The Last Yugoslavia

A Complicated End

The extradition of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic to the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague on St. Vitus's Day has created political shockwaves which over the past two weeks deepened the divisions in the DOS, brought down the federal government and led Yugoslavia a step closer to dissolution.

AIM Belgrade, July 17, 2001

The summer in Belgrade is getting hotter, politically and otherwise. The forming of a new federal government will certainly not help people breathe easier, especially the superstitious, as it was announced on Friday the 13th. Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica accepted a proposal from the Socialist People's Party to appoint Dragisa Pesic, finance minister in Zoran Zizic's outgoing federal government, as the new prime minister designate. According to initial brief statements, the new government will have nine portfolios and a deputy prime minister in charge of foreign economic relations. The ministries of religion, agriculture, sports and health will no longer exist, and the ministries of transportation and communications will merge.

The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) will be in charge of five portfolios and the Montenegrin For Yugoslavia coalition of four, plus the office of prime minister. According to Predrag Bulatovic, president of the Socialist People's Party of Montenegro, the new balance of power in the federal government will prevent either side from being outvoted, which he considers a major change in comparison to the situation prior to June 28, St. Vitus's Day. Dragoljub Micunovic, one of the DOS leaders and speaker of the lower house of parliament, told journalists that the new government was to continue with reforms, and "to preserve Yugoslavia until a platform for constitutional restructuring is prepared."

Given the events that preceded and followed the extradition of Slobodan Milosevic, even these statements seem overly optimistic. The DOS and For Yugoslavia failed to agree on and pass a bill on cooperation with the international Hague court, on which Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica strongly insisted. This resulted in the federal government adopting a cooperation decree at a session which, save for one representative from Montenegro, was held in absence of the Montenegrin part of the cabinet. The one minister from the smaller federal unit abstained from voting but enabled the government to have a quorum. On a motion launched by Milosevic's attorneys the Yugoslav Constitutional Court, appointed during the Milosevic era and minus several of its justices, suspended the decree until it could determine its constitutionality. The Serbian government reacted the same day, June 28, passing a decision on cooperation with the Hague court and authorizing Milosevic's extradition -- probably at a time when he was already in a helicopter on his way to The Hague, via the U.S. base in Tuzla, Bosnia. All members of the Djindjic cabinet signed the decision together with several federal ministers as well, faxing their signatures from abroad. Among them was the federal deputy prime minister, Miroljub Labus, who was at the time attending an international donors' conference in Brussels, and which got Yugoslavia pledges of US$1.38 billion in aid. Yugoslav Prime Minister Zoran Zizic resigned, bringing down the entire federal cabinet.

In all probability the consequences of these events will be lasting and will affect political relations between Montenegro and Serbia, which form what is left of Yugoslavia. They will also have an impact on the DOS, the coalition which last Oct. 5 toppled Slobodan Milosevic. The fierceness of the statements, explanations, accusations, and counter-accusations made in the past two weeks has surpassed even the standards set by the Serbian Radical Party in the Serbian Legislature. Members of this party are the most vocal in ongoing protests and demonstrations against the "traitorous sale of Milosevic"; compared to them, Milosevic's Socialists have yet to learn how to defend the Serb cause. Vojislav Kostunica called the manner of Milosevic's extradition a coup, and described his position as that of a hostage of the international community of the one hand, and of domestic political forces on the other. The Montenegrin For Yugoslavia coalition, which is opposition in Montenegro, accused the DOS of hypocrisy -- particularly Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus – over the way in which Serbian government's decree was passed, and threatened to break the coalition at the federal level if the DOS's attitude towards the Socialist People's Party, a political partner out of necessity, is not substantially changed.

Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic did his best to retain the image of a pragmatic and resolute politician which he seems to enjoy, but which he sometimes loses touch of. He denied, rather unconvincingly, claims that Milosevic had already been on his way to The Hague when the decision was made. He made a whole host of statements on whether Vojislav Kostunica had been informed of the extradition ("Yes, he was informed;" "There was a short silence and then he said, 'Yes',"; "His minister was informed;" "No, he wasn't informed;" "... Not even I knew everything at the time"), and, rather tastelessly and tactlessly, even boasted by revealing some technical details of the operation. It appears that the extradition, or at least the manner in which it was carried out, was not approved of by the Serbian Orthodox Church either. This is confirmed by Djindjic's sudden decision to introduce religious instruction in elementary and secondary schools starting Sept. 1 without any preparation, and announcements that the construction of St. Sava Church in Belgrade will continue. Be it as it may, a columnist of the Belgrade Vreme magazine described this as Djindjic's penitence, alluding to a church erected as a sign of penitence in the 19th century by Serbian Prince Milos, for the murder of Djordje Petrovic, also known as Karadjordje, and then sending his severed head to the Turkish sultan in Constantinople.

In addition to harsh words, the series of speedy decisions also had consequences whose importance will be fully perceived only in the future. Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia decided to form separate caucuses in the Serbian Legislature and Vojvodina Assembly, leaving the DOS caucuses. Velimir Ilic's New Serbia party did the same. Ilic played a prominent role in the Oct. 5 revolution and has announced his plans to run for Serbian president. The Movement for Democratic Serbia, led by former Yugoslav army chief of staff Momcilo Perisic, announced it would follow their lead. In theory, the 46 seats controlled by the Kostunica party and New Serbia's eight, could chip away at the DOS's comfortable majority in the Serbian Legislature. This probably mean that the coalition partners will find it harder to come to terms in the future, than cooperation with the opposition consisting of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party, and the Party of Serbian Unity, formed by the late paramilitary leader Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic.

