Government Wins Confidence Vote, Generals a Trip to The Hague
AIM Zagreb, July 16, 2001
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has caused Croatia to go through a lot in the year and a half that passed since the change of government, but the last ten days or so have brought an avalanche of events that made everything before pale in comparison. First, several ministers from Drazen Budisa's Croatian Social Liberal Party resigned from the government of Prime Minister Ivica Racan, opposing the extradition to The Hague of two Croatian generals, Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi. The prime minister responded to that in an ostensibly defensive manner asking that a vote of confidence in the government be held, practically forcing Budisa to resign as well.
This sufficed to make the coalition government crisis the biggest one in its 500 days of office, but it did not end there. Just like in the Norac case, one of the generals, Gotovina went into hiding, and Ademi agreed to surrender to the international court. A protest letter followed, signed by eleven prominent athletes -- Suker, Boban, Boksic, Radja, et al. -- joined by this year's Wimbledon champion, Goran Ivanisevic.
Unlike in the past, however, the coalition government was sharply split over cooperation with the Hague court. The division was initiated by Budisa, who decided to openly speak out against the extradition of Croatian generals to the U.N. court. Racan took the opposite stand, not because he wanted to but because he had no other choice, and the Croatian president, Stjepan Mesic, sided with him, despite their almost everyday bickering.
Because of the decision to extradite the two generals, Racan immediately received international support, while Budisa's party was strongly criticized inside the Liberal International, and the Irish Liberals even called for the ejection of the Croatian Social Liberal Party from this organization. But a more thorough analysis shows that Racan was, in fact carrying out a plan made beforehand, given that for a month he did not reveal that indictments against the two generals had arrived and that he had sent a letter to The Hague objecting to their contents. This was revealed only during a brief visit to Zagreb by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, admonishing Racan for starting a debate on something that was not debatable (the government can only serve a suspect with his indictment before extraditing him to the international court, and the charges can be questioned or denied only before the Hague court).
But Racan was certainly pleased with the public criticism he was exposed to. It had shown to his coalition partners and the public that he did everything he possibly could -- even more than that – to defend the indicted generals, but, unfortunately nothing could be done. He continued with the same tactics. As we already said, debating the Hague indictments and extradition is not in the government's jurisdiction. Still, Racan placed the handing over of the two generals on the agenda, allegedly because that would give his coalition partners an opportunity to decide on such an important matter, but in fact he wanted them to share his responsibility for the move.
Budisa saw through this maneuver and instructed his ministers to vote against extradition, but they mostly ignored him -- one voted against, two in favor, and one abstained. Instead, most of them resigned, obviously in protest at being forced to choose between loyalty to the government and the party, and Budisa could not endure that pressure. He withdrew, explaining that he did not want to burden his party with his stands and force it to deviate from the coalition agreement, which to an extent fits the image of Budisa as a man who sticks to his convictions even when it is obvious they do not pay off.
But in his claims that he was withdrawing so as not to pose an obstacle to his party there is plenty of insincerity, because until the next special party congress, the party will be led by Jozo Rados, a man quite close to Budisa. This is to say that party's ex-president took great care to secure the party does not deviate from its course, giving it also more maneuvering space than it would have had had he remained its leader. Namely, the party would no longer have to firmly oppose cooperation with the Hague court, and could loyally vote for all government decisions, simultaneously demonstrating its right to a special stand, and thus continue safely to flirt with the center-right and the classical rightist parties. One of the party vice presidents, Josko Kontic, resigned shortly after Budisa in support of his views. But the Social Liberals managed to get out of the crisis, although it brought up memories of big schisms of the recent past, though the crisis this time around was basically provoked by Ivica Racan. Displeased with the fact that Budisa's party was expressing its views independently for several months and ready to stick out particularly when cooperation with the Hague court was in question, he finally decided to corner it. He forced it to choose between loyalty to the coalition and its rightist course, and this is why he asked the parliament for a vote of confidence.
Furthermore, he asked that the vote be solely about relations with the Hague court, and not the government's performance in general, so as not to leave any room for the Social Liberals to continue to declaratively support the government, while reserving a special position when cooperation with the ICTY was concerned. This is where the July 15 marathon session of the Parliament began, at which about one hundred MPs registered to speak, which is about two-thirds of their total number. Realizing this, Parliament Speaker Zlatko Tomcic said: "We can only play until Tuesday, midnight," because another, regular session was scheduled for Wednesday, July 18.
The term "play" was aimed at the Croatian Democratic Union and other opposition parties, which were against the government's recent moves, and which were joined at the last moment by Mate Granic's Democratic Center. Granic's party is discontent because the government was silent for over one month about the existence of the indictments, as well as over the letter Racan sent to The Hague, instead of asking for a consensus of all parties represented in the Parliament on the matter. Given that the government can hardly count on a 50 percent majority in the Parliament without the Social Liberal Party, it initially appeared that Granic could decide the fate of Racan's cabinet.
But, it only appeared so. The Racan government was not in any danger, even for a minute, precisely because it played the card of consensus on the Hague indictments, which Granic failed to perceive. Namely, much like the government, the Parliament also cannot discuss the indictments, but can only repeal the Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY, thereby automatically risking a clash with the world. Nevertheless Racan placed the sealed indictments against the two generals on the agenda, although indirectly, by retelling what his protest letter to The Hague contained.
He thus demonstrated that in the matters in question he was equally concerned with major national issues as his critics, but that the realities of world politics are such that no one can act otherwise. This sufficed to leave the most vocal critics by themselves, and those less loud to stick by the government. At least until the next crisis.
Marinko Culic
(AIM)