Republika Srpska: Will Ivanic Reshuffle His Cabinet?
Ivanic is completely isolated: foreigners are disappointed with his dragging the Serb Democratic Party along; the Serb Democratic Party never really trusted him, Dodik considers him responsible for his collapse more than he does Mirko Sarovic; federal partners with whom he used to be on good terms consider him a nationalist. This is why a cabinet reshuffle could be yet another attempt on his part to regain as many friends as he can while keeping his losses to a minimum
AIM Banja Luka, August 27, 2001
When Republika Srpska's bravest warrior, Zivko Radisic, says the coming fall would be a tough one, that is a sure sign that one should not only take Cedo Volas seriously, but should also prepare much more than warm socks and underwear for the days ahead. In Serb politics it is customary to leave unfinished business for the fall, which makes fall the last chance politicians have to do what they have to do before the next one comes along, when they will be forced to deal not only with that year's issues, but everything that has accumulated in the meantime as well. In accordance with such logic, RS Premier Mladen Ivanic and other government officials are in for a fall of exactly this description, in which much of what was not done by Karadzic, Plavsic and Dodik will challenge their endurance.
"And now, let's see how strong you really are," is an approach foreigners, friends, and enemies alike use every now and then on Ivanic, who is well aware that the instances when cleverness and not strength is required have long ago been passed thanks to his predecessors and, unfortunately, to the detriment of both them and himself. It is now almost certain that Ivanic will have to reshuffle his cabinet. That, however, is not all; it is only the first of many levels of the game that separate him for an extremely elusive victory. And this is the essence of the difficult task before the RS premier.
A PENNILESS REFORMER: What the foreigners have been persistently asking for is that Ivanic reshuffle his cabinet, their sensitive feelings hurt by the fact that too many nationalists and Serb Democratic Party sympathizers are in it. As opposed to how the Dodik and other past governments were treated in this regard, the foreigners had accepted, at the beginning of the year, Ivanic's proposal urging them to wait a while and see for themselves that he is, in fact, surrounded solely by the most determined of reformers, such as himself. As they waited, the foreigners themselves ran no risks; they tolerated the Ivanic government and their tolerance produced no aid. As one cannot be a reformer unless one has money, it inevitably happened that although Ivanic's government made fewer wrong moves than its predecessors, it made no right moves either. Moves require money, and what could be collected through taxes and strict customs controls on the border proved quite insufficient for Ivanic's plans.
This fall Ivanic is finally going to realize that things have hit rock bottom: no one knows whether the school year will start on time, whether the pensioners will again march in front of the government building, or whether police will also strike, now that they have begun cooperating with their colleagues from the Muslim-Croat federation and had a glimpse of their paychecks. It is, however, uncertain whether Ivanic will indeed fire his ministers, since two-thirds of his cabinet, except in name, does not even fit that description. Although painful and difficult, such a reshuffle could, in addition to the foreigners, satisfy Ivanic as well.
If unprepared to get rid of Dragan Kalinic, who is currently providing him with the names of officials who, allegedly, never even saw the inside of the Serb Democratic Party offices, Ivanic will, like in January this year, again have to settle for only minor changes. According to sources close to him, both possibilities are still being considered. Which option he will finally choose will not be a matter of cleverness but of strength and his ability to work normally in conditions of conflict with anyone except Milorad Dodik.
DODIK'S ATTACK: It is true that the foreigners are mostly to blame for the fact that Ivanic has missed the opportunity to stabilize Republika Srpska and reconcile, with the Serb Democratic Party lying low, the interests of the foreigners and the voters. But it is also true that the Serb Democratic Party, while the foreigners did nothing to either help or harm the government, has gradually relaxed and, unbuttoning the uppermost button on its shirt, began showing its old mentality and growing appetite for control -- from the Customs Administration to the tiniest kiosk in Mrkonjic Grad.
It is also true that Ivanic also failed to take action to tie together both the Serb Democrats and Milorad Dodik on several general and undisputed goals, and, depending on the need, play one of these cards alternately. But he is not solely to blame for this, nor for the fact that by the end of his term he will be forced to rely exclusively on the Serb Democrats. Milorad Dodik, who has always perceived himself as being much more important that he is, as soon as he saw Ivanic's soft spot, immediately forgot everything else and took a shot at the only politician who, except for Svetozar Mihailovic and Nebojsa Radmanovic, could have accepted him as a partner in government. Dodik, however, was impatient and accused Ivanic of everything under the sun – from financing Radovan Karadzic, to forcing people to voluntarily hand themselves over to the Hague court, to not having the slightest idea of what a decrease in industrial output actually means. His attacks, of course, pleased the foreigners who are pressuring Ivanic, but were of little use to him.
To the contrary. It appears that Dodik is about to fail in making it into the Council of Ministers, where he could have been much better off than as part of the most corrupt opposition in Europe. This was confirmed by Ivanic, whose party proverbially avoids verbal clashes but still told Dodik to beware of corruption probes. Ivanic has thus become completely isolated: the foreigners are disappointed with his dragging the Serb Democratic Party along; the Serb Democratic Party never really trusted him, Dodik consider him more responsible for his collapse than Mirko Sarovic, and federal partners with whom he used to be on good terms consider him a nationalist.
This is why his cabinet reshuffle could be an attempt to regain as many friends as he can while simultaneously losing as little as possible. For quite some time nothing in Republika Srpska can be done without foreigners, and if Ivanic opts for survival, he might turn in that direction. At the same time his rating in the Federation is definitely poor, since he has been identified by the parties there as a staunch defender of Republika Srpska. He has little chance of making up with Dodik after their harsh exchanges. This, again, leaves him with the Serb Democrats and the foreigners.
You might ask, what then is the difference between now and seven months ago? The difference is that Kalinic will have to lower his ambitions much more than he ever thought he would have to, and Ivanic will no longer act as reformer who should never be questioned but as someone obliged to produce proof to the foreigners. What will happen if that does not come to be? Nothing, and this is the most dangerous outcome. Aware that there is no alternative to Ivanic in Republika Srpska, unless they see it in Dodik, the foreigners will wait for next fall, the same point where some meager funds are awaiting Ivanic. The pensioners and teachers will be there too, but Cedo Volas and the police could intercept him sooner, and in a much less convenient place.
Zejko Cvijanovic
(AIM)