The Government's Plan for the Crisis in Southern Serbia

Beograd Feb 20, 2001

What Do the Ethnic Albanians Get?

AIM Belgrade, Feb. 12, 2001

Officials of the Yugoslav and Serbian governments and representatives of the ethnic Albanian community in the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja are supposed to start talks in the Bujanovac municipal assembly building on finding a peaceful solution for the crisis in southern Serbia. If nothing changes, that is.

The government in Belgrade has offered a concrete three-stage plan. Phase One envisages the integration of the ethnic Albanians into political and social life in Serbia, with due respect for their human rights, in line with European standards. This includes the following: the ethnic structure of state services, state-run businesses and social services should reflect the ethnic structure of the population; ethnic Albanians should have an adequate number of representatives in municipal councils, as well as in the Serbian government; after changes are made to Serbian election and local self-government laws, ethnic Albanians should also have aldermen at the local level and deputies in the Serbian Legislature, and the police should have mixed patrols consisting of equal number of Serbs and Albanians. In exchange the ethnic Albanians are asked to abandon any plans for autonomy, some form of special status or changing Serbia's borders. The integration of the Albanian ethnic community into a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society should start immediately.

Eight months after the agreement is signed, 50 percent of the plan should be completed, and the complete integration of ethnic Albanians will be accomplished within two years, and one-third of it during this year.

Phase Two, which is supposed to last four months, envisages the establishment of peace and security in the region of southern Serbia, a complete and lasting cessation of terrorist activities, disarmament of extremists and the disbanding of their organization. In this phase additional military and police forces should withdraw, regular multi-ethnic local police should take over, roads should be unblocked and those who took part in armed clashes should be exempt from prosecution. Protection of citizens, settlements and communications should be achieved through adequate police measures and police should be prepared to launch anti-terrorist actions. This should be accompanied by a gradual narrowing or the abolition of the Ground Safety Zone and deployment of an adequate number of police and military units in the zone, in accordance with the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement and with permission from KFOR. Security and peace in Lucane and Veliki Trnovac should be verified and guaranteed by KFOR. Extremists should leave Lucane, but special police are supposed to do the same, being replaced by local police, whereas the Yugoslav army would withdraw its tanks and heavy artillery from the Veliki Trnovac-Lucane line, and from the vicinity of Bujanovac and Presevo. Displaced people from all ethnic groups would return to their homes, and would retake possession of their property in the presence of state officials.

The Bujanovac-Gnjilane road would be unblocked, and local police would establish a checkpoint at the exit from Konculj in the direction of Kosovo.

In Phase Three, officials would proceed with the economic and social revitalization of the region, including the accommodation of the people displaced from Kosovo and Metohija, development of agriculture and lumber manufacturing, construction of roads, water supply infrastructure, power and telephone lines in all villages, repair of 527 Serb houses to accommodate 2,300 exiles from Kosovo and Metohija, and compilation of a list of all abandoned ethnic Albanian houses and their repair, to accommodate all displaced Albanians willing to return. The deadline for this phase is three years, and it will mostly depend on foreign aid, which has been announced.

The governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia have also proposed that the international community take part in resolving the crisis in southern Serbia, not as a mediator, however, but as an initiator of the future talks, a guarantor of the agreement and an important factor in its implementation. Ethnic Albanian leaders, who by the way do not speak of dialogue or talks but of negotiations, insist on international mediators. Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic, and not only he, resolutely refutes this by saying that "a government cannot negotiate with its own citizens, and this is what the ethnic Albanians from southern Serbia are; it can talk and make agreements with them, and this process does not require mediators."

The plan of the Serbian authorities received full support from the international community from Brussels, to Moscow, to Washington, but not from all political factors in Serbia and, for the time being, not from all ethnic Albanian representatives in southern Serbia.

