Independence of Montenegro and Kosovo - A Long Painstaking Process!

AIM Pristina, May 4, 2001

Citizens, the public, the media, as well as Kosovo politicians followed with great interest the course and end of parliamentary elections in Montenegro. However, they did not have the same expectations and hopes. The Serbs and, perhaps, some segments of some other national communities wished the victory of the coalition for Yugoslavia. Their calculations regarding Montenegro date far back. Namely, they think that possible secession of Montenegro might open the way or make it easier for Kosovo to break away from Serbia or Yugoslavia.

If Montenegro doesn't become independent from Yugoslavia then the increased insistence of the international community would make it impossible for Kosovo to secede. On numerous occasions in the past month the Serbian politicians warned the Montenegrin President, Milo Djukanovic, that in demanding the independence for his country he should have in mind the interests of Serbia, as well as that such an act could pave the way for Kosovo's independence. The Serbian politicians from Kosovo were the ones who most insisted on this. The Kosovo public was informed in detail how the Montenegrin officials, including President Djukanovic, rejected this thesis pointing out that the status of Kosovo would be resolved within the triangle Pristina-Belgrade-international community over a longer period and that Montenegro could not be held hostage of such a process.

The Albanian and other Kosovo politicians did not compromise themselves so much during pre-election campaign in Montenegro. That means that both them, as well as the Kosovo public intimately did not want the Montenegrin coalition, which advocates the independence of this Republic, to score a convincing victory. However, they proceeded from the stand that Kosovo is a special problem and that its destiny could not, even partly, be linked to the development of relations between Podgorica and Belgrade. They came to a conclusion that the possible confusion in this respect might be very harmful for political and diplomatic actions for Kosovo's independence. On the other hand, the Kosovo public followed with great interest the course of the pre-election campaign and is eagerly expecting the possible outcome of narrow voting results. Despite the moderateness of politicians and political parties, it is widely believed that the secession of Montenegro would facilitate and speed up the process of the final disintegration of Yugoslavia and even of the Yugoslav idea itself.

It is assumed, perhaps with good reason, that the definite breakdown of Yugoslavia, could help clarify the future position of Kosovo. It is also considered that it would undermine the arguments of all those who see Kosovo's future "under Belgrade's cap". It is also considered that if two nations, which are so close by their ethnic origins, language, culture and history, as Serbs and Montenegrins are, cannot live together then it is absurd to insist on common life of Albanians and Serbs, even in a fragile state entity. Another argument that is used is the nearly two-year long war in Kosovo, when the Serbian regime tried to resolve the problem of the rights of Albanians by killing them and driving them out of Kosovo.

According to the assumptions of local and foreign journalists and analysts, which are widely used by the media here, the separation of Montenegro from Yugoslavia is aimed at making it easier for Kosovo to become independent also from the aspect of applicability of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which treats Kosovo as a territory under Yugoslavia's sovereignty. There are circles in the world, even diplomatic ones, that do not distinguish between Serbia and Yugoslavia, but that does not apply to experts and diplomats who adopted the UN Resolution 1244. Therefore, eliminating Serbia from that Resolution can also be explained as both actual and legal extraction of Kosovo from Serbia and its treatment at the Yugoslav level. That was precisely the prevailing thesis in numerous statements of diplomats that Kosovo will not be brought back under the Serbian rule. At the same time, however, this thesis implied the association that would be established between Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro, as equal entities.

A simplified explanation in this case is that if there is no Yugoslavia, there would be no legal framework for maintaining links between Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia. One of the possible interpretations, which plays into the Albanian hands, is the stand that if Yugoslavia ceases to exit the UN Resolution will no longer apply. Thus, Kosovo would remain somewhere outside, i.e. it would in fact become independent. However, Belgrade treats quite differently the legal and actual state after the possible separation of Montenegro. In an interview to the daily "Koha Ditore" and several other statements, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica stated that in case of Montenegro's separation Kosovo's legal position would practically remain unchanged. According to him, Serbia is a legitimate successor of Yugoslavia.

However, there are those in Pristina who do not think that things will be so simple if Montenegro becomes independent. They take very seriously the stands of great powers regarding the need to preserve the present Yugoslavia and think that the world diplomatic centres are mostly against Montenegrin independence also because of Kosovo. Therefore, they assume that New York and offices of great powers will do everything to prevent the dismembering of this Yugoslavia. But, even if it were to disintegrate, they would try to find interpretations which would make it hard for Kosovo to secede from Belgrade, which the Albanians are seeking to attain. Nevertheless, in case of Yugoslavia's disintegration they expect great powers to interfere so as to first place Kosovo under Serbia's rule, and then, to postpone as much as possible the process of determining the definite status of Kosovo. It is estimated that the independence of Kosovo is observed not only from the aspect of diplomatic calculations and other great powers' interests and relations between Pristina-Podgorica-Belgrade, but also from the point of safety in this part of the Balkans.

Fehim REXHEPI

(AIM)