Montenegro & FRY

The Fatherland Calls

What do the People's Party and the Socialist People's Party actually mean when they call on people to boycott the referendum and why are some officials in favor of allowing Slobodan Milosevic or Rexhep Qosja, for instance, to vote in Montenegrin elections

AIM Podgorica, March 18, 2001

A terrible prospect looms large over the Balkans -- "an insignificant minority, 25 percent of the electorate -- could make Montenegro an independent state with its votes." Initially, this sounded like a witty joke launched by the leaders of the Socialist People's Party and the People's Party. After the U.S. State Department, however, publicly expressed concern over the democratic attainments of the Montenegrin Referendum Act, the joke became a serious issue. The calculations are as follows: if 50 percent plus one of all registered voters vote in the referendum, one-half of them plus one would suffice to make Montenegro an independent state.

Such an outcome is theoretically possible indeed. But the validity of this argument that can be heard coming from various sides can best be checked by responding to the following question: does the referendum act offer a provision preventing "25 percent" of voters from doing so? This is not difficult to determine. It it enough for as many Montenegrin citizens as possible to exercise their guaranteed and unalienable right to vote and chose what they believe is right. They should do just that and this theoretical danger will be eliminated.

Let us view this same issue from another angle. Advocates of the joint state have been stressing that they intend to boycott the referendum if, among other things, the law did not stipulate that a decision on Montenegro's independence will be valid only if over 50 percent of the electorate votes for it. The match here is simple: it would suffice for the parties favoring the survival of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to enjoy the support of 30 percent of the people and their boycott operation is likely to succeed. In such an event, all those who have been living outside Montenegro -- who have been "advancing capitalism" by "temporarily" working in the West for decades – would become their unwitting allies. This long list of supporters would also be augmented by those who, enchanted by the FRY, left it during the wars for various international destinations without properly checking out. And by those who, for whatever reason, do not wish to vote. When threatening to boycott the referendum, the Pro-Serb and pro-Yugoslav forces in Montenegro, start from the realistic assumption that not even in normal conditions can a turnout be 100 percent.

In not so normal Montenegro, they assume that their vote deficit will from the very start be covered by the approximately 20 percent of those in favor of a boycott and who inhabit that special place between the voters rolls and reality.

Anybody who knows a thing or two about local conditions also knows it is no secret that if they do vote, the advocates of Yugoslavia's survival cannot prevent Montenegro from becoming independent. This is why their strongest argument rests on their belief that it is possible to avoid conditions of equal opportunity. They do not trust in the free will of the people, they trust in it being suppressed. As far as the stances of the U.S. State Department are concerned, they are nothing new: by boycotting the referendum, the Socialist People's Party, the People's Party, and their kindred partisan souls could create conditions in which more than 50 percent of registered voters will have to vote for an independent Montenegro to make this a reality. This is quite possible. The problem with the U.S. government's message is that it could serve as an additional incentive to such local leaders to take steps aimed at preventing the will of the majority in Montenegro from being identified and subsequently recognized.

Meanwhile, the Federal Constitutional Court has also determined that a provision of the Referendum Act saying that only residents of Montenegro who have been living in the republic for the last two years have the right to vote on Montenegro's future is not legal. The right to vote in the matter belongs to all citizens of Montenegro, regardless of their place of residence. This decision appears generous and full of understanding. The facts, however, are a bit more complicated. Namely, no one knows exactly how many people originally from Montenegro, and their descendants, are today citizens of Serbia. What is known is that they are registered as residents of Serbia and that consequently they exercise their voting rights there. Many of them, which can easily be checked, were senior officials in the former and current government.

During a recent visit to Podgorica, U.N Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Jiri Dienstbier said that regulations on who is entitled to vote in a referendum vary from one country to the next, and that in Montenegro those rules that do not apply to its situation should not be implemented. "If Serbia and Montenegro are a single country, it would be senseless for citizens of one state to have the right to vote twice in various parts of the country," he said, and added that he was not thereby passing judgement on whether the Referendum Act adopted by the Montenegrin Legislature was good or bad.

NOTE: when the FRY was formed, it was all right for the outcome of the referendum (that was subsequently held in Montenegro) to be considered valid if 50 percent plus one of those who turned out and voted were in favor. According to another rule, the right to decide was acknowledged to only citizens of Montenegro who had been residing in the republic for at least two previous years. If a decision entitling all citizens of Montenegro to vote in the referendum is made, numerous interesting things would happen. Thus, for example, former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and Rexhep Qosja, the leader of Kosovo Albanians, could come to Montenegro and cast their ballots because both of them originally are from Montenegro. If on referendum day all those who had left the republic in past decades came back everybody would be able to see that Montenegro is not as small as would seem at first glance.

On the eve of this fateful decision, as has been the case throughout the past century, Montenegro again fails to perceive the key issue: Montenegrin society has split simply because it never attempted to apply to itself the principle of free choice. The Montenegrin authorities missed a number of opportunities to publicly testify that the FRY, in fact, is the foremost example of what happens when you suppress free will. This void has been turned into a maneuvering space for opponents of Montenegro's independence.

Esad Kocan

(AIM)