Sacrificed Dialogue

AIM Tirana, January 19, 2001

Leaders of two major Albanian parties, Fatos Nano from the Socialist Party and Sali Berisha from the Democratic Party met only once during ten years of the pluralistic life in Albania. This meeting dates back to February 1992, and was not held in Albania, but in Trieste, Italy, through the mediation of the Italian Foreign Ministry. It is assumed that the Trieste talks were dedicated to the soft transition of power after the pending elections, from the hands of the withdrawing former communist Left into the hands of the rising anti-communist Right. The change happened on March 22, 1992 when the Democratic Party won a landslide victory and a month later Berisha was elected President.

However, it seemed that the spirit of rightist revanchism, accumulated over the decades, trampled down the Trieste Agreement. At the local elections that same year, which were held only three months after the general ones, the Socialist Party and its President Fatos Nano played it right and recorded a narrow victory. From that moment, the country new only two majorities: the blue one in the central government and the pink majority in the local authorities. This fact demanded balance and co-habitation.

Angry because of the local electoral results, leaders of the Democratic Party in power moved into the opposite direction - away from co-habitation and the Agreement. President of the State Control Service, Blerim Cela, this party's exponent, staged a corruption scandal incriminating the former Primer Minister Fatos Nano and brought charges against him in court. In spring 1993 Nano was arrested and then convicted to 12 years in prison. The Democratic Party thought that the Socialists would slowly distance themselves from their arrested leader, but that calculation proved wrong, and produced quite the opposite results. Among the public, Nano won the status of a political prisoner and became a symbol of the Left.

Since 1993, under the pressure of political needs of the country, Berisha had four - five meetings with leaders of the opposition ad interim Socialist Party, who showed loyalty for their leader despite the fact that he was imprisoned by the regime.

The crisis of March 1997, which culminated in the opening of military depots and liberation of prison inmates, also forced the authorities into signing an inter-party Agreement which opened the way for joint broad-based administration, as well as to early elections. In that period, Berisha issued a decree whereby he pardoned his rival Fatos Nano. Upon his return to the party's headquarters after four years, Nano stated that if the opportunity presented itself he would shake hands with the citizen Sali Berisha. In other words, not with the President of the state or the rival party. It was said that Nano missed his chance of becoming a sort of Mandela because he did not heave the heart to do it and did not find it necessary to sit at the same table with his persecutor whose political star seemed to be on the wane for good.

Early elections of June 1997 were preceded by another Agreement, similar to that signed in Trieste five years earlier. This time too, the venue of the meeting was Italy, more precisely the religious community of Sant Egidio in Rome. Times had changed and the sides changed places. Now the Democrats were withdrawing and the Socialists on the offensive. The decisions brought there concerned the division of responsibilities between the majority and the opposition after the elections. Berisha did not take part in this meeting.

The Socialists won a sweeping victory in June 1997, but they did not honour the Agreement from St.Egidio. Thus, for example, although it had been decided that the President of the State Control Service would be from the opposition ranks, the Socialist majority chose a candidate from the party Balli Kombetare, which was represented in the Assembly by one deputy. On the other hand, the Democratic Party, which was in the opposition, decided to boycott the institutions, which have resulted from these elections.

Berisha rejected the Prime Minister's invitation to join him at the Donor Conference for Albania, which was held in August that year in Rome. Berisha also rejected protocolary invitations of the President of the Republic to meet with him on the occasion of various anniversaries.

Their stands and tricks again made the issue of a true political dialogue in the country quite uncertain. Neither side lacked justifications for avoiding the dialogue. Each side insisted on skeletons in the other side's cupboards, whenever it came handy.

In September 1998, Prime Minister Fatos Nano resigned after the events, which followed after the murder of Azem Hajdari, a Democratic Party's deputy. A young socialist leader, Pandeli Majko, took his place. That December, Majko met with Berisha - an event that reverberated powerfully and positively influenced the improvement of relations between the Government and the opposition just before the war in Kosovo. But, the process was again suspended with the approaching Congress of the Socialist Party. Competing for the place at the party's helm and confronted with Pandeli Majko, Fatos Nano used his rival's meeting with the opposition leader as his warhorse.

"I am inviting him to leave the Democratic Party and join the Socialist Party" said Nano for the Socialist Prime Minister Pandeli Majko. Nano won at the Congress and the political life was again practically blocked and reduced to trench warfare between leaders of the major political parties.

Under this ice, meetings, talks, debates or inter-party round tables between representatives of the second and third level could not have produced the desired effect. Moreover, such meetings often resembled scenes from the theatre of the absurd, so that several weeks ago in a TV interview with a senior Socialist Party deputy Servet Pellumbi, while showing understanding for many problems, the old Democratic Party deputy, Pjetr Arbnori said: "The viewers should have no illusions, they should understand that nothing is in mine or Servet's hands"!

The lack of dialogue at the highest level was identified as the major handicap in the political-social life of Albania, as a source of tensions and conflicts, with serious consequences in all spheres. Due to this vacuum, the presence and role of the international mediating factor in the resolution of Albania's internal problems increased from one year to another and today can be considered of emergency character for a country that had not actually been at war. Western embassies, the OSCE mission and other observer missions from the Council of Europe and EU are constantly monitoring, assisting and promoting the country's democratic standards, primarily regarding the free elections, in an effort to avoid the collisions.

In the course of the last year, the presence of OSCE served as the only point of dialogue between political forces on the electoral process for local elections. Such an active role, dictated by the Albanian circumstances and accepted in principle by all political protagonists in the country, could not be spared criticism and objections for favouring one or the other side. Berisha as the chief of the opposition spoke several times about "nonappointed governors" having in mind Ambassadors of international organisations or great countries. But, Berisha did not offer any alternative regarding the ways of establishing a dialogue without the presence of the international factor.

It turns out that dialogue as such has practically been sacrificed and that two major political camps are in an abnormal situation of non-communication. Local analysts dealt with this problem constantly. Here are some of their observations: Berisha and Nano think that tensions, i.e. lack of dialogue, is the best way of securing for themselves the front positions in their parties and for their parties to remain fundamental factors in the national politics. Berisha and Nano do not see great problems in the country and, therefore, apart from rhetorically, they do not see it necessary to meet. They have no urge to meet. Their personal relations prevent and make their mutual dialogue impossible. They are unable to rise above all this and, moreover, lacked reliable and serious mediators who might have helped establish a culture of dialogue between the leader of the Left and the leader of the Right.

And while much time has been wasted and non-communication has brought all its consequences, the meeting between Nano and Berisha would now be superfluous. Consequently, there is no need for this meeting until new factors appear on the Albanian political scene.

Naturally, whatever the truth may be, the political life in the country is moving on and is in constant need of relaxed tensions, understanding, tolerance, mutual respect. The local elections of October 1, last year have brought to the surface a series of problems, which could be overcome by dialogue. If not, Albania is running a risk of sacrificing the next general elections, together with that dialogue.

AIM Tirana

Prec ZOGAJ