Milosevic in The Hague: What Next?

Extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for war crimes committed in the former additionally shook up the present Yugoslavia and once again raised the question of the survival of the ruling coalition on the federal and the republican level

AIM Belgrade, June 26, 2001

At an extraordinary press conference on Tuesday, June 26, President of FR Yugoslavia Vojislav Kostunica in the form of a “personal confession” stated only one new fact: that in this country, apart from war and anti-war, there are also “the Hague profiteers”. Everything else is known for some time, especially since the spectacular clumsy three-day arrest of Slobodan Milosevic that ironically ended on April 1 (April Fool's Day). Once again ironically, Milosevic was sent to the Hague on St. Vitus' Day.

It was known that within the coalition of 18 parties that form the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) there were significant differences concerning the question of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal; Kostunica just revealed the fact that his Democratic Party of Serbia remained lonely within DOS. It is impossible to try Milosevic in Belgrade because of the external pressure of Washington and internal pressure of the majority in the ruling coalition. Among “the Hague profiteers”, politicians whose platform can be reduced to unconditional cooperation and readiness to make all kinds of concessions, even anticipate demands that have not been made yet, the trail is blazed by Milosevic's former collaborators and those who once negotiated with him. Kostunica refrained from mentioning names just as the leading dailies for some reason refrained from publishing the mentioned part of his statement the next day. Dusan Mihajlovic, the current minister of police of Serbia, and Nebojsa Covic, deputy prime minister of the Republic who is in charge of resolving the problems in southern Serbia, held high posts in Milosevic's regime. Among those who negotiated with him, the most famous is Prime Minister of Serbia Zoran Djindjic: his secret negotiations with Milosevic at the time of 1996/97 citizens' protests served as a pretext for breaking of the then Together coalition, while some Montenegrin media reproach him for two secret meetings with Milo Djukanovic in the past fortnight.

In last year's election campaign Vojislav Kostunica often mentioned that the Hague was utterly unimportant for him, he stressed that the Tribunal operated on political, and not on the principles of law and equal justice, but also – in the capacity of the President of FRY already – that Milosevic should first be tried in Belgrade, that the cooperation with the Hague was a necessity, but that it could take place within legal framework that would satisfy Washington, the Hague and domestic public, later that it could be regulated by a government decree, and finally that at least the procedure in decision-making on extradition of the indicted should be followed. The rest of DOS was not inclined to stick to rules, procedures and good manners. Kostunica said that counting of days until Milosevic's extradition by some of the leaders of the coalition was bad taste, and condemned the Government of Serbia for meddling in the affairs that in the democratic division of power were not in its jurisdiction. This remark refers to Djindjic's announcement that, should the Federal Constitutional Court suspend the implementation of the decree on cooperation with the Tribunal at request of Milosevic's attorney's, the government he was the head of would carry out the cooperation/extradition by directly implementing the Statute of the Tribunal, which was exactly what happened the very next day.

Zoran Djindjic acquired the epithet of a “pragmatic” politician thanks to his frequent change of stands, readiness to deny today what he stated yesterday and to act without special explanations and finally, agreement to work, as the coordinator of the election campaign of DOS, in favour of Kostunica's candidacy for president of FRY. Kostunica has always been more true to his word: indeed, his election campaign began with the slogan: “I pledge my word...”. This detail might point out to non-political temptations of these two leaders: the one and the other guaranteed with their signatures that Slobodan Milosevic would not be arrested in order to be extradited to the Hague; the question is who feels obliged more by his signature. From that angle the earthquake that is just shaking Yugoslavia can be interpreted as an (ab)use of Kostunica by his coalition partners: having failed to arrest Milosevic during Kostunica's absence from the country, they demanded his signature as the guarantee and they got it; when the attempt failed to reach the previous agreement with the coalition partner on passing the law on cooperation with the Tribunal, the majority in DOS and a big part of the Government of Serbia decided that Milosevic be extradited, threatening also that Serbia would “secede” from Yugoslavia.

