Devoted Neighbors

Skopje Jul 13, 2001

>From the beginning of the crisis in Macedonia, none of the four neighboring countries have remained indifferent to it. However great the mistrust displayed in local media towards the ideas, suggestions and offers for help coming from them, Sophia, Belgrade, Tirane and Athens are striving to prove that the well known Balkan philosophy summed up in the saying "may my neighbor's cow drop dead" does not hold true

AIM Skopje, July 5, 2001

Bit by bit, an idea of whose origins little was known at first, started surfacing during the weekend: that an international conference on Macedonia, similar to the one held in Rambouiller prior to the NATO campaign against FR Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, be held. In the first instant, it was said that the idea had come from the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and NATO. On Monday, the spokesman of the Greek Foreign Office, Beglitis, made it known that the idea had, in fact, originated in Athens and gained considerable international support.

At approximately the very same moment, the president of the Republic, Boris Trajkovski, met in Skopje with George Bush's special advisor James Pardew who, according to the official statement issued afterwards, rejected the idea of an international conference and, as smugly as is befit for a White House envoy, declared that all decisions concerning Macedonia will be made in Skopje and Skopje only, by those legitimately chosen to do so...Emboldened by the support coming from such a high place, president Trajkovski echoed Pardew's words at least four times during the next three days. For once, when incidentally prompted by the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreu to state his views on the prospects of an international conference on Macedonia to be held, say, in Paris... Still, there is little reason to believe that the said rebuff will prevent Greece from peeping over its first neighbor's fence or from its intent to offer its neighborly helping hand, when the time comes. This certainly is not the first time Athens has offered its "good services", be it in the form of proposals to engage regional military troops for solving the crisis or by hustling political solutions to the problem in the form of documents, open to debate before relevant political subjects in Skopje. Most political analysts in Macedonia believe that all diplomatic efforts coming from Athens boil down to an attempt to divest Macedonia of its rights as a state, like the one concerning the very name of the tiny Republic. Some local fans of conspiracy theories (more numerous than some would have it), believe that the Greeks had a hand in the production of the thriller entitled "the crisis in Macedonia" in order to extort changes in the Constitution and thus achieve their goal: force Macedonia to finally admit it carries a name it has no right to.

To be true, much of what went on since the beginning of the crisis played into the hands of conspiracy-devotees. Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria and Albania, for one. The local media persisted in allegations that the situation in Macedonia was one of the main pre-election issues in Bulgaria, although the Bulgarians themselves denied this. Now that Bulgaria and some other Eastern-European countries in transition are faced with a possibility of a novel development - the restoration of monarchies - it is only natural that the winners of the elections in Bulgaria themselves have something to say about the crisis in the neighboring country, an issue geo-politicians from New Zealand would probably have a lot to say about as well. Anyway, the media in Skopje reported on the intention of the leaders of the Simeon II National Movement to make a turnabout in Bulgaria's foreign policy towards Macedonia. Judging that the departing government had been unwarrantedly "active" and condescending, one of the strategists of the new authorities criticized the former Minister of Defense in Ivan Kostov's government, Bojko Noev, for his "undiplomatic" statements concerning the possible disintegration of Macedonia. The new message carried by the "king's couriers" now runs: it would be unwise of Bulgaria to assume the stance of a mighty world power, in any way patronizing in its attitude towards Macedonia. In other words, Simeon II believes that the situation in Macedonia, as opposed to plans for the military involvement of the international community in the region, should be resolved through political means. Significantly, official diplomatic circles in Skopje manifested little enthusiasm concerning the recent change on the political scene in their immediate neighborhood. Nevertheless, just so as not to leave the fervent fans of dark conspiracies empty handed (for the sake of the atmosphere, so to say), media in Skopje offered the public a recent discovery of the Sofia newspaper Trud: experts from the former Bulgarian Foreign Office, the story ran, had advised their superiors not to support the territorial integrity of Macedonia! The public was left in the dark as to the true nature of the suggestion: was it to be a mere pre-election stunt or a lasting orientation of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

As for Albania, the situation was altogether different to start with. Its foreign policy concerning Macedonia has been reasonably correct up to the present. As far as is known, the Albanian government has never swerved from insisting on a peaceful solution to the conflict. Nevertheless, from time to time, reproaches that Tirana was not doing enough to curb the radicals among its nationals living abroad could be heard. Once it became obvious that the influence Albania holds over ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia was quite limited, objections of the sort simmered down. Still, most Macedonian media dwelt on the prognosis that Sali Berisha, the former president of Albania, planned to once again seize control of the country, be it through peaceful or violent means. According to this dark conspiracy scenario, upon its realization, Macedonia was to be subjected to the threat of a permeable frontier, support of the NLA on the part of the Albanian government and the possibility of a civil war breaking out in Albania itself over the issue.

At the present stage of the crisis, FR Yugoslavia stands a good chance of assuming the role of an advisor worth listening to. On Sunday, media in Skopje reported that the Serbian vice-president, Nebojsa Covic, the author of the renown Presevo Valley peace plan, escorted by a team of Yugoslav Army generals and the Yugoslav ambassodor to Skopje, Biserka Matic, had a secret meeting in the capital of the troubled republic. Reputedly, Covic informed his hosts, Defense Minister Vlado Buckovski and two or three of his associates from the security forces, of experiences gained in southern Serbia. Claims carried by some news agencies that Covic had assumed the role of a mediator proved wrong. Nevertheless, Covic's visit was met with disapproval in the top echelons of Prime Minister Georgievski's party, VMRO-DPMNE. Previously, the said party had rebuked one of its most prominent members, President Boris Trajkovski, for his recent meeting with Covic of a similarly "instructional" nature. In the next few days, a newspaper run by VMRO-DPMNE accused the Social Democratic Union of Minister Buckovski of "scheming" with the Serbs. In an interview for the weekend edition of Vecer, a newspaper believed to be close to the ruling party, its top ideologist, influential Dosta Dimovska, exploited a benign, futuristic idea of ambassador Matic concerning the possible creation of a union to plunge into a tirade: " Macedonia is a small country, but it can nevertheless subsist as an independent and autonomous state. Good neighborly relations are welcome, but we refuse to agree to solicitude and colonial embraces offered by some."

As in the previous ten years, Macedonian foreign policy - regardless of who happens to be running it - seems to look for allies everywhere else but among its neighbors. At one point it is the USA, at some other Taiwan, then China... Connoisseurs of the local diplomatic scene do not even try to conceal their despair over the lack of any sort of a long-term foreign policy concept. More often than not, the faults of the neighbors, not their merits, are given preference. It seems that the saying about "neighbors and dead cows" is still more popular here than the proverb: " a good neighbor is your best friend" .

ZELJKO BAJIC

(AIM)