off by the Moslems". Still, many ordinary newspaper readers in Belgrade trust him, living in fear of the fundamentalism and jihad warriors coming from Bosnia."

In a program entitled "A new war?" dealing with the repercussions of the terrorist attacks on USA - aired on the Croat state television on September 18 - some of the reports were conceived in such a manner as to suggest that Bosnia represents a potential terrorist threat to the stability of the whole region. The said standpoint was highlighted by a question put to a guest in the studio which ran: "How is Croatia, which has the longest border-line with B&H, to protect itself from the terrorist threat?" Luckily, the guest in the studio happened to be Tomislav Jakic, the foreign affairs adviser to the Croat president who demonstrated a healthy insight into the whole affair and much sound common sense. According to him, the likelihood of terrorists crossing into Croatia from B&H is far lesser than the possibility that they might use the border crossings with Hungary and Italy.

Bosnia & Herzegovina is being singled out for two reasons. For one, a planetary stereotype identifying Islam with terrorism is in effect. Secondly, Bosniacs (Moslems) constitute the majority nation in B&H and, during the war, volunteers from Islamic countries (mujahedeen) did join the Bosnian army, many permanently settling here following the conflict. The late Croat president Franjo Tudjman used to justify Croatia's involvement in the war by stirring up the fear of "Islamic fundamentalism coming from B&H", assuming "the historic role of the foremost safeguard of Christianity" for himself and his country. In the course of the conflict in B&H, both Milosevic and Tudjman exploited the alleged "Islamic threat" as an effective propaganda tool, regardless of the fact that they – in the period preceding the war as well as in the course of it – urged Izetbegovic to set up "a small Moslem state within B&H". Luckily, Izetbegovic rejected the offer. Had he decided otherwise, that could have proved to be disastrous for the future of B&H and its majority nation (the Bosniacs) who might have had ended up in complete isolation, as if in some sort of a Balkan Palestine state.

While largely based on stereotypes stemming from the "European Christian tradition" (Zbignjev Bzezinski), this negative perception should also be perceived as a result of the mistakes made by the former Izetbegovic authorities. When the Moslem Party of Democratic Action (SDA) stepped into power, Islam – a faith subdued for over 50 years - gained overnight recognition, suddenly becoming the ideology governing the country's policies. Aggressive religiosity permeated all walks of life, penetrating politics, public life and, to a great extent, the Army itself, particularly during the critical year of 1993. when the country waged a war on two simultaneous fronts: against both Serb and Croat forces. Religious belief was the sole source of hope available, and in such times, all allies are welcome. Hundreds of Islamic volunteers came to Bosnia to fight. Their motives were twofold: they came to defend their brethren on the brink of extinction as well as their common faith. They also set up a special unit of their own, the "El Mujahedeen", organized according to Islamic principles. As it turned out later on, this unit was never officially incorporated into the officially recognized structure of the Bosnian army. Yet, the very fact that it existed, provided a powerful propaganda boost for the regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb. As for public opinion in B&H, it has long been perturbed by a single question: how come so many mujahedeens made it into Bosnia, if the Croat territory was so closely monitored by the HVO forces?! The answer to this question, if ever given, could resolve at least a part of the mystery regarding the Bosnian tragedy.

In accordance with the act adopted in1993. by the B&H wartime government, on request, all volunteers to the Bosnian army were to be granted B&H citizenship (a practice both the HVO and the army of Bosnian Serbs engaged in). A number of foreigners made use of the offer, thus providing fuel for further wild speculation. In the days following the terrorist attacks on America, media and politicians showered the public with figures ranging from 5 to 12 thousand passports handed out to the mujahedeen. and raised questions as to the true numbers of potential terrorists travelling the world with B&H passports. The Civil Services Ministry issued an official statement citing that around 12 000 foreigners were granted B&H citizenship during the war and that merely 420 of them were of Arabic origin. Out of the 420 Arabs, but 70 volunteers remained in B&H after the conflict, for either political or personal reasons. No one is suggesting that there are no possible suspects among them, an issue to be resolved by the authentication of the passports issued, due to be terminated by October 15.

After the Dayton Accords and police raids in 1997. and 1998, the small mujahedeen community in B&H was driven to the margins of society, isolated and shunned by the local population. Following the Dayton Peace Treaty, the US administration demanded that Islamic warriors leave Bosnia within 45 days. Their unit was demobilized, most went back home or to other battlefields, a minority stayed on, having formed families in B&H. Among them, a couple of individuals wanted by the Interpol were to be found. The ill- famed Abu Hamza (alias Handala) suspected of a car-bomb attack in Mostar and the Frenchman Dumont, a bank robber and convert to Islam who took refuge in Bosnia in order to escape jail, for ones.

Still, the perception of Bosnia as a potential terrorist threat is, to a large extent, an exaggeration. For one, the country is under the patronage of the Western allies who have absolute control over it. Secondly, the susceptibility of the social being of Bosnian Moslems to Islamic radicalization is highly questionable and, thirdly, the Alliance presently governing the country can hardly be accused of ties with radical Islamic circles, whether at home or around the world. Thanks to all this, the tendency to much to much lightly single out Bosnia as a safe haven for Islamic radicalism has been significantly dampened. At the same time, the B&H government has resolutely sided with the global anti-terrorist block, a stand it is likely to benefit from.

Prior attempts to secure the state border and to enact a minimum of coordination between the existing state security agencies failed, due to the opposition of the Serb and Croat nationalists, qualifying all such attempts as unitarianist. The recent terrorist attacks have proved that terrorism is a global issue, thus underlying the need for the consolidation of security measures and policies on the state level. B&H can hardly be expected to efficiently fight the global terrorist plague while harboring two distinct agencies within the Federation itself and another one in the Serb entity of Republika Srpska, whether by means of three separate national armies or through three distinct police forces and a quarter of its border left prey to the evildoers. Now is the moment for it to exert itself as member of the international community capable of defending itself, as well as a country willing to contribute to the efforts of fighting terrorism in the region. As is the case with most evil, the recent atrocities had a bright side to them, too. Just a few months ago, the call of the Prime Minister of the B&H Federation Zlatko Lagumdzija for a unified state security system would have been stigmatized as being unitarianist. At the moment, the threat of global terrorism seems to be the uniting forces amongst the otherwise hopelessly divided sections of the B&H political scene.

EMIR HABUL

(AIM Sarajevo)