Zoran Djindjic looked serious and resolute in the evening of June 28 when he announced that his government had reached the decision on cooperation with the Tribunal based on an article of (“Milosevic's”) Constitution of Serbia which prescribed that in case of discrepancy between the federal and the republican laws the Republic of Serbia was entitled to act independently, that the decision was already printed in the Official Gazette, that it had therefore become effective and that it would be implemented immediately... The session of the Government was hasty judging by the fact that some of its members appeared just before the decision was stated. At that moment Milosevic had already been on his way to the Hague, that is, he was in the hands of the Tribunal investigators – the whole procedure from the beginning of the session of the Government of Serbia to confirmation that Slobodan Milosevic was in the Hague lasted hardly more than a few hours. Zoran Djindjic stated that the reason for the Government decision and extra quick extradition was the decision of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia which suspended the decree of the Federal Government on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal until it decides whether it is in accordance with the Constitution, which is a routine procedure. The other reason is the donors' conference in Brussels and the possibility that the failure to extradite Milosevic may affect the amount of donations, negotiations with the creditors' clubs and therefrom – the future of the whole country. Finally, the Prime Minister stated that the Federal Constitutional Court was not working in the interest of Serbia, although Djindjic should be aware of the rule that courts work pursuant the Constitution and laws, and not interests.

In any case, the severest blow on Kostunica's authority could be the failure to establish legal cooperation with the Hague Tribunal which could not be achieved without the agreement of the Socialist People's Party (SNP) from Montenegro. Almost two months were lost in haggling, because that is how long it took for SNP to finally refuse to support the drafted law on cooperation in the Federal Assembly after consulting its voters. That is how DOS was forced to reach the decision on extradition which was celebrated by the entire world, which ended a dark period and due to which spokeswoman of the Tribunal Chief Prosecutor, Florence Hartmann, according to her own confession, had already drunk an undetermi9ned number of drinks.

Judging that the moment was exceptionally difficult, almost fateful, Vojislav Kostunica addressed the public late in the evening on June 28, assessing in the beginning that along with all the ugly heritage of Milosevic's regime Yugoslavia was facing a problem “which was unnecessarily and thoughtlessly created. Tonight's extradition of former president of FRY Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal, and the previous extradition of Milomir Stakic cannot be considered as legal and constitutional”. Ignoring of the decision of the Constitutional Court by the Government of Serbia can be “interpreted as a serious threat to the Constitutional system of the country” and the legal state, as DOS's platform goal “cannot be built on the absence of law. From the arsenal of Milosevic's policy which was indeed crushing for the state and the people, its least democratic elements were taken and revived: unlawfulness and making hasty and humiliating moves which nobody from the international community demanded, at least not explicitly”. Calm as usual and without anything dramatic in his attitude, Kostunica assessed that the necessary cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was in this way reduced to “mere extradition of the indicted, without any protection of the citizens and, finally, without any protection of the interests of the state. Not even the fundamental procedure was respected, as if somebody over here, not abroad, was in a hurry to meet the obligation imposed who knows when, how and by whom”.

With this extradition the Government of Serbia nullified even the minimum legal framework for cooperation – the decree of the Federal Government. In his short address Vojislav Kostunica concluded that “without hesitation, but with a cool head” it was necessary to face the consequences and prevent the worst, so this and similar moves would not seriously endanger the country, its citizens and the already disturbed peace in the region: “I will do everything in my power to prevent the worst and preserve the unity of the state, the interests of its citizens, and see that everything accomplished so far in cooperation with the international community continues on healthy international and legal foundations”.

That same evening two or three thousand Milosevic's supporters – his Socialists and Seselj's Radicals – protested in Belgrade Square of the Republic. State Television station (RTS) and a considerable number of electronic media which on October 5 last year overnight joined the winners this time “suppressed” all reactions that could raise any doubt about the decision of the Government of Serbia, the news was published that excavation of the first discovered grave of Kosovo Albanians was completed and finally Zoran Djindjic addressed the public. After repeating all the previous reasons for reaching the decision, with a slightly odd or at least vague remark that the Constitutional Court had suspended the decree of the Federal Government on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal for an “indefinite” time, the Prime Minister stressed that the difficult decision on extradition was made "not for our sake or that of our fathers, but for the sake of our children”.

