The Return of Serb Refugees - A Humanitarian or Political Issue?

AIM Pristina, June 21, 2001

One of the "historically" most disputed questions in the years-long Albanian-Serb conflict was (and remains) the issue of the presence of Slavs in Kosovo. Two years after the arrival of NATO forces in Kosovo, which ended the domination of the Belgrade regime, the issue of the ethnic composition of Kosovo has been brought up once more. This time it involves the return of members of the Serb community who were displaced from Kosovo. Namely, in June 1999, about 100,000 Serbs and members of other ethnic communities left Kosovo together with Serbian security forces out of fear of being targeted for revenge by ethnic Albanians returning to their homes after having been forced out of them by Serbian forces during NATO's air campaign. The occasional act of vengeance, violence and crimes committed by individuals and various groups mostly against Serbs and Roma (although other ethnic groups were also targeted), motivated by personal gain (to seize apartments, homes, or businesses) have forced other Serbs (and people of other ethnic background) to leave as well. They went either to Serbia or to the zones in which they were dominant, creating enclaves surrounded by heavily armed KFOR troops and barbed wire. Northern Kosovo became the largest and strongest enclave, remaining only symbolically a part of Kosovo.

Simultaneously with the exodus of the Kosovo Serbs, debates on their possible return began. As part of two experimental operations code-named Trojan 1 and Trojan 2, only a handful of Serbs returned to certain villages near Pristina and the plan failed in producing the "desired" results. U.S. diplomats attempted to realize a plan for the return of some 700 Serbs to a village in Istok municipality, in western Kosovo. They reached an agreement with the former head of this municipality, but due to strong reactions, the plan failed even before its implementation started. The U.N. mission (UNMIK) which governs Kosovo, together with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and representatives of the Serb National Council formed a joint committee for the return of Serbs. In January 2001, the committee adopted a Framework for the Return of Serbs which after being publicized several months later prompted strong reactions by Albanian political factors. In the Transitional Administrative Council of Kosovo, which is Kosovo's government, a fierce debate over this plan began. One of Albanian leaders, Democratic Party of Kosovo president Hashim Thaci said that the framework envisaged "the return of 170,000 Serbs by the end of 2001." This caused a veritable explosion of discontent. International officials tried to reduce tensions by saying the claim was incorrect. The UNHCR explained that "the figure of 170,000 people is the total number of displaced Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro," and that no one was planning their return by the end of 2001. An UNHCR spokeswoman stressed that "officials do not want a new war in Kosovo."

Still the framework was not rejected and continues to be an issue over which international representatives and Albanian politicians are fiercely clashing. Representatives of Albanian political parties in Kosovo claim "conditions do not exist for the return of Serbs to Kosovo before general elections and inauguration of the Kosovo parliament," stressing that their return would destabilize the situation in Kosovo. The UNHCR head, Rud Luubers said "Serb participation in elections would give legitimacy to the future parliament of Kosovo," and that a certain, limited number of them could return before the vote. This statement, however, did nothing to mellow down the position of Albanian representatives either.

"This issue should not have been brought up before the inauguration of the parliament because there is no body competent to deal with its full complexity," representatives of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo led by "moderate" Ibrahim Rugova, said. Its chief rival, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, led by Hashim Thaci (the former political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army), says that "conditions have not been created for the return of displaced people to Kosovo because we do not have efficient mechanisms to ensure the security of all citizens." According to them, at this stage there is not a degree of relaxation of inter-ethnic relations that would provide for the return of all people displaced from Kosovo, even more so because Belgrade has not made any progress in releasing prisoners and finding missing persons." Albanian political representatives claim that "after elections a strategy for their return should be created by the Kosovo parliament, because only then can there be safety for all citizens." Representatives of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, the third strongest party led by Ramush Haradinaj (one of the former commanders of the KLA) say "there are no conditions for the return of Serbs to Kosovo before general elections, because the enclaves must first be unblocked and the hostages held in Serbian prison released, and only then can there be a debate on an organized return."

Albanian representatives rejected any possibilities of "new investment in the zones peopled by Serbs, because this would strengthen the enclaves and boost ethnic division of Kosovo." Having in view that the security situation remains fragile, international and local representatives are convinced that "in the first stage the enclaves should be consolidated and heavily armed KFOR and police forces would have to be engaged in their protection." Before embarking on the realization of any plan, they demand that an answer be found to "the Albanian population's fears that those responsible for war crimes could return together with Serb refugees."

The return framework prompted reactions by Albanian demographic experts. Some of them even criticized the UNHCR for "exaggerating" the number of Serbs in Kosovo. According to Yugoslav statistics, they claim, the number of Serbs living in Kosovo before the war was about 195,000. Since there are 100,000 left in Kosovo after the war, "where did those 170,000 come from?"

Be it as it may, international officials seem resolved to realize at least a part of their project. They are expected to begin with an experimental return project in the village of Slivovo, on the Pristina-Gnjilane road, but before that they want to obtain Albanian representatives' support. The latter say that they have agreed in principle with "the declaration on the return of all Kosovo's displaced inhabitants," describing as a "success" their transformation of the "framework" into "a declaration on the return of the displaced."

Brought up shortly before the start of the election campaign, the issue of displaced Serbs will persist as the most controversial issue in the Albanian-Serb conflict, and as such could have a great bearing on the upcoming vote. It appears, however, that international officials hoped they would kill many birds with one stone. The Albanians will be forced to support the return so that the Serbs would participate in the vote. Thereby the Serbs would accept participation in joint administrative structures, and the Albanians would have to recognize "the new reality" in Kosovo, and the Serb isolation in enclaves would end. This would, simultaneously, spare the international mission from critics alleging that it "assisted new ethnic cleansing while trying to prevent another." The issue is still open, and international officials are trying to find a solution that will satisfy all sides.

It appears, however, that the return of displaced Serbs (and members of other ethnic communities) is being transferred from the humanitarian area to the area of politics (or, better still, quasi-politics, as is frequently the case in the Balkans). Among the participants in the debate are not only politicians, but intellectuals and almost all media outlets as well. Serb representatives in Kosovo (and the new authorities in Belgrade as well) view the return of the displaced as giving legitimacy to Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo, and Albanian politicians as a threat to their aspirations for an "Albanian Kosovo" and a factor limiting their "acquired freedom." In short, we saw all this before, didn't we?

Besnik Bala

(AIM)