Fear of Milosevic

AIM Belgrade, February 7, 2001

As of late the local public has been persistently critical of the lack of tact with which the new authorities have responded to the demands of the key international factors to extradite Slobodan Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal. This was for a long time considered to be the least important problem but when that caused the loss of the international confidence in our country and brought into question the granting of financial aid for its economic recovery, this issue became a top priority problem. If this policy of turning a deaf ear to these demands continues and the new authorities keep postponing extradition to some later date, this will bring into question their maturity and capability of running the country.

Ever since Milosevic's fall, virtually nothing has been done for economic upswing. The economy has fallen into a state of stupor and the latest developments are warning that such a situation might persist. The price will be paid when the foreign financial aid dries out. Thanks to this assistance Serbia has electricity and heating and its citizens receive wages and pensions, children - child benefits and vulnerable families- social welfare.

Supported form all sides for its accomplishments, the newly established authorities gave priority to political issues over economic difficulties. They toured the world fishing for compliments, forgetting that they would be valued more by their deeds than by their words. It thus happened that their results were the worst exactly where the world expected them to be the best.

This concerns the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, i.e. extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to this international tribunal which the Security Council had established with the view to personalising the responsibility for all that had happened in the territory of former SFRY and thus exonerate its people from collective guilt so as to bring them back onto the paths of international cooperation. The energy with which Milosevic was toppled dissipated and today's authorities have no strength to even evict him from the presidential palace.

The highest authorities in Yugoslavia responded to warnings from all over the world that Milosevic would have to be brought to justice that this problem was not the top priority of either Serbia or Yugoslavia. Milosevic's responsibility before the Hague Tribunal was persistently being shoved under the carpet as a mere trifle. This cannot help the former Yugoslav President in the least, but can certainly have serious repercussions for the citizens of Serbia.

This was clearly stated to Federal Deputy Prime Minister, Miroljub Labus in Davos and to Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in Washington. Unless Milosevic is aboard a plane for the Hague, the announced financial support for the recovery of the Serbian economy will not be forthcoming. Labus came back from Davos empty-handed. Likewise, the Governor of the Central Bank, Mladjan Dinkic, is having increasing troubles in concluding financial arrangements. They are both concerned about Yugoslavia's prospects to survive until autumn because the assistance is diminishing and the expected lines of credit are still wishful thinking.

The people from the Economic Institute have calculated that the country needs two billion dollars at the minimum, in order to start the production cycle and achieve social product which would guarantee 20 percent improvement of life by the end of 2001. Currently, Belgrade is the host of a two-week meeting with the International Monetary Fund dedicated to the formulation of this year's economic policy on the basis of which Yugoslavia could get USD 150 million in loans.

This amount is symbolic because it is far below the needs, but what is important is that it opens up the possibility for rescheduling the existing debt (which is in the range of annual social product of USD 12 billion) as well as obtaining a new loan. On the proposal of key international financial institutions, it is quite possible for Yugoslavia to succeed in obtaining an approval for the writing-off of the major part of its accumulated debt.

Talks with the IMF could easily prove a waste of time for both sides if the Yugoslav authorities keep insisting that Milosevic's extradition is of secondary importance for them. On the basis of what was said to the Serbian Prime Minister in Washington it became clear that the responsibility of Milosevic and his associates is of primary importance for USA. Djindjic was clearly told that the American support in the IMF would not be given if the Yugoslav authorities failed to show by March 31, that they would let the international judicial authorities decide on the responsibility of the former Yugoslav leader.

This deadline has long been common knowledge and the fact that the Yugoslav authorities have turned a deaf ear to this request can be considered one of the most serious setbacks of the new authorities that wrongly assumed that the international factors would let them haggle over their request. Now probably everybody is aware of what the new government should do and whether Milosevic will be indicted and punished for the committed war crimes or not will be up to the Hague Tribunal to decide. The worst scenario will be if the new Government decides to wait until the eleventh hour to meet the set requests. In that case, precious time will be lost and this will result in slower economic development than that necessary and anticipated.

Some analysts of Yugoslav developments are surprised by how unresponsive the Yugoslav authorities are to these external requests. Such an attitude is in part to blame for deflation of the initial enthusiasm of the international public and its doubts that are manifest in the question whether only personnel changes have been effected in Yugoslavia.

The demands for Milosevic to be brought before the Hague Tribunal went hand in hand with these increased doubts. The concerned international public would like to have in its hands the key to the cell in which the former Yugoslav President should be placed. There are at least two reasons for that. One is the mistrust towards the Yugoslav authorities and their capability to sentence Milosevic and even if they do so, the locks of Yugoslav prisons are less safe. The second is to be found in the fears of the Yugoslav milieu of Milosevic at large as the President of the strongest opposition party in Serbia. While this fear exists, all efforts aimed at building international confidence are doomed in advance.

According to the assessment and position of the international factors, controlling the Balkan critical area would require Milosevic's isolation and removal of even the slightest possibility for his political comeback. If this is known, then it is difficult to explain why the new authorities have been so restrained so far in executing their commitments to foreign judicial institutions. The only explanation could be that there is no man courageous enough in Serbia to dare arrest Milosevic or, perhaps, the authorities wish, by keeping him seemingly at large to frighten the public with his possible return and thus remove the butt of criticism voiced against their own weaknesses. But this may prove to be a too high a price to pay for the country's future and its economic recovery.

Ratomir Petkovic

(AIM)