Milosevic's Extradition Causes Both Joy and Fear

Beograd Jul 3, 2001

AIM Zagreb, June 29, 2001

The handing over of Slobodan Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague (ICTY) was breaking news for all Croatian daily newspapers, even for some weeklies which managed to cover it, and in many cases the headlines were so big that they covered the entire front pages. The situation is probably similar in all countries of the former Yugoslavia, but in Croatia the event is of particular importance. Croatia always claimed it would organized the biggest celebration when this happened, although if Tudjman was alive he would probably be sitting somewhere in seclusion, pondering the consequences.

His successors in office have no second thoughts about Milosevic's extradition, although when considered more closely they also have reason to think it over. Among the first to make a statement following the extradition, Croatian President Stjepan Mesic remained true to his strong anti-Milosevic (and anti-Tudjman) rhetoric. "I will not shed a single tear. I told him back in 1991 that we would meet in court and I am pleased because of that. If they summon me to The Hague to testify, I will certainly accept."

Mesic also added some anecdotes about their last encounter. "When I was leaving Belgrade in 1991, I was even brutal with him. I told him the Serbs would hang him, and while being hanged he should think of me, and I will think of him." Zdravko Tomac, deputy speaker of the Croatian Parliament, is also pleased with the extradition, although in expressing himself he is not as sophisticated and skilled as Mesic. "The surrender of Milosevic to the Hague court is a great event for all victims of Greater Serbia's aggression." Although he was handed over on St. Vitus Day, the same day when 12 years ago in Kosovo he announced a decade of wars, Serbia did not extradite him readily and willingly, but because of pressure and personal interests. Milosevic became "the number one export of Serbia and Yugoslavia."

Tomac also said he doubted the extradition will result in the desired effects in Yugoslavia. "There are attempts in Serbia to blame Milosevic for everything, while preserving the legacy of his policies." This, according to him, particularly goes for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia itself, where his legacy is strongly noticeable. A similar view, though combined with an incomprehensible aloofness, came from Tudjman's close associate Hrvoje Sarinic, who for years personally delivered all of Tudjman's messages to Milosevic and vice versa.

Sarinic openly expressed doubt that Milosevic's departure from Yugoslavia will make it a democratic country, because, he explained, the DOS demonstrated by some its actions it was changing Milosevic's policies unwillingly. Coming from a man who was Tudjman's and Milosevic's errand boy, carrying to and fro their most secret and dark messages of significance not only to other nations but for democracy in Croatia and Yugoslavia, this is quite curious to say the least. But it shows quite well that many in Croatia are still looking down on the DOS and the "November revolution," despite the fact that by extraditing Milosevic, this revolution made the dream of every revolutionary come true -- the king is dead. Such an attitude was displayed by more or less all relevant politicians in Croatia, with Mesic being the only exception, who this time around hailed the handing over of Milosevic as a "mature and courageous" decision by the Serbian authorities.

There is, however, a good side to this snobbish disparaging. To analysts this is a sign that the contentedness with Milosevic's extradition is covering up another mood that could soon surface. This other mood is uncertainty over what this extradition will bring Croatia in the near future. Mesic himself hesitated to say whether Tudjman would have shared Milosevic's fate it he were alive today. He managed to avoid a straightforward answer by saying that dead people are not put on trial, and that, long ago, he distanced himself from the Tudjman policy, isolation of Croatia and the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Had he been asked, however, more directly whether the current Croatian government would have extradited Tudjman if he were alive, Mesic's response would have been even less convincing. Still more unconvincing would have been the reply of Prime Minister Ivica Racan, Parliament Speaker Zlatko Tomcic, Tomac or some other officials of the ruling five-member coalition. Their attitude towards Tudjman and Tudjmanism is much more cautious than Mesic's and they are very carefully weighing everything that could be of interest to the ICTY (first of all, the War for the Fatherland itself, both in Croatia and Bosnia, because as a result of a stupid automatism the 1993 Croatian-Bosniak war is also being referred to by this name).

Furthermore, the extradition of Milosevic will face Croatia with new obligations in regard to punishing war crimes. Namely, it is clear that the Hague court will now strive to balance the responsibility for the 1991-1994 war, for which the blame is now mostly laid on the Yugoslav side. This is why even before the former Yugoslav president was handed over, rumors were started by sources considered reliable by the media indicating that two Croatian generals and one senior police official would be indicted shortly. And they can hardly expect anything good from top government officials.

Even more so given the events that accompanied the arrest and trial of Mirko Norac. Because of this general, whose name is hardly familiar to anyone outside Croatia, Croatia was shaken even more than Yugoslavia over Milosevic. And this happened despite the fact that the Hague court showed much understanding for Croatia's problems with Norac, and probably deliberately failed to indict him so that a trial could be organized before the District Court in Rijeka. In the case of the two generals and the police official, however, this will not be so. Namely, if the Hague tribunal indeed indicts them, the trial would have to be held in The Hague and not in Croatia.

This is what Ivica Racan recently told a select group of journalists at a meeting likened by independent media outlets to former party briefings, asking them not to spread it further. Still somebody leaked the news. According to them, Racan said that indictments of those three officials could be the most serious threat to the stability of the new government and the country as a whole. Thereby Racan contradicted his statement given shortly before recent local elections that mass demonstrations organized by Croatian rightists against war crimes trials cannot destabilize the government, and will even consolidate it.

It turned out, however, that the rightists, probably thanks to the demonstrations, were quite successful at the polls. This is why the pending trials of Croatian war criminals could be a turning point, which, much like is Serbia and Yugoslavia today, will decide who will run the country in the near future.

Marinko Culic

(AIM)