The Milosevic Extradition: Possible Implications for Kosovo

AIM Pristina, July 1, 2001

Ethnic Albanian representatives responded belatedly to Milosevic's extradition to The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, as expected, were in complete disharmony.

Announcements and press releases issued by parties and politicians were both late and routine, and lacked good insights into how the former Yugoslav president's extradition will influence the fate of ethnic Albanians and Kosovo. As opposed to the parties and politicians, radio and TV stations responded immediately, the same evening the extradition took place. They changed their regular programming and featured documentary shows, which viewers had seen millions of times before. Radio stations opened telephone lines to people who wanted to speak their minds. All of them could hardly wait to interrupt their routine schedules, but they offered nothing new and nothing particularly interesting on this special occasion. In this sea of information it was nearly impossible to take note of any really novel views, which is not to say that there weren't any.

Given all that we can say that despite their ostensible disharmony, Albanian positions were, in fact, quite uniform. Milosevic was indicted by the ICTY because of war crimes committed in Kosovo. All statements, however, stressed that he was handed over after the West applied strong pressure and made conditions, and for reasons Serbia found consistent with its own interests. What was at stake were huge sums of money needed for the reconstruction of the ailing Serbian economy. Some said Milosevic's extradition would finally make sense when a new era in relations between the Balkan states and peoples began. In regard to this, many people here have expressed strong doubts ever since the toppling of the Milosevic regime last year. Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic's pragmatic explanations and internal disputes over Milosevic's extradition only confirmed Albanians' suspicions that Serbia is still not ready for any degree of change that would question the goals of Milosevic's policies or face its practical consequences that had inflicted much evil on all the peoples in the former Yugoslavia.

People in Kosovo rightly believe that the first and most important test of the new government in Belgrade will be Albanians and Kosovo. In this sense not one bit of change has been noticed. That is why Albanian circles do not expect anything positive from Belgrade, at least not in the near future, which would help the stabilization and consolidation of Kosovo, regardless of Milosevic's fate. To the contrary. Since Milosevic's arrest last April, many analysts and intellectuals have been expecting Serbia, now enjoying international support, to be more persistent in its demands for the integration of Kosovo. This currently appears impossible to ethnic Albanians, but who knows what course the international administration in Kosovo will opt for in the long run.

UNMIK and international diplomats do not hide they are looking forward to a democratic Kosovo as part of a democratic Serbia, or, as they prefer to put it, of a democratic Yugoslavia. This is why many UNMIK measures, especially in the economic sector, are working in favor of preserving the ties between Kosovo and Serbia and return of Serbia's influence. In the sector of politics, the most illustrative example is the factual division of Mitrovica, where UNMIK for over two years has been tolerating the continuity of Serbia's legal system and separate police who, regardless of their uniforms and name, pursue Milosevic's policies. The same is the case in all other Serb enclaves. Ethnic Albanian circles have voiced their concern that many war criminals have found refuge there. On the other hand, the Albanian factor, did not display any organizational, creative or other capabilities in the way of seeking and creating ways for a gradual realization of the project of a Kosovo independent of Belgrade. Regardless of what ethnic Albanians think, as long as their representatives fail in showing an actual ability to rule Kosovo in line with democratic principles and friendship with their neighbors, their independence project will remain intangible.

These problems are closely linked with the handing over of Milosevic to the ICTY, and especially with his trial. In initial Albanian responses, two characteristic positions were noticed. One, slightly more optimistic, was expressed by Adem Demaci, and the other, rather pessimistic, in the Koha Ditore daily newspaper. After agreeing that Milosevic was sent to The Hague because Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic needs money to remain in power and heal the devastated Serbian economy, Demaci said that the trial of Milosevic will have great and beneficial consequences for Kosovo. According to him, "The Hague court will prove that Serbia has lost all its rights, even moral, to Kosovo. The trials of war criminals, with Milosevic at their helm, will prove that Albanian aspirations for independence were a realistic and fundamental fact for the stability of the Balkans and Europe." Demaci also added that "... thanks to Milosevic's extradition, the hegemonistic, fascist and colonialistic goals of, and acts by the Serbian state in the Balkans will be fully exposed. This will serve to correct certain mistakes the international community committed in Kosovo, because Kosovo's independence is the only solution that can ensure peace in the Balkans."

The Koha Ditore editorial, however, indicates that the opening of these issues will not happen that soon. It even claims that Serbia will try never to face the consequences of its former policies, over which consensus existed both in society and among politicians. According to the daily, the generally accepted view that Milosevic has been sold out could only be part of the truth. Although money could be seen as one of the main reasons, "...the young Serbian democracy has attempted to close yet another dark chapter in the history of the Serb nation. This is why no one should be surprised if soon the Serbs stop talking about the butchered bodies of Albanian women and children, that are being discovered across Serbia, and if they start viewing the Hague trial as a film."

The editorial's other point is that regardless of what the Serbs do about the crimes committed in their name, the Albanians should never forget what they went through and thanks to whom. "It is not the job of us, former victims, to tell our Serb neighbors what they should do. But our job is not to forget June 28 (the day Milosevic was handed over), and the truth. Since it is not our job to teach our Serb neighbors, it is our job to teach our children to always keep in mind who their neighbor is."

And let us note several other facts that should be born in mind on the occasion of Milosevic's extradition. If the arrests of other war criminals do not follow, Kosovo residents believe that the Milosevic trial will be a truly small step in enforcing law and justice. It is believed that some 11,000 have been killed in Kosovo and that over 250,000 homes have been razed or badly damaged. These crimes cannot be individualized unless the hundreds and thousands of Milosevics who perpetrated them are also brought to justice. Without that there will be no formal justice at all. The apprehending of concrete criminals, especially the Albanians' former neighbors, has been a source of daily tensions and has prevented the establishment of communication between the Serbs and the Albanians ever since the war ended. It would not be moral to expect spectacular trials to nullify the crimes and put to rest the souls of both the dead and the living in Kosovo.

Fehim Rexhepi

(AIM)