Demands made by the For Yugoslavia coalition in negotiations on a new federal government prompted outgoing deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus to send a letter last week to Vojislav Kostunica, Zoran Djindjic, and his outgoing "boss," Zoran Zizic. Labus said he was taking a well-deserved vacation, asking them to inform him once farcical negotiations were finished. Otherwise exhibiting a very high degree of outward calm (in which he outdone only by Vojislav Kostunica), Labus sent a copy of the letter to the media. Thus the public and scandal lovers could learn that over the past months Labus was in fact doing Zoran Zizic's job. Zizic responded by saying that whatever Labus did, he did "reasonably properly," and that Labus was working for him and on his orders. It appears that the reason for this exchange was the Socialist People's Party's demand for control of the finance ministry and foreign economic cooperation. In any case it was a bit too much -- not because of a lack of qualifications and expertise, but for two reasons: Djukanovic's Montenegro long ago stopped financing the federal state and foreign funding was supposed to begin to arrive.

Slobodan Samardzic, an expert on federalism and political communities and an aide to Vojislav Kostunica, has noted that Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic readily jumped into the space created by the disputes inside the DOS, and between the DOS and For Yugoslavia. After having subsided for several months, the campaign in favor of an independent Montenegro was revived once more. Milo Djukanovic, Montenegrin Premier Filip Vujanovic and Djukanovic's aide, Miodrag Vukovic, added to the already brutal exchanges by announcing a referendum on independence would be held next March, that future negotiations on the federation should be held between republic governments, Djindjic's and Djukanovic's, that forming a new federal government was "only aggravating the situation and delaying the unavoidable," trying to resurrect something (Yugoslavia) "destined to doom" and a "useless effort." Compared to the intensity of the disputes inside the DOS, the responses to these statements were not at all expected. A new federal government will be formed, and all involved in this task say that its objective will be preserving Yugoslavia's membership in international institutions and drafting a joint platform for a constitutional restructuring of the joint country. When Montenegrin Premier Filip Vujanovic said talks between the two governments (which were not scheduled) "will demonstrate in a quality, clear and acceptable way, the need to regulate mutual relations in the terms of an alliance of two independent, internationally recognized states," Zoran Djindjic responded by saying, "I am quite exhausted by Montenegro's constant haggling." He added that since everybody agrees that a referendum on Montenegro's status is needed, it should finally be organized, instead of being constantly brought up and then postponed. Appearing offended, Milo Djukanovic replied that Serbia cannot and will not determine when Montenegro will make its decisions.

In the middle of an unbearably muggy and hot summer, the citizens of Yugoslavia are trying to guess what will happen next. Slobodan Samardzic says there are two possible ways out. The ruling DOS coalition, For Yugoslavia and all Serbian opposition parties are in favor of a federation with a minimum of common functions – human rights, foreign affairs, defense, basics of the economic system, and transportation and communications. The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro want complete independence. Djukanovic's Democratic Party of Socialists favors a "divorce" followed by an "open marriage." In other words, the ultimate decision will depend on whether the Djukanovic party will accept a platform on redefining relations in the federation. In any other event there will be no Yugoslavia. Even if the Socialist People's Party, in the next few months, wins over a majority of the electorate, this will not eliminate the fact that Montenegro is deeply divided politically. In that event, says Samardzic, only the protagonists on the political stage will change.

Judging by his speech on July 13, Montenegro's Insurrection Day, Milo Djukanovic is doing his best to attract more traditional voters. As he interpreted it, 60 years ago, on July 13, 1941, during World War 2, Montenegrin communists renewed Montenegro's independence, after falling to pressure from supporters of Serb hegemony in 1918. This revisionist view would not be interesting if it did not indirectly confirming political analysts' claims that, over the past several years, the Montenegrin president has completely exhausted his popular support, and that the two sister parties -- the Democratic Party of Socialists and the Socialist People's Party -- remain firmly rooted in their respective segments of the electorate. Over the past decade not a single authentic political party has sprouted in the shadow of the two factions of former communists.

As far as Serbia is concerned, there is a degree of indifference in regard to the issue of Montenegro's independence. The public is more interested in its daily affairs, in which very little has changed for the better since Milosevic's regime fell eight months ago. A distant second place on the interest scale is held by the issue of when the DOS will fall apart and what factions will remain. The four basic groups -- Djindjic's Democratic Party and its satellites, the Democratic Party of Serbia carried by Kostunica's popularity, the Vojvodina "autonomy-mongers," and regional and ethnic parties – have become clearly distinct, as well as is the undisputable advantage of the Democratic Party of Serbia compared to all other parties or coalitions. This is why the Vojvodina "autonomy-mongers" have become very impatient to resolve the issue of the province's territorial autonomy before some new elections are scheduled, despite a lack of any popular demand in that direction. The same is the case with Djindjic's occasional readiness to reshuffle the Serbian cabinet.

The next to last act of a Greek tragedy, the peripety, was frequently resolved by a deus ex machina, divine intervention in the plot. In the ongoing Yugoslav tragedy, not even the merciful angels have proven they are up to that task. This is why, regardless of how paradoxical and incredible this may sound, the only hope lies within the limits of human reason.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)