In their initial reactions, the Albanians flatly refused the "Covic Plan," named after Serbian Vice Premier Nebojsa Covic, the most publicly visible government representative in the crisis region. The Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (LAPMB) did that claiming that the Albanians would not settle for less than the joining of the Presevo Valley to Kosovo, noting that they would "mercilessly fight with all means available" against the enforcement of the plan, because "the freedom fighters did not arm themselves to gain a handful of seats in local assemblies, to participate in the Serbian Legislature, or put on the dirty uniforms of the criminal Serbian police." According to a press release, the objective of their struggle is "to free ourselves from Serbia once and for all, and to return where we belong to, together with Kosovo." One of the ethnic Albanian separatist leaders, commander Spetimi, however, denied that the proposal of the Serbian and Yugoslav governments had been entirely rejected: "For us the only unacceptable part of the plan is the partial demilitarization of the region. We want complete demilitarization," he said, adding that negotiations would also be acceptable with the participation of the international community, which should guarantee the implementation of the agreement, if it is reached."

Political leaders of the ethnic Albanians inhabiting the municipalities of Medvedja, Presevo and Bujanovac, together with LAPMB representatives, said the proposal from Belgrade "contains elements that could serve as basis for negotiations," and therefore have decided to form a group for negotiations that should consist of two representatives of Albanian political parties from Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac, two representatives of the Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac Political Council and three representatives of the LAPMB, leaving open the possibility of independent ethnic Albanian representatives joining the team and the drawing up a platform as well. Riza Halimi, president of the Party for Democratic Action and Presevo mayor, not hiding his pleasure that the term "terrorists" had been replaced by the term "armed Albanians," explains that "we have our platform based on the 1992 referendum." Recalling that back then the ethnic Albanians voted that in the event of changes to the boundaries within the former Yugoslavia, the region of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac should be joined to Kosovo, he adds that "our views differ much from those of Belgrade, but we will get closer and will resolve such disputes that arise in the process." The president of the Party for Democratic Unification of Albanians, Zeqirja Fazliu, believes that joining these three municipalities to Kosovo would be the best solution, but given the position of the international community, advocates the finding of a solution within the existing borders. "We are aware that we are separated from our homeland, Kosovo. If there is no agreement, we will not resort to violence. We will exercise our rights here where we are, we'll find a solution. I think we have experienced enough bitterness, both of us, but Albanians a little more."

To "state" negotiators who expect a final Albanian answer in several days at the latest, according to Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic, the makeup of the Albanian delegation does not pose a major problem despite criticism from the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party, which claim this is proof of their readiness "to negotiate with terrorists." "If Albanians from southern Serbia believe they should be represented by LAPMB fighters, that is their decision. The important thing is to have people who can do something to resolve the problems at the negotiating table," says the Serbian premier, adding that the extremists' rejection of the plan for southern Serbia is in fact the private opinion of some people and not the official stance of those who speak on behalf on the municipalities of Bujanovac and Presevo. "We are doing our best to resolve the problem peacefully. If, of course, someone does not want a peaceful solution, than he is giving us a free hand to resort to other measures."

Nebojsa Covic, coordinator of the Yugoslav and Serbian governments, stresses that Serbia does not want war, and that "it is important for everyone to see who in fact wants war and who is refusing something that he hasn't even seen or examined." Ethnic Albanian political parties are parties from this country, parties of Serbia and Yugoslavia." Explaining his program he warned that "all those who think that the plan we have offered can end the crisis in southern Serbia overnight are not realistic."

Now it is up to the Albanians from southern Serbia to act. The new Serbian authorities have offered them an agreement on coexistence. After many years someone in this region is truly attempting to resolve a crisis peacefully. The importance of making public the views of ethnic Albanian political representatives is underlined by Rasim Ljajic, federal minister of ethnic minorities, the state official who in addition to Nebojsa Covic is the most active in trying to settle situation in southern Serbia. He recently warned that "if this plan is flatly refused, if the very idea of sitting at the negotiating table and discussing ways to resolve the crisis is rejected outright, then we will have the diplomatic upper hand and a more concrete response from the international community should be expected. It might even support a sort of intervention in which care will be taken to not cause civilian casualties or material destruction. The campaign would be exclusively focused on military strongholds which pose a constant threat," said Ljajic.

According to the latest reports, Covic will be visiting Brussels at the middle of this week, where at NATO's invitation he will present the Serbian authorities' plan for the crisis. So far, NATO has indirectly supported negotiations. The plan of action in the event the ethnic Albanians reject dialogue will depend on how the talks proceed. In any case, Serbia is fed up with fighting, and the presence of the army and police in southern Serbia costs much and prevents the new authorities from making major moves aimed at pulling the country out of the crisis.

Tatjana Stankovic

(AIM)