There Will be War After All!

There will be war because the local politicians have been leading the country in that direction for the last six months. No breakthrough even after three days of negotiations in Ohrid. Despite optimistic announcements that the President of the state and leaders of four largest political parties in Macedonia would have to agree because they have no other alternative and were taking their last chance to spare the country from a veritable civil war

AIM Skopje, July 30, 2001

It seems that in the previous couple of months – from February till today – the war was the only possible future development in Macedonia. Every other option – despite a logical conclusion that everything is better than war – was soon exhausted. At the very beginning, irrespective of condemnation of armed operations, the international community demanded the initiation of inter-ethnic political dialogue. However, it was constantly postponed while the war started spreading from Tanusevci to the villages around Tetovo, and even Kumanovo.

After that, the formation of a Government with a broad coalition seemed a salvation – the idea being to have this dialogue within the Government and Parliament. The new Government fell after the Prime Minister delivered his provocative address and the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity reacted to it accordingly. Actually, the real reason was the increasingly evident polarisation between those who believed that peace could be restored in Macedonia only by force and those who thought that all political alternatives should first be exhausted. Since then Macedonia practically has no Government, although it is in session permanently. Ministers appear in public with totally opposed stands, so that, for example, the spokesman for the Government now serves as only Prime Minister's press representative.

Then President Trajkovski's peace plan came into play. This was actually a plan written by “foreigners”, but signed by the President. At that time he held meetings with leaders of four major Government and parliamentary parties, first alone and then with the participation of international mediators – EU representative Leotar and the American President's envoy, James Pardew. These two appeared on the scene when the tireless duo - Javier Solana and George Robertson - realised that their arrival to Skoplje was not enough for them to succeed in their mission of “bringing local politicians to their senses”. Since this did not suit them after the “Aracinovo incident”, they decided to temporarily station their men in Skoplje. Foreign experts for constitutional problems also joined in and the things starting moving. Finally, they got stuck with the final version of the political agreement, which the Macedonian political leaders refused to accept because it contained disputable demands on the second official language and possibility of greater influence of local authorities on the election of first policemen in municipalities.

Actually, things definitely reached a deadlock for a number of reasons. First, before even reading it, the Macedonian side proclaimed the latest version of the document offered by Leotar and Pardew unacceptable, so that the media stirred up a big fuss and the public mood reached a boiling point so that the Macedonian politicians could not possibly withdraw and accept the offered document. They were simply left to stew in their own juices. The Albanian politicians had and still have even less leeway to negotiate. They are practically “dead” in the eyes of their electorate. In ten years of Macedonian independence they did not succeed in restoring the rights their population once enjoyed. They have been even more marginalized by the fact that the Macedonian NLA has become practically the only factor that enjoys the support of Albanians in Macedonia – the inefficiency of politicians strengthened the positions of the National Liberation Army (NLA), not only among the Albanian population, but also with the NATO which, even before Aracinovo, established direct contacts with its political representative Ali Ahmeti, with whom it is still communicating and negotiating. And, finally, its position strengthened because it is indispensable to the international community for negotiations with the Macedonian side, as it cannot yet directly negotiate with Ahmeti and the NLA.

For the NLA concluding negotiations with Trajkovski would mean the end of its political mission – then no one will need it any more: neither the grassroots which have given up on them, nor the foreigners. On the one hand, negotiations and possible forced acceptance of as many Albanian requests as possible is their only chance of survival, while on the other, the Albanians will consider the failure of negotiations as their success.

The international mediators are stuck because the Macedonian side rejected their last proposal as unacceptable, whereas going back to the previous version is unacceptable for the Albanian negotiators. Solana and Robertson came by plane on a rescue mission in order to save the country from war because, according to them, 95 percent of the agreement has been already agreed and only 5 percent remains to be agreed upon, which is not worth waging a war. Then came Ohrid.

Recently many journalists with a long memory recalled the embarrassing coincidence. Namely quite some time ago Ohrid was also the last stop of the caravan of Presidents of the Republic of former SFRY, a place in which they agreed that they disagreed on the peaceful solution of the then YU crisis. It is common knowledge what happened latter.

Talks in Ohrid cannot bring anything new unless one of the sides changes its stands fundamentally. And there are no indications that that is likely to happen. In all this, it is totally irrelevant that the introduction of the Albanian as the second official language will be the reason for failed negotiations. It is equally unimportant that the Albanians are asking for something what they used to have in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia in late '80s and that the Macedonia is offering them much less than is already contained in the valid law on local self-government. Both sides are suffering from an incurable disease – the Macedonians are convinced that the Albanians are asking for too much, while the Albanians think that they are getting too little (whereas further development of the situation doesn't depend on their negotiators in the least). Naturally, unless the political solution is found the only remaining alternative is war, which everyone seems to want.

For, according to foreign diplomats (the source: Skoplje TV Telma) it seems that Prime Minister Georgievski doesn't want the agreement in Ohrid to be reached. It is well known that several days ago he sent a letter to the President calling upon him to use his powers and embark upon the war operation in order to resolve the situation. His parliamentary deputies demanded an extraordinary session of Parliament in order to discuss the introduction of the state of emergency; his Minister of the Interior accused the Minister of Defence together with Army Generals of being too preoccupied with peace options and playing into the hands of the international community, which most of the Macedonians considers hostile because it insists on the preservation of ceasefire. The majority of Macedonians – inhabitants of the villages around Tetovo, which they deserted and which the NLA held and finally withdrew from – demand guarantees for their safe return home, which would mean that the state would get rid of “terrorists” by force. The media in the Macedonian language are much closer to the latter option.

The Albanian population in Tetovo was somewhat disappointed when the NLA abandoned its positions in and around some parts of the town. They regret that they had not been liberated. For the time being, only the NLA is “cool”. By withdrawing from positions around Tetovo and the surrounding villages, Ahmeti showed that he could control the new nervous boys in his ranks. One of the better known NLA commanders, who was around Tetovo in the beginning, and then in the vicinity of Kumanovo and finally in Aracinovo (from which he sent a message that he would shell the airport and targets in Skoplje), Ahmeti told France Press that if “they want /meaning the Macedonian authorities/ war, they will get it”. When comparing military efficiency of the Macedonian security forces and the NLA everybody knows who is more efficient for the time being.

And what can be concluded from all this. Pessimistic prognosis from the headline is not so far fetched after all.

Iso Rusi (AIM)