Return of Serb Political Parties
AIM Zagreb, May 25, 2001
In numerous analyses of the recent local and regional elections - which according to a series of criteria were in fact a variant of national elections on the local level - estimates prevails that the Croatian political scene has sharply split between the left and the right. In some individual opinions, like that of Stipe Mesic, the main thesis is contained in the assessment that the political centre triumphed in Croatia. Just rare ones have noted that regardless of the polarisation between the left and the right, these elections have brought a strong revival of the Serb political parties. In absolute figures they have won a larger number of votes than ever, so that especially because of the complex political situation in the whole country and on the local and regional level, their political influence will grow to the extent which was unthinkable just a few days ago. In a series of municipalities, cities and districts, the opinion of Serb parties on the desirable ruling majority will be decisive for creation of coalitions, just as in certain other regions, the opinion of the most powerful parties – Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) or Social Democratic Party (SDP) - on whether it will be better for them to make a coalition with each other or take Serb parties for partners, will create unprecedented situations that will be very important for future political cooperation in Croatia.
The turnout of Serb voters in all regions of return was extremely high, which is in contrast with the general characteristic of these elections in other regions where the abstention rate was extremely high. According to Vjesnik the turnout of Serb voters was about 80 per cent which is double the percentage of the turnout of other voters. In the regions of return - in former UNPA zones - Serb political parties won 40 per cent of the votes, but it still has not been determined to what extent they will actually participate in power, because nobody knows what the coalition combinations will be like. The fact that also contributed to the high turnout and to the election success is that more Serb refugees from FR Yugoslavia voted in these elections and that they were better organised than before. This was greatly conditioned by the fact that both in Zagreb and in Belgrade the regime had fallen which had firmly agreed to obstruct all attempts of mass return.
Serb parties have crossed the election threshold in four districts. Djukic's Serb People's Party (SNS) ranks third in Licko-Senjska district where HDZ has traditionally remained the most powerful, while in three districts - Sibensko-Kninska (six per cent), Sisacko-Moslavacka (six per cent) and Vukovarsko-Srijemska (17 per cent) - the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) of Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic will from now have its deputies in the assemblies.
SDSS won majority of seats in the municipal assemblies of Kistanje, Biskupija and Ervenik in Dalmatia, of Plasko on the territory of Lika, and of Dvor na Uni in Banija. In municipalities Knjak and Vrhovine in Kordun and in Lika, SDSS ranks second. In Gvozd SDSS also ranks second after SDP, and SDSS will also have a few deputies in Korenica, Lapac and Vrbovsko. In Eastern Slavonia where the concentration of the Serb population is the biggest, SDSS won the elections in seven municipalities while in Vukovar SDSS has achieved second best results (24.69 per cent of the votes) after HDZ which won 28.58 per cent. In these elections the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) won the total of 139 seats in the assemblies of municipalities and cities. In Eastern Slavonia the general success of SDSS among Serb voters was dimmed only by the success of Djukic's SNS which won just a symbolic number of seats in Borovo, Markusici, Ernestinovo and Trpinja.
"Generally speaking, SDSS and I as the president of Serb People's Council are very satisfied with the turnout of the voters of Serb ethnic origin and with the results the party has achieved", Dr. Milorad Pupovac commented on the elections to the Vjesnik daily. "In this way the Serb community is becoming an integral part of political life in the regions of return and an unavoidable democratic and constitutive element of local authorities".
His main rival on the minority political scene, Milan Djukic, president of SNS, did not conceal pleasure either. "We are satisfied with the turnout of the voters because more than 60 per cent of the voters who had the right to vote actually came to the polls", said Djukic. "We are surprised with the good results for instance in Knin where SNS ranks just below HDZ. We are satisfied with the results in Udbina where we won 55 per cent of the votes, but also in Vrhovine, Vukovar and Vojnic where we made it into the assembly". According to Djukic these elections, despite the good results achieved by the Serb parties, have shown that the Serbs still have not the rights they are entitled to by law. Djukic sees one of the arguments that speak in favour of such conviction in the fact that the Serb refugees who have gone to Bosnia and FR Yugoslavia were prevented from voting, and he also added that in many places in Croatia the Serbs went to the polls in fear because they still are not treated as equal citizens. Djukic also added that numerous sick Serb voters were unable to vote because the polling committees could not visit them at their homes as customary in such cases, and finally because there was an insufficient number of Serbs in electoral commissions.
The data for all the cities and municipalities are not known yet, but it seems that apart from four districts, Serb parties will be a significant participant in power in twenty odd municipalities and in the cities of Knin and Vukovar. The Serb electorate in Croatia, judging by the profile of the parties that have won votes, at first sight appears to be more rightist than ever. Both Djukic's and Stanimirovic's party cultivate explicitly nationalistic rhetoric. They were both founded on ethnic principle, they are practically completely ethically pure, what distinguishes them is that Stanimirovic's party is closer to the Serb Orthodox Church. In municipalities where Serb population prevails (Eastern Slavonia or some regions of former sectors North and South) the parties of civic orientation have fared pretty poorly. Even Suvar's SRP
- without doubt the civic party most inclined towards the Serbs - experienced a fiasco in the elections in the regions with Serb majority population and those where a significant Serb population lives. The reasons for such orientation of the voters are manifold and they cannot be explained solely by nationalistic charge of the Serb returnees.
Indeed, the election lists of majority Croatian parties, equally in Zagreb as in other cities or districts, consist almost 100 per cent of candidates of Croat ethnic origin, which is a specific scandal. Even the most democratic among them, SDP and HNS, have not overcome this ethnic centrism. This is certainly a reflection of the conviction of the members of different minorities that in politics they are considered second-rate people. Essentially this conviction has an empirical confirmation. After the election in January last year Racan's government has not paid much attention to the proportional representation of the members of different minorities - Serb inclusive - in the administration. Further more, in comparison with the HDZ's, this government has not at all accelerated the return of Serb refugees, in fact after the elections a tide of the arrests of returnees has begun, even of the Serbs who peacefully lived in their homes after peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia. The property is returned to the returnees with equal sluggishness, unsuccessfully and slowly, as at the time of the rule of HDZ, so the Serbs arrived at the conclusion that it was safest for them to vote for the parties with the ethnic prefix.
This is in fact a serious defeat of the civic spirit in post-Tudjman's Croatia. The problems Racan's government voluntarily failed to resolve will have to be resolved by it in a series of inter-connected deals under pressure of necessity of forming coalitions. Majority of agreements on municipal and district levels will probably be paid by concessions in the return of confiscated Serb property, reconstruction of the destroyed homes, electrification of villages and hamlets which have so far been without electric power. Racan is faced with quite a difficult dilemma – whether to accept in some municipalities and districts a coalition with the unpopular Serbs or with no less popular HDZ. The stake in the game is quite high: four years in power and the possibility to provide for a large number of party followers. The risk is also big: will the voters punish more the partnership with, for example, Djuro Brodarac in Sisak or with some of the local Serbs. It is easier for the Serbs in this game because from being absolute losers they have reached the position in which they have something to trade in.
Boris Raseta
(AIM)