The Gaza Strip in Mitrovica

Pristina Feb 17, 2001

AIM Mitrovica, February 4, 2001

"Mitrovica resembles the Gaza Strip," one journalist wrote in a report recently sent from this town, divided in two by the Ibar River, but also by numerous troops deployed to prevent clashes between the Serbs from the town's northern half, and the ethnic Albanians from the south. To a person visiting the town for the first time, such a report could seem like a selling ploy, but the tear gas and the smoke coming from the burning tires is not all that different from the tear gas and smoke in the Gaza Strip. The end of January and the beginning of February again saw an escalation of violence and bloodshed. A 15-year- old Albanian boy was killed in an explosion in the northern part of the town, in a district called Bosnjacka Mahala with a mixed population. The killing was like all the others that usually happen in Mitrovica. Nobody every knows who is behind the clashes, but after they happen, the embattled sides are counting their casualties, and peacekeepers who are in charge of preventing the clashes hasten to announce that they "are in the process of creating a new strategy for establishing peace."

Still, in this case they accused the local Serbs of starting the clash. Reports from the town said that a fight between a group of Serbs and a group of young Albanians caused everything. KFOR soldiers who prevented the fight from spreading were shot at by a group of Serbs who fled the site of the incident in a car. After the car was found in front of the seat of the Mitrovica Serb National Council, several weapons were discovered in the building. The following day, several ethnic Albanians "taught" several Serbs "a lesson." On the third day, a large group of Serbs entered Bosnjacka Mahala to show the locals "who's in charge." During the clash hand grenades were thrown, one of which killed the boy. A day after the 15-year-old was killed, hundred of Albanians took to the streets to protest, and the demonstrations turned into violent riots. The angry demonstrators vented their fury on French KFOR soldiers, whom they accuse of indifference, even of being pro-Serb. Witnesses to the murder in Bosnjacka Mahala claim that "everything took place in the presence of French peacekeepers, who did nothing to prevent it." Several military vehicles displaying French flags were set on fire, and the peacekeepers fired tear gas and lobbed stun grenades to disperse the crowd, which hurled stones and other objects at the Maison de France, the building housing a part of the KFOR troops in the town, smashing all its windows. The night brought some order to the streets, but on the new day the riots continued.

The peacekeepers took additional security measures and introduced a curfew in the so-called zone of trust. This did not help much. Thousands of people gathered again to protest, hurling stones and Molotov cocktails at French soldiers, who again responded with tear gas and stun grenades. The result of the second day of riots was over 100 injured civilians and 22 injured soldiers. On the next day, KFOR dispatched four battalions to the town as reinforcements. In the morning, on the bridge across the Ibar, which is the line of demarcation, Italian Carabinieri were deployed, together with British, German, Italian and Turkish troops positioned in other parts of the town. Several hundred demonstrators gathered near the bridge and distributed flowers to Carabinieri. For the French, however, they only had stones. Although not too many French were seen in the town, the Maison de France and the Adriatic Hotel, where they are accommodated, were again targeted by the demonstrators. This time the British used tear gas, rubber bullets and even trained dogs to protect their French colleagues. The town was engulfed in chaos for several days and the crowd refused to listen to the calls of international representatives and their local leaders. The latter said "the fury of the citizens was justified," and explained their disobedience by the fact that "we have promised them many times that we will resolve the problem, but have failed to do anything." They even warned international representatives that their credibility was about to be exhausted.

The situation began to calm down only after Kosovo administrator Hans Haekkerup, KFOR Commander Carlo Cabigiosu, representatives of three Albanian parties and the commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps, Agim Ceku, arrived in Mitrovica from Pristina. After a meeting held behind closed doors, the officials announced that they would take new steps to resolve the problem in Mitrovica. They underlined that additional security measures would be introduced, that the zone of trust would be expanded and freedom of movement secured for all, that all displaced persons would return to their homes and that functional administrative structures would be built. They called on the citizens to help restore peace and order because, as their joint declaration said, "stabilization of the southern part of the town is a precondition for stabilization of the northern part." They even added that without restoring peace in the southern part, other long-term issues and the unification of the town could not be debated. It seems that the weather sided with the authorities, because it snowed the following day, which made movement difficult and ended the demonstrations. A fragile peace was restored in the town and how long it will last in "the most dangerous spot in Europe," as U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke labeled the town, remains to be seen.

Such events have become almost ritual since the town was divided in two. The soldiers of the French KFOR contingent were deployed in the center of the town in June, 1999, to prevent clashes between the Serbs and Albanians, and have remain to this day on this mission.

Still, they failed in preventing bloodshed. A year ago, individuals armed with rocket launchers attacked a UNHCR bus in a Drenica village in central Kosovo, killing two members of the Serb community, and provoking a wave of serious violence in northern Mitrovica. Groups of armed Serbs attacked Albanian families and at least nine people (mostly elderly) died in the clashes. International and domestic officials, from the Administrative Council of Kosovo, then adopted a "unified town" strategy. In line with this strategy, a zone of trust was established in Mitrovica, stretching several hundred meters into both sides of the Ibar River. According to the plan, it was supposed to widen gradually on both sides, but it was never accomplished in the northern part of Mitrovica. Whenever the peacekeepers tried to expand the zone, they faced resistance from the so-called "guardians of the bridge" (organized groups of Serbs who are believed to be controlling the northern part of the town). The then KFOR commander, German Gen. Klaus Reinhardt, appeared rather resolved to implement the strategy, but his mandate ended soon thereafter and his successors seemed rather reluctant to continue his plans. Sources inside KFOR claim that the strategy was never realized because certain French military circles were against it.

This is why after the latest riots in Mitrovica the measures adopted by international representatives to resolve the problems in the town did not convince Mitrovica residents and domestic observers that something will indeed be done. They said that similar measures were adopted a year ago and were never implemented. Susan Manuel, a spokeswoman for the U.N. mission, said "the plans were not implemented because of policy pursued outside Kosovo," but failed to specify who was pursuing the policy she mentioned. Her bosses, on the other hand, said they would do their best to amend their mistakes, and Albanian polit ical leaders said that matters were more serious this time around. A spokeswoman for the peacekeeping forces in Mitrovica promised "speedy results."

Similar promises were made on several occasions, but the trouble is citizens do not trust them any more. They even joke saying that "Mitrovica will not be a divided town." Peace was restored in the southern part of the town not by trust, but by hope which is said to always "die hard."

Be it as it may, one thing is certain. There is now little love between the French forces and the ethnic Albanians in Mitrovica. Albanian leaders, on the other hand, do not want this to spoil their "love affair" with KFOR because, as they put it, "this would mean victory for Serb extremists."

Besnik Bala

(AIM)