Like in the case of Milosevic's arrest on April 1, the Government of Serbia manifested an awkwardness during his extradition that cannot be explained by publicly known facts. There are news that speak about Milosevic's resistance when he realised what was happening, others on the refusal of the head of Belgrade Central Prison to hand him over. The investigative judge in Milosevic's case Goran Cavlina, who has not distinguished himself with major results in the investigation in the past three months so that he has not even supplemented the indictment after “discovery” of mass graves - allegedly refused to sign the paper on “transfer”... There will be many such stories in the next few days despite the laconic statement of the State Department that Washington had been informed about the extradition and that it had left Belgrade to resolve “technical problems”.

Djindjic's Government obviously relies on the custom of the people to forget quickly and positive effects of the donors' conference, but also on the unity of all the coalition partners in it, visually demonstrated by joint facing the journalists in order to state the news on extradition that was underlined by public reading of the names of all those who had voted in favour of the decision. It is ungratifying to forecast further developments, but at least some parts of the outcome are predictable. SNP which had enabled the functioning of the Federal Government until the decree on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal will probably withdraw from the coalition which in view of the distribution of forces in the federal parliament leads to unsolvable paralysis of federal administration. The crisis of the government can formally be the reason for scheduling federal elections, but at this moment only Seselj's Radicals are in favour of running in them, and the Socialists are paying lip-service to the idea. Montenegrin parties that support Milo Djukanovic – including his own personal advisors – have already estimated that the decision of the Government of Serbia that violated the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia was the last piece of evidence that the joint state does not exist. Separatist ambitions, cooled by the fact that among the citizens of Montenegro there is not sufficient will for separation but also by pressure of the international community, have now got (or may get) an unexpectedly powerful additional stimulus.

The question of the moment and/or the immediate cause that will bring about the dissolution of DOS is on the agenda again. In the past nine months in power on the federal and four months on the Republican level this variegated coalition has manifested an enviable resistance to the attacks that were coming mostly from within, from the “politburos” of party leaders and their closest associates. The latest public opinion polls show that DOS has in the meantime spent a considerable part of the popularity that had brought it to power. The disappointment by the absence of any signs of improvement of the standard of living or readiness to wait for them until the end of the year at the most is expressed by 45, while 34 per cent of the citizens are ready to wait for another year or two according to the just published large investigation of the Belgrade Centre for Studying Alternatives (SPA). On the list of popularity Vojislav Kostunica is at the top far ahead of the others (the ratio of positive and negative points is 77:5) and much lower is the governor of the National Bank Mladjan Dinkic (54:11) and federal deputy prime minister Miroljub Labus (52:8), both known to the public as economic experts and not political leaders. Then follow Nebojsa Covic (50:15), Goran Svilanovic (48:13) and Zoran Djindjic who still gets high negative points (43:25).

According to the mentioned poll, Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia has the biggest support of the public, with the “balance in the black” (the difference between good and bad marks) 51. The only other parties that have the balance in the black but with a much lower ratio are Djindjic's Democratic (14), Covic's Democratic Alternative (11) and Svilanovic's Civic Alliance of Serbia (5). The analysts of CPA estimate that a general consensus exists in public on resolving the basic social problems, but there is a significant difference in the choice of priorities among the citizens on the one and the Government on the other hand. That is what the conclusion derives from that it is necessary that DOS “makes it clear in time to the citizens that 'there is no free lunch', i.e. that it agrees on priorities in a social dialogue in order not to clash later on more dramatically with the prevailing public opinion”.

A part of Serbian public will applaud to the Government and Zoran Djindjic for shouldering the burden of the decision to extradite Slobodan Milosevic to Scheveningen using summary procedure, a part will be concerned that the peaceful democratic transformation of Serbia after nine months requires revolutionary moves, and some will regret for ever for the missed opportunity to have Milosevic brought to trial by those he has grieved the most, and some will just shrug their soldiers at yet another proof of irresistible attraction of power and impatience of power addicts... At this moment probably the most difficult decisions await Vojislav Kostunica, decisions which may be described by the saying that you will regret it whichever you choose, of having to pay double, and similar such wise thoughts. In a sense, perhaps one can say that the President of FR Yugoslavia has nothing to lose. What his coalition partners will gain, they will certainly have to explain, one way or the other, on their own. Until next elections.

Aleksandar Ciric

(AIM)