"Big Brother's" Protection

During the entire decade of its independence, the Macedonian top state leadership primarily and above all believed in the support and protection of the American foreign policy. That is why the seemingly "slow reactions" and "reluctance" of the young Bush's administration was received with fear and anxiety.

AIM Skoplje, July 14, 2001

In the mid this week the Macedonian Foreign Minister, Ilinka Mitreva, came to Washington in order to somehow "force out" the promise of the White House officials that the United States would send their soldiers to the future missions for the disarming of members of the National Liberation Army (NLA). Madame Mitreva did not manage to see the President himself, nor Defence Minister Rumsfield, nor National Security Counsellor Candoleezze Rise. She did see her colleague Collin Powell, the State Secretary, as well as his predecessor Madeleine Albright, who is now a private person and whom the Macedonian chief of diplomacy can only envy her time and interest for the region. Mr.Powell saw his guest from the Vardar river for half an hour, listened to her wishes and told her that the solution to the Macedonian crisis was a dialogue and, again, dialogue. He also pointed out that the plan for disarming members of the National Liberation Army (NLA) and a platform on constitutional amendments represented a very good basis for that. From diplomatic sources close to the American State Secretary the press learned of the decision to use political means so as to prevent the Albanian radicalisation, which would narrow the extremists' popular backing.

However, the American Minister was unable to fulfil the primary wish of the Macedonian state leadership: At this moment the United States can provide only logistic support to NATO troops. Anyway, 700 American logisticians were already stationed in Macedonia within the KFOR troops, which as Washington repeatedly pointed out, could be of assistance, if required. Another dilemmas also solved: James Pardew is the biggest political shot that at this moment President Bush can send to the Balkans as his personal envoy. It remains to be seen whether Pardew can be Holbrooke at his best.

Approximately at the same time when Mitreva was saying goodbye to Washington, the media carried the statement of the "brain" of the current American foreign policy, Candoleezze Rise, which will be much analysed in the coming days: "The US Administration sees Macedonia as a test of relations between the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union. Endeavours of the European Union to mediate together with the United States in the Macedonian conflict is a test of their future c ooperation". Encouragingly, Rise also added that Washington was ready to help the Balkans become a part of Europe as a peaceful and free region.

Statement of another influential lady of the American foreign policy was somewhat more global in character. In her report to the Foreign-Policy Committee of the House of Representatives, Elisabeth Johns said that "the objective is to eliminate the need for American constant presence in the Balkans".

Macedonia is considered to differ from Bosnia and Kosovo by its multi-ethnic democratic basis. "We believe that the resolution of the problem of Albanian minority would not require the establishment of international civil administration or long-term military presence. Once the political agreement is reached, the United States will support the operation for disarming the Albanian extremists".

In short, this is a framework within which the American diplomacy is operating in the Macedonian crisis. On the ground, in Skoplje, the media want to believe with all their heart that Bush's envoy James Pardew will be taking the conductor's baton in his hands and, instead of dialogue that could last till kingdom come, dictate the leaders of four major political parties what to do. On Friday they quoted in detail his warning that "they should seize this historic moment. They should act responsibly towards their country and its citizens. We are trying hard to help, we are looking for compromise that will help not only in this political debate that has been going on for years, but in the military conflict as well. We hope that the political leaders will make a truly historic decision for the citizens of Macedonia. If not, if negotiations and fragile truce fall through, that will be a tragedy both for the country and the region at large".

All those who were in two minds why was America reserved and disinterested for the crisis, can feel relieved. Because, a myth on the American determination to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia had been created for years. Washington reiterated this from the "highest place" during sanctions against FR Yugoslavia when the only American land troops had been stationed precisely in Macedonia as part of the United Nations preventive mission, and especially loudly and resolutely during the Kosovo crisis. Many believe even today that with its unusual congratulations sent to presidential candidate Kiro Gligorov between two electoral rounds in 1994, Clinton's Cabinet defined its relation towards developments in Macedonia in the second half of the nineties. Similar was the reasoning regarding the victory of the current President Boris Trajkovski five years later who, as a Methodist and American admirer, was to Washington's "liking" despite his disputable electoral victory.

And then, at the beginning of the crisis in Macedonia silence came from the other side of "the Big Pond". Such silence that it practically jarred on everybody's ears in Macedonia. In March, Prime Minister Georgijevski broke this unpleasant silence by a clumsy or desperate (depending on the point of view) accusation against America, which together with Germany made it possible for members of the National Liberation Army to freely enter Macedonia from Kosovo. Sometime later, in April, Collin Powell appeared in person to express in front of 11 Foreign Ministers of the region open support to the Macedonian Government and convey to President Trajkovski invitation to visit Washington. And indeed, Trajkovski arrived to the White House on May 1, expecting President Bush to openly label members of the National Liberation Army "terrorists". However, Trajkovski could read the answer of the American Government in the Report on Terrorism in the World, which was published literally on that same day by the State Department. The National Liberation Army was mentioned in the report, but was not qualified as the Macedonian state leadership hoped.

The confidence in America might have been shaken when the NATO pulled out NLA members from the Skoplje village of Aracinovo in which, as it turned out later, American soldiers took part. The rage because of this action of American soldiers erupted at the protest of thousand of citizens organised in front of the Parliament building the next day, on June 25. The American Embassy received a threat that indicated that something had to be done so that the Macedonians would not think that America has turned its back on them.

Several days later a "black list" appeared with names of persons connected with the activities of the National Liberation Army, who were prohibited from entering the United States. Also, the American President banned all financial transactions for the NLA from the American territory. The Macedonian public was impressed: finally, a step in the right direction which also showed the Europeans how things should be done! Only those well versed knew that Washington resorted to this least painful move just to restore the disturbed balance.

The Embassy in Skoplje properly refuted the claims of a German evening paper that American military instructors had been stationed in Aracinovo and that the true reason for such agility was to pull out both the instructors, as well as the state-of-the-art weapons of American production with which members of the National Liberation Army were armed. Be that as it may, the worm of doubt started gnawing at many Macedonian citizens.

However, that is no longer important! Many people think that what is important is that the America is here, ready to do something concrete. A few reasons are given why it took so much time and did not show much enthusiasm: first, the unwillingness of Bush's administration to reap what the previous administration had sown; second, the presumed rivalry with Europe and the intention to "put its foot down" in a Dayton, Holbrooke's manner once Brussels gets tired of futile attempts to persuade the Macedonian "warlords"; third, lack of any real strategy for the region. Conspiracy is not mentioned. To put it simply, all this "may be so, but doesn't have to".

ZELJKO BAJIC

(AIM)